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 Editors' Preface 
 
 
With the present series "Comparative Case Studies on the Effectiveness of the OSCE High Commissioner 
on National Minorities," we are publishing the results of the five country studies on Estonia, Latvia, 
Ukraine, Macedonia and Romania of the project "On the Effectiveness of the OSCE Minority Regime. 
Comparative Case Studies on the Implementation of the Recommendations of the High Commissioner on 
National Minorities (HCNM) of the OSCE". A comparative analysis on the differing success rates and 
conditions of the High Commissioner's facilitation and mediation efforts in these countries will follow. 
 
The High Commissioner project was a challenging and fascinating task for several reasons. First, we had 
to deal with a new instrument of crisis prevention, one of the most innovative developments resulting from 
the international community's reaction to the shocking and for most of us surprising new reality of inter-
ethnic conflict and war after the end of the East-West confrontation. When the High Commissioner's 
mandate was adopted, there was little experience with how to deal with this kind of conflict. And when we 
started the project in 1999, there was no empirical in-depth analysis on the High Commissioner's work. 
Thus, we found a rather empty field and had to start from the scratch. 
 
Second, we had the privilege to deal with Max van der Stoel, the first incumbent of this new institution. 
When he took office, nearly everything that today goes to make the High Commissioner - sufficient funds, 
advisers, working instruments, contacts, experience - was not yet in place. It was fascinating to follow the 
straight-forward way this great European statesman used the raw material of the mandate and his own 
experience of a whole life devoted to peace and human rights to frame the institution of the High 
Commissioner to what it is today: an established and overall respected institution of European crisis 
prevention. Max van der Stoel and his advisers in The Hague have shown vivid interest in our project; 
they have encouraged us and have always been ready to answer our questions. We are very grateful for all 
their help. 
 
Third, it was a great pleasure for us to work with a team of young, motivated and talented academics in 
the countries analysed: with Dr. Teuta Arifi in Macedonia, Jekaterina Dorodnova in Latvia, István 
Horváth in Romania, Dr. Volodymyr Kulyk in Ukraine, and Margit Sarv in Estonia. They not only 
collected and analysed piles of materials in eight languages to draft reports into a ninth one, but more 
importantly, they enriched the project with their specific experiences, avenues of access and points of 
view to an extent which would have never been achievable without them. We want to thank all of them for 
years of work and devotion. 
 
We are also very grateful to Klemens Büscher, who worked with the project's Hamburg staff from the 
beginning of 1999 to mid-2000. The project owes very much to his superb expertise and analytical skills. 
And we want to warmly thank Kim Bennett, Jeffrey Hathaway, Katri Kemppainen and Veronica 
Trespalacios who have polished about 700 pages of English-language text written by non-native speakers. 
 
Last, but by no means least, we are especially grateful to the Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft, whose 
generous grant first of all enabled us to carry out this demanding and rewarding research. 
 
 
 
 
 
Hamburg, May 2002 
The editors 
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 Chapter 1. Introduction 
 
 
This study on the recommendations of the OSCE High Commissioner on National Minorities (HCNM) to 
Estonia was prepared in the framework of the larger project "On the Effectiveness of the OSCE Minority 
Regime. Comparative Case Studies on the Implementation of the Recommendations of the High 
Commissioner on National Minorities of the OSCE", comprising five country studies and a comparative 
analysis. The research was sponsored by the German Research Association (Deutsche 
Forschungsgemeinschaft) and was carried out from 1999 to 2002 by an international team of five 
researchers in the countries analysed, as well as by two researchers working at the Institute for Peace 
Research and Security Policy at the University of Hamburg. The objective of this study, as well as the one 
of the whole project, "lies […] in the investigation of the effectiveness of the OSCE minority regime in 
light of the implementation of the HCNM's recommendations."1  
 
Alongside the OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR) and the OSCE field 
missions, the High Commissioner on National Minorities is one of the main instruments for early warning 
and conflict prevention of the new CSCE/OSCE,2 as it developed after the 1990 Paris Summit. Because of 
its flexible mandate and its high degree of institutional autonomy,3 the HCNM can even be viewed as 
being one of the most innovative instruments. The basic stipulation of the HCNM's mandate4 reads as 
follows:  
 
The High Commissioner will provide "early warning" and, as appropriate, "early action", at the earliest 
possible stage in regard to tensions involving national minority issues which have not yet developed beyond 
an early warning stage, but in the judgement of the High Commissioner, have the potential to develop into a 
conflict within the OSCE area, affecting peace, stability or relations between participating States, requiring 
the attention of and action by the Council or the CSO [Committee of Senior Officials].5  
 
The instrument of the OSCE High Commissioner was formed and developed by the first incumbent, 
former Dutch Foreign Minister Max van der Stoel. He held the HCNM office from January 1993 to June 
2001, and Van der Stoel's name became basically synonymous to the HCNM. As his successor, Swedish 
diplomat Rolf Ekéus, took office only on 1 July 2001, this study will be restricted to Van der Stoel's work.  
 
The HCNM became involved in Estonia in January 1993, just a few days after he had taken office. Thus, 
he traveled to Estonia as early as possible, although this was fairly late when compared to other 
international actors. A wide range of fact-finding missions from the United Nations (UN), the Council of 
Europe (CoE) and even the OSCE had visited Estonia in 1991 and 1992.6 However, the involvement of 
the HCNM was the most consistent and long-lasting approach to the conflict between the Estonian 
government and Estonia's Russian-speaking population. Ultimately, he even outlasted the OSCE Mission 
to Estonia, which was active in the country between April 1993 and December 2001. The profound 
interest in Estonia of influential OSCE participating States, such as the Nordic countries (Sweden held the 
Chairmanship-in-Office in 1993), the USA and Russia was a crucial factor for the early and extensive 
involvement of the OSCE in Estonia. The fear that an escalation of the conflict between the Estonian 
government and the Russian-speaking population in Estonia might have wider security implications 
motivated the Nordic countries and the USA to engage the OSCE in this conflict. Given that this view was 
                                                 
1  Zellner 1999, p. 31. 
2  The Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe (CSCE) was, starting from 1 January 1995, renamed the 
Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe at the 1994 Budapest Summit. For reasons of consistency, the 
abbreviation OSCE will be used throughout this study, regardless of which year is made reference to. Citations are the only 
exception. 
3  On the HCNM's working principles and practical approach, see Kemp (Ed.) 2001, and Simhandl 2002, pp. 69-106. 
4  As the history and substance of the HCNM's mandate has been extensively dealt with in the literature, we can do without 
repeating this exercise. Cf. Zaagman/Zaal 1994, Zaagman 1994, The Foundation on Inter-Ethnic Relations (FIER) 1997.  
5   CSCE Helsinki Document 1992, para. 3. 
6  Cf. Birckenbach 1997a. 
 8
 widespread in the early 1990s, Estonia indeed seemed, in the light of the HCNM's above-mentioned 
mandate, to be a typical case to be taken up by the HCNM. The Russian Federation, on the other hand, 
saw the chance to influence the Estonian policy towards the Russians in Estonia with the help of the 
OSCE. Estonia, on its side, accepted this involvement, as it hoped to receive OSCE backing for the core 
principles of its policy. 
 
In 2002 we might disregard the fears of 1992 or 1993 as unrealistic. However, the list of missed or failed 
opportunities for conflict prevention has become too long over the last decade to allow ourselves to be that 
shortsighted. The High Commissioner's involvement in Estonia can be regarded as an example of 
successful conflict prevention, and taking a closer look at the HCNM's activities and investigating his 
effectiveness might also spark new ideas on the future development of the HCNM as an instrument for 
early warning and conflict prevention. Analysing the HCNM's work under the aspect of the multitude of 
actors present in Estonia might in particular provide us with some ideas on the HCNM's role within the 
conflict prevention network of OSCE, CoE, EU and other actors in the OSCE area. At this point, some 
terms, which will be used extensively in the following pages, need to be clarified: "non-Estonians", 
"Russian-speakers" and "non-citizens".  
 
"Non-Estonians" are defined as all inhabitants of Estonia who are not part of the titular nation, regardless 
of their mother tongue or citizenship. The category "Russian-speakers" includes all persons living in 
Estonia who speak Russian as their mother tongue, or who use it in every-day life, as most Ukrainian, 
Belarusians or other former Soviet nationalities do. This category does not include non-Estonian 
minorities such as Finns or others who rarely use Russian. As more than 90 per cent of the Russian-
speakers living in Estonia are actually Russians,7 the categories "Russians" and "Russian-speakers" will be 
used interchangeably to a certain extent. Additionally, the category "non-citizens" will be used for persons 
who reside permanently in Estonia, but who do not have the Estonian citizenship. Their legal status, not 
their ethnicity, is a criterion in this case. Practically all of these persons are, however, non-Estonians.  
 
Following this introduction, the relations between Estonians and Russians prior to Estonia's independence 
from the Soviet Union in 1991 will be briefly discussed, in order to understand the underlying historical 
and psychological dimensions of the current conflict constellation. For one, it is important to understand 
the demographic factors, as well as the psychologically traumatic effects that the Soviet occupation during 
1940 and 1991 had on Estonia. These factors are central for an understanding of the Estonian approach 
towards the Russian-speaking settler community after 1991. Secondly, it is important to show the 
differentiation within the group of Russian-speakers, and especially the growing support for Estonian 
independence among non-Estonians in 1990-1991. As 55 per cent of non-Estonians supported Estonian 
independence in 1991, and a Russian-Estonian agreement, which envisaged Estonian citizenship for all 
Russians residing in Estonia who wished to receive it, had been signed in the same year, the conflict 
constellation in Estonia was actually dispersed in summer 1991. The main cleavage at the time ran 
between Russian-speaking hardliners with a pro-Soviet or chauvinistic Russian orientation and the more 
or less multi-ethnic pro-independence camp. The Russian Federation, being the homeland of a great 
majority of Estonia's non-Estonians, also played quite a constructive role during this period.8 However, the 
conflict constellation became more ethnified, as the radicalization of Estonian politics right after 
independence resulted in a citizenship policy that effectively disenfranchised the vast majority of the 
Russian-speaking population. The background and details of this policy will be discussed in the first 
subchapter of chapter 3, which analyses the Radicalization Period from 1991 to 1994. This study is 
chronologically divided into three sections: Radicalization from 1991 to 1994, Stabilization from 1995 to 
1997 and Liberalization since 1998. This sequence was chosen in order to illustrate the overall changes in 
the environment that influenced the HCNM's work in Estonia. All three chapters are, however, subdivided 
into content-oriented subchapters. These will discuss the most central issues in each respective period. 
                                                 
7  See Eesti Statstikaamet/Statistical Office of Estonia, Ethnic Composition of the Population. 
8  Cf. Neukirch 2001, p. 8. 
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 During the radicalization period from 1991 to 1994, this was clearly the citizenship and aliens' legislation, 
which in combination with other more specific laws provoked the summer crisis of 1993. The degree of 
ethnification and the level of escalation in July 1993 were the highest in Estonia during the whole period 
that is analysed in this study. The HCNM's mediation efforts in this crisis will be analysed in subchapter 
3.7, after the discussions on his recommendations on the Law on Citizenship (subchapter 3.3) and the draft 
Law on Aliens (subchapter 3.6). The latter two are preceded by subchapters on the respective legislation 
itself (3.2 and 3.5 respectively). The issue of language-training for non-Estonians will be discussed in 
between separately (3.4), as the acquisition of language skills in Estonian was not only crucial for the 
naturalization process, but also for the overall integration of the Russian-speakers. The implementation of 
the Law on Aliens in 1993 and in 1994, after the summer crisis had been overcome, will be discussed in 
subchapter 3.8. The agreement on the withdrawal of the Russian troops, which were still stationed in 
Estonia until August 1994, will be elaborated on separately in subchapter 3.9. 
 
The stabilization period, discussed in chapter 4, was mainly initiated through internal developments (4.1), 
namely the change of government after the parliamentary elections of March 1995. To be sure, the new 
Law on Citizenship of 1995 did not lead to a real improvement in the situation, and instead provoked new 
as well as restated recommendations by the High Commissioner (4.2 and 4.3). Realizing this, the HCNM 
shifted his focus from the citizenship to the aliens' legislation, with regard to which he was more 
successful: In 1996 and 1997 real improvements were forthcoming in the question of passports for non-
citizens residing in Estonia (4.4) and in the question of residence permits (4.5). A special subchapter is 
dedicated to the discussion surrounding the ratification of the Framework Convention for the Protection of 
National Minorities and, in order to counterbalance the chapter on the internal developments that shaped 
the stabilization period, the influence of international actors during this period will be briefly discussed in 
subchapter 4.7. The conclusions drawn in 1997 by the Estonian Ministry of Foreign Affairs on the 
recommendations of the HCNM and their implementation by Estonia will provide the guideline for a 
concluding analysis on this chapter. 
 
The fifth chapter, titled the Liberalization Period since 1998, deals with those issues which stem from 
earlier, until then unimplemented recommendations of the HCNM – namely the integration process (5.1), 
the issue of granting citizenship to stateless children (5.2) and the creation of an ombudsman's office (5.4) 
– as well as with new or renewed recommendations which were provoked by the setbacks in the language 
legislation. These setbacks, which took place during the period of liberalization, underlined how 
problematic the relationship between Estonian and Russian-speaking Estonians still is, and how easily the 
level of escalation might rise again. This by no means indicates that a violent outbreak of the conflict 
might be a realistic scenario. To a greater extent than in chapter 4, chapter 5 brings forward the argument 
that the level of escalation has been notably reduced, and that the conflict constellation as such has been 
effectively dispersed, when compared with the period from 1991 to 1994. 
 
As this study is part of a series of comparative studies, the conclusions, presented in chapter 6, aim not 
only to offer an analytical analysis of the HCNM's work, but also to lay out the main points required for 
the comparative analyses. In the framework of this project, a differentiation is made between three tightly 
interrelated but analytically discernible levels of potential effectiveness: (1) operational effectiveness, i.e. 
influencing the negotiation process as such, (2) normative effectiveness, i.e. changing the frame of 
reference for this process by the introduction of international norms and standards and (3) substantial 
effectiveness, i.e. achieving results. In order to prove the latter, it is first crucial to establish whether a 
correlation exists between the recommendations of the HCNM and the actions of domestic actors, 
concerning both legal acts and their implementation. Secondly, it has to be developed whether and to what 
degree the activity of the HCNM was a causal factor for the actions of domestic players. Thus, the 
concluding chapter will start with a review of the recommendations that the HCNM issued. In this chapter, 
the internal and external factors contributing to their implementation will be integrated. Only upon this 
foundation will it be possible to elaborate on the effectiveness of the HCNM in operational, normative and 
substantial terms. 
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 Chapter 2. The Legacies of Soviet Rule: A Brief History of Estonian-Russian 
Relations up to 1991 
 
 
For an understanding of the conflict formation in Estonia, it is important to take into account the particular 
stress that Estonians place on e.g. language and home country,9 as well as the socio-economic and cultural 
differences between the Estonian population and the Russian-speaking majority that immigrated into the 
country after 1945. Estonians have resided in their historical home country since around 3,500 BC,10 and 
have retained their Ugro-Finic language despite having been under the foreign rule of Danes, Germans, 
Swedes and Russians for most of the period since the 13th century. The threat of this foreign rule resulted 
in a feeling that the small Estonian nation had to protect its language and culture, and has formed the 
perception and way of thinking of many Estonians. With regard to the relationship to the Russian 
migrants, it is of particular importance that the Estonian culture was continuously under the influence of 
Protestantism, and thus clearly remained separate from the Russian-Orthodox culture of immigrants that 
entered the country after 1940. This was possible despite two centuries of rule by the Russian Empire and 
Russification policies at the end of the 19th century, and can by explained by the economically and 
culturally dominant role played by Baltic Germans. Estonians also identified with the collective values of 
Soviet-socialist culture to a lesser extent than those Russian-speaking migrants who had immigrated after 
1940. Instead, Estonians shared a national Estonian culture that stressed individuality, national freedom 
and material values more than society and immaterial, moral values.11 These values further strengthened in 
Estonia during the period of independence from 1918 to 1940. The process of Estonian nation-building 
reached its peak during this period. This was made possible by state education and the simultaneous 
formulation of an Estonian constitution and legal system, the establishment of Estonian parties, the 
standardization of written language, the setting up of an Estonian education system and the freedom of 
Estonian culture to further develop without being bound and limited by foreign rule.12 Due to the 
acceleration of its modernization process, Estonia was socio-economically more developed than Russia in 
1940.13 Though this development process led to contradictions and conflicts within Estonian society, it 
was not the cause for conflict situations with ethnic groundings.  
 
The Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact of 23 August 1939 predetermined the end of Estonian independence. In its 
annexes that violated international law,14 Germany left Estonia and Latvia, as well as Bessarabia, to the 
Russian zone of influence. Using diplomatic and military pressure, the Soviet Union transformed Estonia 
into a Soviet protectorate within the following weeks,15 and eventually occupied it completely on 16 June 
1940.16 On 6 June 1940, the "wish" of the Estonian Soviet Socialist Republic (ESSR) to accede the Soviet 
Union was complied with.17 From the viewpoint of international law, the case was not one of accession 
but one-sided appropriation of the Estonian national territory by the Soviet Union, resulting from the use 
of force without the means of war.18  
 
The process of Sovietization of Estonia was initiated immediately.19 Leading politicians, members of the 
military, police officers, administrative employees, members of the clergy and intellectuals were deported 
or executed in 1940/41. By August 1940, 90 per cent of industry had been nationalized and land plots of 
                                                 
9  Cf. Kaskla 2001, p. 733. 
10  Cf. Taagepera 1993, pp. 11-13. 
11  Cf. ibid. p. 95. 
12  Cf. Raun 1997, p.498; see also Rauch 1970, pp. 72-74, 84-89, 113-115. 
13  Cf. Raun 1991, pp. 125-127; see also Schlau 1991, p. 367. 
14  Cf. Thiele 1999a, pp. 8-11. 
15  Cf. Raun 1991, p. 141; see also Taagepera 1993, p. 60. 
16  Cf. Taagepera 1993, p. 61. 
17  Cf. Raun 1991, p. 145f; see also Clemens 1991, p. 53 and Taagepera 1993, pp. 61-63. 
18  Cf. Thiele 1999a, p. 16. For further information on how the Soviet occupation of Estonia violated international law, see 
Meissner 1991b, pp. 275-286. 
19  For a detailed description of the Sovietization process in the first years of Soviet occupation, see Misiunas/Taagepera 1983, 
pp. 29-44. 
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 over 30 hectares were appropriated. The Estonian Orthodox Church was placed under the Moscow 
Patriarch.20 The German occupation (July 1941 - September 1944) and the renewed invasion by Soviet 
troops resulted in the loss of around 30 per cent of Estonia's pre-war population through fleeing, 
expulsion, deportation and death.21 Further population loss, contributing to the experiences of war and 
collective memory of Estonians,22 resulted from violent resistance of Estonian guerrillas, the so-called 
Forrest Brothers, and further deportations through a collectivization campaign in spring 1949.23  
 
The demographic changes that occurred in Estonia after the Second World War were fundamental. In 
1934 Estonia was a homogeneous nation state with its titular nation encompassing 88.2 per cent, and the 
largest minority, that of Russians, comprising 8.2 per cent. By 1989 the percentage of Estonians in the 
population fell to 61.5 per cent, while the proportion of Russians rose to 30.3 per cent.24 Alongside the 
nearly complete disappearance of the small German, Swedish and Jewish minorities, the Estonian war and 
post-war losses, as well as the manifold increase of the Slavic population were evident. The figure of 
around 977,000 Estonians who lived in the present territory of Estonia in 1934 fell to 892,700 by 1959. 
Despite natural population increase, their number only increased to 963,300 by 1989.25 In contrast, the 
number of Slavs that lived in the ESSR tripled to 272,700 by 1959. Due to continuous migration, this 
figure further doubled to 550,800 by 1989.26  
 
In the case of Estonia, the cause for this immense scale of immigration was the Soviet-directed 
industrialization process, which in turn was only possible due to the resettlement of industrial workers that 
was required as a result of high war and post-war losses.27 The population structure changed 
fundamentally after 1945, in particular in the city of Narva, which lies on the border to Russia. The 
percentage of the Russian population rose from 29.7 to 85.1 per cent between 1934 and 1979. Estonians, 
who were not allowed to return to the city that had been destroyed by the war, comprised only slightly less 
than five per cent of the population in 1979. A similar change in population structure, caused by the 
Soviet-directed industrialization process, also took place in other Estonian cities. In Kohtla-Järve, the 
centre of oil shale industry, the Estonian population percentage decreased from 91.8 per cent in 1934 to 
26.4 per cent in 1979. In 1979, only 3 per cent of the population of the marine basis Paldiski was Estonian 
(1934: 94 per cent). Hardly any Estonians lived in Sillamäe, which was also a "closed city", similar to 
Paldiski.28 In Tallinn, which saw its population triple from 1934 to 1979, the percentage of Russians 
increased from 5.7 to 38 per cent, rising further to 41.2 per cent in 1989. Comprising 47.7 per cent of the 
population, Estonians had also become a minority in Tallinn by 1989.29 In contrast, the rural regions 
around Narva, Kohtla-Järve and the capital Tallinn retained a population majority of Estonians (68 and 78 
per cent respectively). Also Tartu remained mostly Estonian, despite a Russian percentage of 20.6 (1934: 
4.5 per cent) and a rapid percentage increase.30 The conclusion therefore holds that the continuing 
migration of non-Estonians was aimed at two urban centres: 92 per cent of Russians and Belarusians, as 
well as nearly 88 per cent of Ukrainians lived in cities in 1989.31 Russians and Estonians rarely 
intermeshed in Narva, Sillamäe, Paldiski, Tallinn or other mixed cities. Most Russians who migrated into 
the area moved to suburbs that had been built for migrants, and showed very little interest in learning the 
                                                 
20  Cf. Raun 1991, pp. 150 - 152, 156. 
21  Cf. Taagepera 1993, p. 71; see also Raun 1991, p. 166. 
22  Cf. Lieven 1994, p. 82f.  
23  Cf. Misiunas/Taagpera 1983, pp. 81 - 91; see also Uipobuu 1991, p. 113; Raun 1991, pp. 174-181; Taagepera 1993, p. 79f 
and Shtromas 1996, pp. 86-97.  
24  Raun 1991, p. 130; see also Raun 1997, p. 409.  
25  Due to emigration and low birth rates, this figure again fell to 939,310 by 2000 (Estonia Today, 5 February 2001). 
26  Cf. Raun 1997, p. 405; see also Zvidrinš 1994, p. 372. 
27  Parallel to a similar situation in Moldavia, Estonians argue that the planned Russification of Estonia was the real cause for 
massive immigration. However, a more realistic explanation is that this was only a side-effect to the process. Cf. Wiegandt 
1995, p. 117. Independent of the real motivation, it remains a fact that the number of industrial workers quadrupled in 
Estonia between 1944 and 1955, and rose by a further 56 per cent by 1975. Cf. Raun 1991, p. 176, 199. 
28  Cf. Raun 1991, p. 207. 
29  Cf. ibid. p. 248f. 
30  Cf. ibid. p. 207. 
31  Cf. Kionka 1990g, p. 22. 
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 Estonian language or engaging in the culture.32 Russians did not find this necessary, as their living and 
working quarters, as well as the state bureaucracy, was Russian speaking.33 Therefore, only 13.7 per cent 
of Russians and 11.8 per cent of the non-Russian minority could speak Estonian in 1989. The proportion 
that could prove at least a minimal proficiency in Estonian lay at 28 per cent.34 Estonians themselves also 
showed very little interest in building contacts to settlers. Only ten per cent of Estonians entered mixed 
marriages.35 Estonians and non-Estonians therefore lived segregated in the ESSR. The police, security 
service and management personnel comprised of immigrants in the ESSR, who also dominated the all-
union industries, which employed 80 per cent of workers.36 In contrast, Estonians often worked in the 
cultural, scientific or education sector, and also dominated the agricultural sector. The Soviet 
modernization process eventually led to the establishment of two parallel societies in Estonia, which were 
divided ethnically, linguistically and culturally (see above), as well as spatially and with regard to 
education and employment.37 
 
Initially, Estonians were also largely absent from leading positions in the party and state. These positions 
were filled by Russian immigrants or by so-called Russian-Estonians, who had migrated to Estonia during 
the Tsarist era and had been socialized by Soviets after 1917. Only these Estonians were trusted by the 
Soviet leadership.38 In particular the 1978 order from Moscow that Russian-Estonian Karl Vaino should 
become 1st Secretary instead of Vaino Väljas led to disappointment amongst Estonians, who initially 
hoped to be able to influence the future of their country through the communist system, despite being a 
nominal minority in the nomenclature.39 Only in 1988 was the position of 1st Secretary held for the first 
time since Nikolai Karotamm was removed from office in 1950 by an Estonian national, Vaino Väljäs.40  
 
The above-mentioned massive demographic changes and the limited possibility for political influence 
resulted in a feeling in Estonians of being threatened. The danger of becoming a minority in the Republic 
appeared to be real by the end of the 1980s.41 The linguistic Russification of Estonian public life, as well 
as the spread of Russian education to schools was viewed as an additional threat to the Estonian language 
and culture. Furthermore, the refusal of Russians to speak Estonian was taken as an insult, and the 
annoyance of the Estonian population with respect to this development continued to rise in the eighties.42 
This annoyance was coupled with frustrations about the actual or supposed preference of migrants.43 In the 
end of the eighties, these feelings added to a general anti-Russian attitude.44 Fundamental, however, was 
that the continuous Russification and halting migration were viewed by many Estonians as undermining 
the survival of the Estonian nation. The perception of such a fundamental threat laid the basis for future 
policy decisions that would be made in the fields of language and citizenship. However, the catalyst for 
the Estonian national movement in the end of the eighties proved to be the contradictions that arose from 
centralized industrial policies in the field of the environment. After the Second World War, the Estonian 
economy was completely centralized and incorporated into the economic system of the Soviet Union. 
Over 90 per cent of industry was controlled directly from Moscow in 1980.45 The interests of Moscow 
with regard to economic developments did not always coincide with Estonian interests. The extraction of 
oil, phosphor and uranium resulted in extensive environmental damage in Estonia, and the Republic only 
benefited from this extraction to a limited extent. The planned expansion of phosphor extraction 
                                                 
32  Cf. Kionka 1990h, p. 23; see also Shafir 1995, p. 156.  
33  Cf. Clemens 1991, p. 153. 
34  Cf. Lieven 1994, p. 186. 
35  Cf. Clemens 1991, p. 67, p. 227; see also Raun 1991, p. 205. 
36  Cf. Aklaev 1999, p. 155. 
37  Cf. Shafir 1995, pp. 152-161. 
38  Cf. Shtromas 1996, p. 99; see also Misiunas/Taagepera 1983, pp. 77-81, 282-284.  
39  Cf. Semjonov 2000, p. 40f.; see also Raun 1991, p. 190.  
40  Cf. Lieven 1994, p. 94. 
41  Cf. Kionka 1990g, p. 21. 
42  Cf. Brettin 1996, p. 138f; see also Taagepera 1992, p. 124.  
43  Cf. Kolstoe 1995, p. 111; see also Semjonov 2000, p. 40; Butenschön 1992, p. 40; Uibopuu 1989, p. 42f. 
44  Cf. Brettin 1996, p. 137. 
45  Cf. Raun 1991, p. 198.  
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 eventually faltered in spring 1987, due to growing resistance among the Estonian population.46 The 
planned expansion would not only have posed a threat to 40 per cent of Estonian drinking water, but 
would have also been linked to a further wave of immigration.47 While such contradictions of the Soviet 
modernization process had been ignored to a large extent until the mid-1980s, and had only been tackled 
concretely with regard to particular cases, glasnost and perestroika enhanced liberalization and opened 
windows of opportunities to act,48 simultaneously also reducing the threat of possible repression. The 
relatively mild reactions towards Estonian dissidents in the last 15 years also contributed to more fearless 
action.49 The discussion over the annexation of Estonia in 1940 and the legitimacy of Soviet rule, which 
had been conducted until 1987 in the inner private sphere and by particular dissident groups, was carried 
over into public debate.50 On 24 February 1988, over 8,000 people demonstrated to highlight that 70 years 
had passed from the proclamation of the Estonian Republic.51 Later on in the year, the separate protests for 
the environment, for economic development, historical discussion, for worries about the future of the 
Estonian language as well as anti-Russia resentment accumulated into an Estonian national movement, the 
"Singing Revolution".52 This initially called primarily for democratization and autonomy, but in 1989 
developed into an independence movement. What remained constant in this "revolution" was the absence 
of violence, which was strengthened by contacts to sympathizing environmentalist and human rights 
movements in Northern and Western Europe.53  
 
In 1987/88, public discourse in Estonia appeared to split along linguistic lines. While articles in the 
Estonian Communist Party newspaper attempted to unify Estonian nationalism with Soviet patriotism, the 
Russian edition defended the rights of Russians in Estonia.54 Although the "National Front for the Support 
of the Perestroika" (Rahvarinne), which had been established in April 1988, was also supported by 
reform-oriented Russians, its goals and members were primarily Estonian.55 As a reaction to the Estonian 
national movement, the "International Movement of Workers in the Estonian SSR" (Internacional’noe 
dviženie trudjaščichsja Estonskoj SSR), in short the Intermovement (Interdviženie), was formed in July 
1988 to act as a counterbalance. This primarily represented Russian party and state officials, army 
personnel as well as workers from industry centres with a Russian population majority.56 Due to its 
nationalistic Russian rhetoric, the Intermovement failed to appeal to the masses.57 According to polls, only 
10.9 per cent of the non-Estonian population supported it in 1989.58 
 
On 30 November 1988, a second Russian movement was founded - the Union of Councils of Worker 
Collectives (Ob’edinennyi sovet trudvykh kolletivov, OSTK). This organization was an umbrella to 140 
companies that stood under direct control of Moscow ministries and had been founded "from above",59 i.e. 
by the directors of the companies, in order to prevent disorder amongst Estonian workers.60 The OSTK 
was in general more moderate than the Intermovement, and was supported by 17.9 per cent of non-
Estonians.61 Only a third of the non-Estonian population favoured a radical, pro-Soviet organization in the 
beginning of 1989. A relative majority (32.2 per cent) continued to support the Communist Party, and 
                                                 
46  Cf. Butenschön 1992, pp. 29-36; see also Taagepera 1993, pp. 120-124. 
47  Cf. Raun 1991, p. 223. 
48  Cf. ibid. p. 237.  
49  Cf. Taagepera 1993, p. 118. 
50  Cf. Raun 1991, p. 223; see also Clemens 1991, p. 75. 
51  Cf. Brettin 1996, p. 149f. 
52  This term was formulated based on a festival "Estonia's Song 1988". Hundreds of thousands of old and new patriotic songs 
were sung at this festival in the Estonian language. Cf. Thiele 1999a, p. 37. 
53  Cf. Birckenbach 1997b, pp. 12-14. 
54  Cf. Clemens 1991, p. 78, 156f. 
55  Cf. Brettin 1996, p. 148; see also Butenschön 1992, pp. 37-46; and Taagepera 1993, p. 142. 
56  Cf. Brettin 1996, p. 159f. 
57  Cf. ibid. p. 163. 
58  Cf. Ilves 1989, p. 15. 
59  Cf. Aklaev et al. 1995, p. 2. 
60  As a countermovement, the company managers that stood under the republic's administration, or who alternatively wished to 
be in this position, founded a (pro-Estonian) League of Worker Collectives. Cf. Lieven 1994, p. 103. 
61  Cf. Ilves 1989, p. 15. 
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 around 20 per cent of non-Estonians even supported the democratization attempts of the National Front as 
well as the environmental ideas of the Greens.62 
  
On 16 November 1988, the Supreme Soviet of the ESSR accepted a declaration of Estonian sovereignty 
with five abstentions and one no-vote.63 The declaration established that laws of the Republic had primacy 
over laws of the Union.64 Furthermore, in the end of 1988 important steps were taken to strengthen the 
position of the Estonian language: In a meeting on 7 December that altered the constitution, Estonian 
became an official language of the ESSR, and on 18 January 1989 the new language law was passed.65 
The new law granted the citizens of the ESSR the right to use the Estonian language in public 
administration.66 Simultaneously, the use of Russian language was also guaranteed.67 Following an order 
on 14 July 1989, minority-language proficiency became a prerequisite for certain jobs - these were divided 
into six categories from A to F - and had to be proven within two to four years with a language test.68 The 
working language of official institutions and the language used in the economic sector was now 
Estonian,69 although in regions with a Russian minority - with the exception of Tallinn - Russian could be 
used for an interim period.70 In order to guarantee the position of the Estonian language, education was to 
take place in Estonian in a broad range of regions, although Russian would also be a language of 
education in regions with a Russian majority.71 Overall, the law strengthened the position of the Estonian 
language, but also defended that of the Russian language.72 Nevertheless, and even though also non-
Estonian parliamentarians had voted in favour of the declaration of sovereignty and for the language law,73 
non-Estonians viewed the laws very negatively, and protest demonstrations erupted especially in Narva.74 
 
Further conflict material was produced in summer 1989 by the new communal election law, which 
coupled active and passive election rights in Estonia to residence duration in the ESSR.75 The 
Intermovement and the OSTK reacted to this law with a strike, which paralysed the Estonian economy to a 
great extent and pressured the Estonian leadership into concessions.76 The pattern of this conflict was 
carried out in the following way: Estonian politicians continued to strive for policies that furthered 
independence and sovereignty, while the pro-Soviet forces, comprised of the party, army and economic 
sector, continued to oppose this development, mobilizing the insecurities of the regions with Russian 
majorities.  
 
In the beginning of 1990, the independence of Estonia appeared to be unavoidable.77 This goal was 
supported by 96 per cent of Estonians,78 and was striven for by various Estonian-dominated political 
groupings. These, however, argued about the best way to attain independence.79 The National Front and 
the Estonian reform wing that arose from the Communist Party, the Union "Free Estonia", continued to 
pursue a way that could be called "marsh through the institutions". Independence was to follow from 
negotiations with Moscow and through the existing institutions of the ESSR. On the other hand, the 
Estonian Party of National Independence, which had been founded in February 1988, and the Estonian 
National Heritage Society, which was founded in 1986, refused to recognize the legitimacy of these 
                                                 
62  Cf. ibid. p. 15f. 
63  Cf. Meissner 1991a, p. 384. 
64  Cf. Bungs 1989; see also Uibopuu 1989, p. 46. 
65  Cf. Raun 1995, p. 517f. Eesti NSV keeleseadus [Law on Language], 18 January 1989.  
66  Eesti NSV keeleseadus [Law on Language], 18 January 1989, art. 2. 
67  Ibid. 
68  Cf. Brettin 1996, p. 255, 259. 
69  Eesti NSV keeleseadus [Law on Language], 18 January 1989, art. 8, 11, 12. 
70  Ibid., art. 36. 
71  Ibid., art. 19, 20 
72  Cf. Brettin 1996, p. 260. 
73  According to Brettin (1996, p. 245), only 186 of the parliamentarians were of Estonian nationality. 
74  Cf. Gorohhov 1997, p. 126. 
75  Cf. Brettin 1996, pp. 263-266. 
76  Cf. Taagepera 1993, p. 155; see also Girnius 1989; and Brettin 1996, p. 268. 
77  Cf. Taagepera 1993, p. 173f. 
78  Cf. Raun 1991, p. 229. 
79  Cf. Kionka 1990c. 
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 institutions. These two organizations, whose members mostly comprised former dissidents, called for a 
Congress of Estonia to be elected. In their view, this would be the legitimate institution of the Republic of 
Estonia, which had been under foreign rule since 1940. The election for this preparliament was organized 
by the Committee of the Estonian Citizens on 24 February 1989,80 and was carried out between 24 
February and 1 March 1990.81 Citizens of the Republic of Estonia and their descendants held the right to 
vote. Immigrants who had entered the country after 1940 were therefore consciously excluded from this 
parliament, but could - in the case that they supported Estonian independence - register as candidates for 
Estonian citizenship and elect observers who did not have the right to vote into the Congress. Shortly after 
the election of the Congress, on 18 March 1990, the first free elections for the official Estonian 
parliament, the Highest Soviet, were held. The Independence Party was not represented in this election, as 
it declined to participate in an election for an institution of a foreign ruler, and which also included 
representatives of "migrants".82 The National Front, its allies (49) and the reform communists (29) 
therefore achieved a majority with 105 seats.83 The OSTK and the Intermovement attained 27 seats, 
therefore falling short of their most important goal - a blocking minority of 35 per cent against 
constitutional changes.84 The main conflict line in the new parliament ran between the Estonian 
independence supporters and the non-Estonian anti-independence movement. The formation of these 
mainly parallel ethnic (Estonian/non-Estonian) and political (pro-independence/pro-Soviet Union) 
cleavages had developed gradually during the previous years, continuously becoming more fixed. On 25 
March 1990 the Communist Party of Estonia also split along these lines.85 Nevertheless, in May 1990 the 
number of non-Estonian supporters of independence has substantially risen: Up to 26 per cent from around 
5 per cent in the previous spring of 1989.86 According to Shafir, this increase was mostly caused by 
democratically oriented Russian-speaking intellectuals and young workers, who believed economic and 
social development would be more successful in an independent Estonia than as a part of the Soviet 
Union.87 Older immigrants, who had been born outside Estonia and who had closer ties to the Soviet 
Union, and in particular representatives of the Soviet system in the party, administration and businesses, 
built the core of the anti-independence movement.88 Their regional basis lay mostly in Narva, Sillamäe 
and Kohtla-Järve. Estonian independence was not in the interest of members of the local administration 
and the management of the all-Union companies, and these therefore attempted to mobilize Russian-
speaking workers against the new Estonian leadership. Control of local media by radical forces, language 
barriers between Estonians and Russians, and the limited attempts of Estonians to spread their views into 
the Northeast made their task easier.89  
 
On 30 March 1990, the day that it was constituted, the Supreme Soviet of Estonia voted on the status of 
Estonia.90 With a two-third majority, it de facto, but not de jure proclaimed the commencement of the 
transition phase to reinstate independence that had been lost in 1940 with Soviet annexation.91 This 
decision further increased tensions between independence supporters and the anti-independence 
movement. When on 15 May 1990 around 5,000 pro-Soviet demonstrators attempted to storm the seat of 
the Estonian government on the Tompea castle, a temporary danger even existed that the violence would 
erupt.92 However, neither side was mentally or materially prepared to use violence in May 1990. To be 
sure, on the non-Estonian side, political organizations, which had access to light weapons, had formed 
paramilitary organizations in the late eighties. The Estonian side, which was also politically organized and 
                                                 
80  Cf. Kionka 1990b, p. 32. 
81  Cf. Butenschön 1992, pp. 74-77.  
82  Cf. ibid. 1992, p. 76.  
83  As one candidate could officially be nominated by several parties, the classifications were not always clear. Cf. Ishiyama 
1994, p. 182. E.g. Taagepera, 1993, p. 176, arrives at slightly differing results.  
84  Cf. Taagepera 1993, p. 176; see also Kionka 1990e, p. 23.  
85  Cf. Ishiyama 1993, p. 290.  
86  Cf. Ilves 1989, p. 15f; see also Taagepera 1993, p. 176f.  
87  Cf. Shafir 1995, p. 184f. 
88  Cf. Kolstoe 1995, p. 113.  
89  Cf. ibid., p. 157.  
90  Cf. Meissner 1991a, p. 389.  
91  Cf. Ilves 1990.  
92  Cf. Taagepera 1993, p. 178; see also Brettin 1996, p. 285 and Kolstoe 2000, p. 5.  
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 which had built the unarmed "Home Defence" after the incident of 15 May, also began to build up a 
military organization. But these forces were not very strong, and thus both sides were prepared for violent 
confrontation only to a limited extent from the material point of view. Nevertheless, the escalation spiral 
continued to tighten in 1990, and at this point in time it was also uncertain how around 120,000 Soviet 
troops that were stationed in Estonia would act.93 Violent outbursts involving Soviet troops eventually 
occurred in Lithuania and Latvia, but did not take place in Estonia.94 Though the situation was tense in 
Tallinn when incidents occurred in Vilnius and Riga, and although threats were made by the Soviet 
military and local, pro-Soviet forces also in Estonia, the situation remained calm.95 As a matter of fact, 
Estonia received important support from the Russian side in this situation: On 12 January 1991, Boris 
Yeltsin signed a "Treaty on the Bases of Inter-State Relations between the RSFSR and the Republic of 
Estonia", and traveled to Tallinn on the next day to appeal to Russian soldiers not to get involved in acts 
of violence.96  
 
Although the conflict between pro-Soviet and pro-Estonian forces did not escalate in January 1991, the 
situation did temporarily reach a crisis level. On the Estonian side, the willingness and opportunity to use 
violence was limited despite half-hearted mobilization attempts.97 The radical pro-Soviet side, however, 
appeared to be psychologically - supported by Soviet forces - as well as materially ready in January 1991. 
The pro-Baltic stance of the Russian government managed to weaken the propaganda of the radicals, and 
consequentially also their opportunity to attain broader support from the non-Estonian population - 
practically pulling the ground from under their feet.98 A similar limited outcome was the result when the 
non-Estonians called for the formation of a paramilitary force on 17 January, and also when the OSTK and 
the Intermovement organized a strike. As the Soviet leadership began to send out stronger de-escalation 
signals,99 the conflict deescalated further in the beginning of 1991.  
 
Independence was, however, pushed for even harder by the Estonian side. On 3 March 1991, the Estonian 
parliament decided to hold a referendum on the reinstatement of independence on 17 March, before a 
Soviet referendum that was to be held on a new union treaty. With an election participation rate of 82.9 
per cent, 77.8 per cent voted in favour of reinstating Estonian independence. This means that around 25-30 
per cent of non-Estonians also voted in favour of and 35-40 per cent of non-Estonians voted against 
independence. Around a third of those entitled to vote declined to participate.100 Several polls support the 
result of the referendum on independence of 3 March.101 Support for pro-Soviet forces and their leadership 
barely reached 30 per cent even amongst the non-Estonian voters, and the Intermovement lost most of 
their support to the OSTK and the pro-Union part of the Communist Party.102  
 
In the end, the putsch of conservative, pro-Soviet forces on 19 August 1991 in Moscow forced the 
Estonian leadership to negotiate. While the Intermovement called for demonstrations to support the crisis 
committee,103 and tanks rolled through Tallinn, the Estonian parliament decided to make public a 
statement on the evening of 20 August. The statement: 
 
(1) confirms the independence of the Republic of Estonia and proclaims the end of the transition period;  
(2) calls for the creation of a Constitutional Assembly, the members of which will be chosen together by 
the Supreme Council and the Congress, and which will carry out a referendum on a reformulated 
constitution; 
                                                 
93  Cf. Kionka 1990a, p. 23. 
94  Cf. Brettin 1996, p. 317, 325.  
95  Cf. Kionka 1991a.  
96  Cf. Brettin 1996, pp. 318-320.  
97  Cf. Kionka 1991a, p. 5f.  
98  Cf. Linz/Stepan 1996b, p. 409; see also Dunlop 1993, p. 60.  
99  Cf. Brettin 1996, pp. 326-328.  
100  Cf. Taagepera 1993, p. 194; see also Kolstoe 1995, p. 118; and Kionka 1991b.  
101  Cf. Semjonov 2000, p. 5-7.  
102  Cf. Taagepera 1993, p. 195, 198f; see also Kionka 1991c, p. 61; and Semjonov 2000, p. 7f. 
103  Cf. Kionka 1991c, p. 60.  
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 (3) determines that parliamentary elections will be held after the new constitution has been passed in the 
following year.104  
 
After the failure of the putsch attempt, the Estonian leadership took concrete steps to secure independence. 
Estonian border troops took over the control of external borders. The city councils of Narva, Sillamäe and 
Kohtla-Järve, which had supported the putsch, were disbanded. The Communist Party, the OSTK and the 
Intermovement were prohibited.105 Furthermore, Estonia received important support from Moscow: 
Already on 24 August, Russia recognized the independence of the Baltic states, and the Soviet Union 
followed on 6 September. Also within Estonia, the pro-Soviet forces that were to a great extent isolated by 
late-summer 1991 were discredited and lacked an organizational basis:106 55 per cent of non-Estonians 
now supported Estonian independence.107  
 
                                                 
104  Cf. Kionka 1991c, p. 59; see also Taagepera 1994, p. 215.  
105  Cf. Taagepera 1993, p. 202; see also Kionka 1991c, p. 60f.  
106  Cf. Lieven 1994, p. 200.  
107  Cf. Semjonov 2000, p. 6f.  
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 Chapter 3. Estonia after Independence: The Radicalized Period from 1991 to 1994 
 
 
3.1  From Privileges to Statelessness: The Citizenship Issue in Estonia in 1992 
 
After Estonia regained independence on 20 August 1991, an Estonian Constitutional Assembly was 
formed to decide on the new democratic institutions for Estonia.108 The Constitutional Assembly was not 
only set up to work out a new constitution for Estonia, but was also to be in charge of articulating the 
citizenship law. It was formed jointly by the Supreme Council and the Congress of Estonia.109 Both 
parliamentary bodies claimed to be legitimate representatives of the Estonian people and, therefore, 
entitled to model the new democratic institution for the republic. As a compromise, they decided to share 
the responsibility, and both of the representative assemblies were thus included in the constitution-making 
process.  
 
Four main groupings in the Constitutional Assembly can be identified: 20 members of the Estonian 
Popular Front; 20 nationalist radicals, mostly from the Estonian National Independence Party; 13 
moderates and reform communists; and seven Russian deputies.110 Members of the Constitutional 
Assembly were thus mainly ethnic Estonians. Although some non-Estonians were also included in the 
decision-making body, these were not proportionally represented to their number in the overall population. 
This disproportion was due to the fact that the Congress of Estonia was elected only by citizens of the first 
Estonian Republic, and by their descendants. Also the composition of the Congress was therefore 
overwhelmingly Estonian. All seven Russian representatives in the Constitutional Assembly were elected 
into office by the Supreme Council.111 To make matters worse for Russian-speakers, their representatives 
in the Constitutional Assembly were partly discredited following their anti-independence attitude in 1990 
and 1991.112 The resulting balance of forces became essential for the ultimate outcome of the Citizenship 
Law. The draft laws on citizenship, which had been elaborated before independence by the responsible 
commission of the Supreme Council, had been quite accommodative for the Russian-speakers. However, 
as the influence of those forces favouring a more exclusionist approach grew continuously in the second 
half of 1991, the subsequent drafts turned out to be much less convenient.113 
 
Ethnic questions played a significant role in the negotiations on the new institutions and their legal basis, 
but the underlying force still seemed to be political competition. The power advantage over the Russian-
speaking minority played a decisive role, as the political marginalization of the ethnic minorities could 
increase the chance of success of ethnic Estonian parties in the upcoming parliamentary elections. 
However, the competition between Estonian parties can also explain the institutional path that was 
adopted. At the time of the bargaining process on the constitution and citizenship, political parties were 
rather fragmented and the possible outcome of the first elections was highly uncertain with regard to all 
parties.  
 
Clear cleavages existed both between the moderate and radical forces, as well as within their own camps. 
The main party in the radical wing was the National Independence Party, which had some small allies 
such as the Christian Democrats. These forces stressed the legal continuity of independence, appealing to 
the experience of the first Republic of Estonia during the inter-war period.114  
 
                                                 
108  Alternatively, the term Constituent Assembly is sometimes used. 
109  See chapter 2. 
110  Cf. Frye 1997, pp. 523-552. 
111  The share of seven Russians among the thirty representatives in the Supreme Council was proportionate to the ethnic 
composition of Estonian society. 
112  Cf. Kask 1994, pp. 379-390, 383. 
113  Cf. Kionka 1991d, pp. 21-26, 24; see also Kionka 1991e, pp. 21-24, 23. 
114  Cf. Taagepera 1993, pp. 196-197. 
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 The moderate forces also supported the notion of a legal continuity, but wanted to adapt it to the existing 
situation. Hoping to gain extra votes from Russian-speakers, the moderates, most notably the Popular 
Front, which had enjoyed a rather large support of the non-Estonians in the past, supported a more 
inclusive version of the citizenship legislation. They initially favoured a version of the so-called "zero-
option" as the basis of citizenship. The zero-option envisaged that all people living on Estonian territory at 
the time when independence was declared would automatically be considered as citizens of Estonia. 
However, the flow of immigrants from other parts of the Soviet Union to Estonia had inflated in the 
eighties to the extent that Estonians faced the danger of becoming a minority in their own country. 
Moreover, many of these settlers resided in Estonia only for a short period of time, emigrating to other 
parts of the Soviet Union soon after entering the country. These settlers were therefore hardly attached to 
Estonia, and were not integrated into Estonian society culturally or linguistically. Consequentially, many 
decision-makers supported at least some sort of residency requirement as a precondition for granting 
Estonian citizenship to people who had settled into the country during the Soviet era.  
 
In the view of the conservatives, however, it did not matter how long a person had lived in Estonia. 
Automatic citizenship could not be granted, as citizenship was a personal choice. Thus granting automatic 
citizenship to all or some Soviet settlers would be ‘forceful’ naturalization, which the Estonian citizenship 
legislation did not foresee. Citizenship could therefore only be granted to those people who had not been 
citizens of the inter-war republic on a voluntary basis, i.e. it had to be requested.115 However, when the 
Supreme Council proposed the possibility that during a certain period, Soviet settlers could express their 
wish for citizenship without having to fulfill the residence and language requirement, the conservatives 
considered this a hidden zero-option.116 
 
Discussions also revolved around the question of what to do with those Soviet era settlers who had 
actively supported Estonian independence. Approximately 30,000 non-Estonians had applied for Estonian 
citizenship through the Estonian Committee (the founding body of the Congress of Estonia) in 1990, and 
one third of the ‘non-natives’ had supported Estonia’s independent statehood in the 1991 referendum. 
Moreover, in the case that only citizens of the first republic would be granted citizenship, some members 
of the Constitutional Assembly and the Supreme Council themselves would have been excluded. A large 
number of people who had participated in drafting the citizenship legislation and the Constitution, and 
who had consented to the basic principles of the new Estonian society, would then find themselves as 
being excluded from the state, the basis of which they had participated in forming. All such people were 
considered as having contributed to Estonian independence, and they were therefore to be granted 
citizenship without regard to residency or language requirements. At the time, Estonian decision-makers, 
whether moderate or nationalist, were united in this point to a large extent. To conclude, all non-Estonian 
representatives who had participated in the work of the Estonian Congress and Constitutional Assembly, 
or who had applied for Estonian citizenship before March 1990 were eventually given an advantaged 
position in the actual process of acquiring citizenship. This advantage was granted to them in return for 
their support in state-building. Why this advantage was only granted eventually and not immediately will 
be explained at a further point in this chapter. Keeping the later developments in mind, the claims of the 
non-Estonian deputies in the assembly could have been in accordance with the Estonian majority, but they 
were not representing the interests of their constituency. By agreeing to the preferential treatment of those 
non-Estonians who had contributed to Estonian independence in terms of naturalization, the Russian 
deputies secured their own privileged right to citizenship, but not that of their constituents. 
 
The argument of international opinion was a part of the discussion on the citizenship issue. Russian 
deputies sent an appeal to the United Nations that claimed that international rights of non-Estonians were 
being abridged. UN principles were referred to also by some Estonian deputies, who argued in favour of 
                                                 
115   Cf. Päevaleht, 4 September 1991, Vabariigi kodakondsuse seaduse taasjõustamisest [On re-establishment of Citizenship 
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 the ius soli rule, by which all persons born in Estonia would be entitled to Estonian citizenship.117 The 
moderates also tried to stress that the West would neither understand nor support Estonia’s exclusive 
citizenship policies. US State Secretary James Baker, for example, had affirmed that economic support of 
the West to the Baltics was dependent on them respecting both human and minority rights. Moreover, a 
report on human rights in Estonia, commissioned by the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of 
Europe, pointed out that the democratic character of the country could be affected if substantial parts of 
the population were "denied the right to become citizens, and thereby are also denied for instance the right 
to vote in parliamentary elections."118 However, the supporters of the strict citizenship rules downplayed 
the Western threats, saying that in sight of material gains Estonia should not give in to its principles.119  
 
Over time, the zero-option became increasingly unpopular among the Estonian public. Radicals publicly 
questioned the national feelings and loyalty to Estonia of moderates, and claimed that they were working 
against national interests. In fear of losing the support of Estonian voters in the first free elections, the 
moderates abandoned their position in favour of the radical and exclusive viewpoint. Initially, Marju 
Lauristin, the leader of the Social Democrats, proposed the zero-option to the Supreme Soviet’s 
Citizenship Commission. With Edgar Savisaar as Prime Minister and many Russian deputies in 
parliament, at the time a fair chance existed that the necessary support for the plan could have been 
attained in the Supreme Soviet.120 However, growing inner disagreements undermined the Popular Front 
faction. This faction was composed of several parties, which had been more or less unified in confronting 
Moscow and in steps towards independence, but in the process of institution-building their leaders and 
agendas had drifted apart. This process led to inner tensions and finally to the split of the Popular Front.121 
Moreover, support for the Popular Front had declined because of the government’s policies and alliances 
with Russian deputies. In January 1992, the government of Edgar Savisaar, leader of the Popular Front, 
"won a parliamentary vote giving it emergency economic powers, but only with the support of Russian 
deputies, with a majority of Estonian deputies against the move."122 As this became public, Savisaar was 
forced to leave office and much of his personal as well as the party’s popularity was eroded. Due to 
political calculations according to which the votes of the Estonian constituency had a higher value than 
those of non-Estonians, the Social Democrats and other moderates changed their position on the 
citizenship question. They gave into the radicals and agreed to the re-enactment of the Law on Citizenship 
dating from 1938 and to a limited and exclusionist definition of citizenry. 
 
On 26 February 1992 the Supreme Council decided, in accordance with the recommendations of the 
Constitutional Assembly, to re-enact the Law on Citizenship of 1938 from Estonia’s pre-war republic. The 
version that had been valid on 16 June 1940 was adopted.123 According to this decision, citizens of the 
inter-war Republic of Estonia, as well as their descendants in the paternal line were to be considered as 
Estonian citizens.  
 
This decision followed the notion of legal continuity. This was based on the assumption that the legal 
framework of the Estonian Republic was still in force, and that the Constitutional Assembly had to derive 
its decision in the following manner: If Soviet occupation in Estonia was illegal, the independent Republic 
of Estonia had never seized to exist. And if the Republic had continued to exist, so had the citizenry of the 
Republic. In the case that Estonia would change its notion of citizenry and would widen its definition to 
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 include the people who had moved to Estonia during the Soviet period, Estonia would deny the 
illegitimacy of the occupation. According to this point of view, if all persons living in the territory of 
Estonia during the time of the declaration of independence would be considered as citizens, the current 
Estonian state would by definition be the second Republic of Estonia, and the first one had seized to 
exist.124 
 
This line of argumentation was not, however, the only possible one, as the Lithuanian case illustrates. 
Lithuania granted automatic citizenship to all its residents when it regained independence. Russia was 
more than willing to point out Lithuania’s approach to the other two Baltic states. It also claimed that the 
1920 Tartu peace treaty was not the last valid document that established relations between the two states. 
According to Russia, the Union Treaty of 1946 and the agreement between Estonia and Russia in 1990 
were also still in force, and committed Estonia to grant citizenship to all its residents. In the end, the legal 
continuity argument was used as the ‘holy cow’ to justify the adoption of the 1938 Law on Citizenship. 
However, the application of the legal continuity principle was rather selective. Several changes and 
additions were made to the Law on Citizenship, including the introduction of the maternal hereditary line 
for acquiring Estonian citizenship. This modification was introduced in 1993 after pressure exercised by 
the Council of Europe, which made Estonia's accession to this body dependent on this question.125 This 
type of adaptation to the current situation was, however, ruled out in view of granting citizenship to Soviet 
era immigrants. 
  
Moreover, it should be noted that the new constitution was adopted on the basis of the 1922 constitution, 
when Estonia was still a democratic country, and not on the basis of the authoritarian constitutions of 1933 
or 1937. The latter constitutions were ruled out as supportive of a non-democratic (semi-authoritarian) 
regime, and thus not suitable. In addition, further provisions were made to strengthen parliamentarianism, 
in order to avoid fragmentation and other problems that led to the establishment of authoritarian rule in the 
inter-war republic.126 The adoption of the 1938 Citizenship Law was not seen as undemocratic vis-à-vis 
the universal suffrage requirement.127 
 
In any case, due to the strict application of the principle of legal continuity, only about 80,000 of the 
approximately 600,000 non-Estonians living in Estonia automatically acquired Estonian nationality in 
1992.128 Residents of Estonia who had settled into the country during the Soviet period were considered as 
immigrants. They could acquire citizenship only upon request, provided that they also fulfilled specific 
prerequisites. Applicants had to be 18 years of age or older, or had to produce the accord of their parents 
or guardian. They were also required to master the Estonian language and had to have been permanently 
resident in Estonia for at least two years before and one year after the application.129 Persons without legal 
income, criminals, former members of the Soviet security services and active members of foreign armed 
forces were excluded from the naturalization process altogether.130 A decree of the Estonian government 
from 6 April 1992 regulated the procedures for naturalization.131 However, the law stipulating the exact 
requirements concerning the required knowledge of the Estonian language and the decree on the 
procedure of the language examination followed only in February and April 1993.132 Thus for more than 
one year the required level of Estonian-language proficiency remained unclear. Even more problematic 
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 was the provision in the decree on the re-enactment of the 1938 Law on Citizenship, which stipulated that 
the required two years of permanent residency were to be calculated only from 30 March 1990 onwards.133 
Consequentially, no one could be naturalized before 30 March 1993, regardless how long the applicant 
had actually been resident in Estonia, and independent of whether he or she spoke Estonian. All Soviet 
time settlers were thus effectively disfranchised at least from the constitutional referendum of June 1992 
and from the first elections of independent Estonia in September 1992. This also held true for those non-
Estonians who had registered as applicants for Estonian citizenship before the Congress of Estonia 
elections in 1990. These persons were exempted from the residency requirement and language exams only 
on 18 February 1993.134 As a result, not a single Russian-speaker was among the 101 deputies elected to 
the new parliament, the Riigikogu, in the September 1992 elections.  
 
Consequentially, the 1992 citizenship legislation not only failed to grant citizenship to the vast majority of 
Estonia's Russian-speaking population, but also prevented those non-Estonians who were qualified and 
ready to acquire Estonian citizenship from doing so immediately. Thereby, most Russian-speakers were 
effectively excluded from national politics in the early phase of Estonia's regained independence, during 
which important decisions concerning the future of the country were made. In fact, this was exactly what 
the Estonian legislators had intended. The citizenship legislation was adopted before the first free 
parliamentary elections in newly independent Estonia, in order to define who would have the right to 
participate in the elections (both as candidates and as voters). And one of the main reasons behind the 
exclusionary citizenship principle was clearly to bar the vast majority of non-Estonian settlers from 
participating in the first free parliamentary elections. It was feared that they could have potentially 
undermined the development of an independent and democratic Estonia. The decision-makers were 
suspicious whether the newcomers would not use their right to vote to succumb Estonia to Russia’s sphere 
of influence. 
 
Whereas ethnic Estonians were certain about their commitment to the newly independent Republic of 
Estonia, other ethnic groups in Estonia were more perplexed over the issue of the legacy of the 
disappearing Soviet Union vis-à-vis the emerging polities of Russia, Estonia and other post-Soviet 
republics. Non-Estonians were unsure which state they belonged to, or aspired to belong to. Whereas most 
ethnic Estonians came to uphold the independent Republic of Estonia, other Estonian ethnicities, such as 
Estonian Russians and Estonian Ukrainians, were greatly divided and confused over their identifications. 
Some of them maintained a Soviet identification, while others adopted a new identity according to their 
ethnic origin, supporting several of the Soviet successor states, such as Russia, the Ukraine or Belarus. By 
witnessing these developments, Estonian authorities doubted the minorities’ conviction towards the newly 
born Estonian state. As Linz and Stepan note: 
 
The key questions for a democratic multinational state are whether the minorities are or are not open to 
multiple and complementary political identities and loyalties and, if so, whether they will be given 
citizenship. If minorities’ cultural and political freedoms are guarantees, might they indeed become loyal 
citizens, or would their primary loyalty remain to the 'homeland' state?135 
 
The argument ran that Russian-speakers were not devoting their primary allegiance to Estonia and, by 
having ambiguous loyalties, could potentially undermine the existence of the Estonian state as such. In 
other words, those who did not support the common state could not belong to the Estonian political 
community, and could therefore not automatically be admitted as citizens. The fears about disloyalty can 
be understood if these are viewed in the particular historical context. The greatest source of distrust in this 
respect was caused by the non-Estonians’ resentment of Estonian independence.136 In the light of the 
strikes and demonstrations conducted by Russian-speakers in the late 1980s and early 1990s against 
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 Estonian independence, many Estonian politicians and parts of the general public were convinced that if 
all Russian-speakers were given the freedom and equal rights to take part in the decision-making process 
of the newly independent Estonia, they would use it to destroy the state and possibly reunite it with the 
Soviet Union. In less stark colours, granting citizenship to non-Estonians was seen as a destabilizing factor 
for the state, and would result in ‘unbalanced compromising’.137 
 
The granting of citizenship to those who had settled into the country during the forty years of Soviet rule 
was thus designed gradually. The slowdown in solving the citizenship issue of Soviet settlers was caused 
by the underlying idea that over time, the loyalty of non-Estonians towards the Estonian state would grow. 
Eventually, they would therefore depict less of a threat to Estonian independence. By gradually including 
non-Estonians into the political community, the Estonian state hoped and continues to hope to influence 
the value judgments of Russian-speakers. By testing, for example, the language skills of a person applying 
for citizenship, Estonian authorities pressure members of the Russian minority to become more Estonia-
oriented. 
 
Several surveys from the early 1990s give an idea of the actual interests of the people in Estonia. A survey 
dating from 1990 shows that over half of the Russian-speaking minority in Estonia identified themselves 
with Estonia. To the question "What is your primary territorial identity?" 37 per cent of non-Estonians 
answered "the Republic of Estonia" and 32 per cent "the locality where I live". Only 21 per cent of people 
identified themselves primarily with the Soviet Union.138 However, the Russian-speakers in Estonia 
continued to identify themselves with the Soviet Republic of Estonia, i.e. with Estonia as a part of the 
Soviet Union. In a survey on the future of the Republic, 77 per cent of non-Estonians believed Estonia’s 
future lay within the USSR, and only 11 per cent were in favour of Estonia’s independence. Respective 
figures for ethnic Estonians were 12 and 87 per cent.139 The survey shows how significantly different the 
perceptions on the republic's future between Estonians and non-Estonians were. In this light, it is not 
surprising that the Russian-speakers' anti-independence attitude was seen as a threat to Estonia’s future as 
an independent and democratic state. 
 
However, very different results emerged from a survey in which Russian-speaking respondents in 
independent Estonia were presented with the citizenship question. In yet another survey that was 
conducted in 1990, the proportion of people who preferred Estonian citizenship to any other one was 49 
per cent. Even if they would be compelled to relinquish their citizenship of another country, 78 per cent 
still preferred the Estonian citizenship.140 In a survey conducted in 1991, 38 per cent of Russian-speakers 
preferred Russian citizenship, while 49 per cent would choose to become citizens of Estonia. 66 per cent 
of non-Estonians preferred a solution through which permanent residents of Estonia would have the option 
to become Estonian citizens while maintaining their Soviet or respective Russian citizenship.141 In another 
survey conducted in 1991, only every twentieth non-Estonian stated that they would refuse Estonian 
citizenship under any condition.142 
 
These results could be interpreted either way, and can be used to support opposing points of views by 
using different figures. Some commentators justify the harsh citizenship policy using these numbers, 
pointing out that the majority of non-Estonians wanted Estonia to remain a part of the Soviet Union. The 
counter-argument runs that over half of non-Estonians primarily identified themselves with Estonia, on 
either the national or the local level, and were interested in acquiring Estonian citizenship. Thus, by 
conducting the right policies, their commitment and trust in the Estonian state could have been increased 
and consolidated. However, the exclusive approach threatened to exclude even those non-Estonians who 
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 originally supported Estonian independence. What can be said with certainty is that the threats of possible 
disloyalty were greatly exaggerated and over-politicised.  
 
As result of this over-politicisation of the loyalty issue, a Law on Citizenship was adopted that inaugurated 
a particular situation in Estonia, in which only two thirds of Estonian residents were actually Estonian 
citizens who were entitled to vote, while the remaining third were stapled as aliens, having no political 
representation. The distinction between citizens and immigrants is valid to some extent, but the polity 
consisting of thirty per cent non-citizens is abnormal and extremely dysfunctional. Therefore, "the 
transition to democracy requires social and political institutions to integrate these large immigrant 
populations",143 and that these are accepted as citizens. Otherwise the democratic claim is not a sufficient 
one. In fact, the Estonian polity is considered an "ethnic democracy"144 by most scholars who study the 
country. In other words, Estonia is a democratic state, but one with ethnic elements which skew towards 
the ethnic Estonian majority and place the Russian-speaking minority in disadvantaged position.145 
Discrimination did of course not formally exist on the basis of ethnicity in the new citizenship legislation: 
Those who had been citizens of the inter-war republic, including also their descendants, received 
citizenship, independent of their ethnic belonging. But although the wording of the law has no ethnic 
connotation, its hidden purpose (Estonia for Estonians) is obvious, and consequently the legal problem of 
the naturalization of Soviet-time immigrants appears to be one of ethnic minority.146  
 
As one should have expected, the adoption of the Law on Citizenship and its connotations did not go 
down well with Russian-speakers, who suddenly found themselves as being alien in a "foreign" country, 
without having moved abroad. In March 1992 a big protest meeting in Tallinn denounced Estonian 
independence and called for the establishment of ‘Baltic Russia’. In April the energy workers in Narva 
carried out a warning strike, demanding automatic citizenship for all Russians in Estonia.147 However, 
ethnic relations in Estonia ded not turn violent after 1992, and also the Estonian expectation that Soviet-
time settlers would have to leave the country did not materialize. Around 65,000 non-Estonians did 
permanently leave Estonia between 1991 and 1993. However, the rate of migration slowed down already 
in summer 1992 when Estonia adopted its own currency. And as the living standard gap between Estonia 
and Russia continued to grow in the following years, migration reached a nearly insignificant level in the 
mid-1990s.148 Some Estonian radicals have actually claimed that the monetary reform undermined the 
migration of Russians-speakers. They argue that it would have been preferable if the Estonian currency 
had adopted later, as Estonia would now have to deal with a much smaller number of Russian-speakers. 
However, the early adoption of its own currency geared Estonia off to sharp and rapid economic growth. 
 
A short while later, the economic argument in relation to the Russian minority was used in a very different 
context. The Russian-speaking minority is considered to be better off in Estonia than in their country of 
origin. Because the economic situation in Russia is significantly worse than in Estonia, "there is 
willingness on the part of Estonians and Russians to discuss ‘bread and butter issues’."149 As Taagepera 
assumes, the better economic situation of Russians in Estonia in comparison to the situation of those in 
Russia is a good basis for integration. The reasoning behind this is that ethnic unrest or any substantial 
instability would negatively affect the economic situation in Estonia and the two ethnic communities 
therefore prefer reasonable co-existence, or more correctly stated, parallel existence. Thus, the kind of 
pragmatism of inter-ethnic relations in Estonia is driven by economic reasoning. In most of the analyses 
on ethnic relations in Estonia, authors stress the pragmatism of Estonian politics.150 Analysts are mostly 
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 surprised that the Estonian and the non-Estonian communities have not engaged in violent confrontation. 
Despite the injustice that Russian-speakers have to bear in face of Estonian-centred policies, as well as the 
mutual distrust between Russian-speakers and Estonians in general, ethnic violence has not erupted in 
Estonia.  
 
In addition to economic reasoning, another explanation why ethnic tensions have not amounted to 
threatening levels in Estonia lies in the fragmentation of the Russian-speaking population. Already the 
term 'Russian-speaking population' indicates that we are not talking about a distinct group, but about 
people with different ethnic and political identities, united through one language. Russian-speakers 
include also Jewish people, Belarusians, Ukrainians and others who migrated to Estonia during the Soviet 
period, and who thus faced the same citizenship and residency issues as Russians did. Nevertheless, 
Russians are the largest group among the new settlers (almost 80 per cent), and are the most organized 
group in representing their interests. On the other hand, Russians and other non-Estonians who had lived 
in Estonia prior to 1940, and who had been citizens of Estonia at that time, were considered Estonian 
citizens also after 1992. These persons used to be more integrated into Estonian society, and belonged to a 
different social strata than the industrial workers and party officials who settled into Estonia during Soviet 
times.151 As Estonian citizens, they also held a different legal status and were able to participate in the 
political process. Moreover, Russian-speakers were divided between moderate democrats, who had 
supported Estonian independence, and pro-Soviet hardliners.  
 
A majority of [the democratic leaders] favoured Estonia’s independence or, at least, did not oppose it [...]. So 
they expected, not unfoundedly, that they would participate in future nation building, and within the 
framework of a civic project. Therefore, leaders of the Russian Democratic Movement (established in August 
1991) and the Representative Assembly (1993) consistently avoided an ethnic mobilisation approach for the 
Russians and tried to find contacts with moderate Estonian political forces instead.152 
 
Thus the Russian-speakers in Estonia remained politically divided and, consequently, two rather opposing 
bodies were formed. First, the Russian Assembly was created with the goal to represent the interests of 
non-citizens. Its organizers were moderately disposed and aimed to represent the whole Russian-speaking 
non-citizen population. The Russian Assembly appealed to the Estonian parliament to recognize the 
existence of the problems of Russian-speakers, and called for re-enacting the citizenship law. Their 
leaders argued that:  
 
Russians who settled in the Estonia during the Soviet regime had no idea the country was occupied and 
cannot thus be treated as illegal immigrants the way Estonia has been regarding them, [in addition] Russian 
settlers should be given Estonian citizenship as many of them have lived in the country for a long time.153  
 
More radical Russian leaders regarded the assembly as ‘too subservient’ to Estonians and distanced 
themselves from it. They formed an alternative body called the Russian Community, which was a 
hardliner nationalist organization, uniting only Russians and identifying itself with Vladimir Zhirinovski’s 
Liberal Democratic Party in Russia.154 The organization called for unconditional Estonian citizenship to be 
offered to all Russians, as well as for the legalization of dual citizenship.155  
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 3.2 Estonia's Law on Citizenship and International Reactions  
 
The citizenship legislation provoked dissatisfaction also in Russia proper. The Russian government, and in 
particular the Russian parliament started to make frequent statements about alleged human rights abuses in 
Estonia. According to Russia, Estonia employed legal and political means to hound out the Russian 
population. In fact, the Law on Citizenship marked an important turn in the Russian-Estonian relations. In 
the early 1990s, President Yeltsin had been a strong proponent of Estonia’s independence. At the time, 
Russian and Baltic leaders were united in their opposition to the Soviet leadership and the pro-Soviet 
forces in the Baltic Republics. When OMON troops of the Soviet Interior Ministry wreaked bloodshed in 
Vilnius and Riga in January 1991, Yeltsin travelled to Tallinn in order to back the Baltic leaders. The 
friendly approach taken by the liberal Russian government towards the Baltic states initially prevailed also 
in 1991, as the official Russian foreign policy makers, President Boris Yeltsin and Foreign Minister 
Andrei Kozyrev, were mainly interested in the economic aspects of foreign policy, and thus in good 
relations with the West.156 The problems of the Russian diaspora were not high on the government’s 
agenda at the time.157 The Estonian-Russian Agreement from 12 January 1991 stipulated that any person 
living on the territory of either Estonia or the RSFSR had the right to receive or retain the citizenship of 
the RSFSR or the Republic of Estonia, in accordance with the free expression of his or her will.158 Thus, 
from the Russian point of view, the settlers were supposed to receive the Estonian citizenship. As the 
Estonian side then disregarded this agreement by deciding to re-enact the 1938 Law on Citizenship, 
Estonian-Russian relations became more strained. The tension tightened as the liberal foreign policy of 
Andrei Kozyrev increasingly came under fire in Russia, and the influence of so-called national democrats 
grew. In order to maintain his popularity in Russia and to fight back the increasing criticism of hardliners, 
Yeltsin had to radicalise his foreign policy position. This resulted in the development of a new foreign 
policy concept that tended towards the so-called near-abroad concept, through which the protection of the 
Russian diaspora became a priority in Russian foreign policy.159 The Russian Foreign Ministry had started 
to prepare this new doctrine based on a foreign policy strategy seminar organized by the Moscow 
International Relations Institute. Among other, the seminar concluded that Russia could use economic 
sanctions and use force to protect the human and minority rights in the territories of the former Soviet 
Union. Also, Russia should encourage Russian-speakers to remain in the newly independent states, in 
order to allow Russia to assert political influence on these countries.160 Consequently, Russia's stance vis-
à-vis Estonia became much tougher. Although Kozyrev still used the framework of international 
agreements and organizations, such as the OSCE, to protect Russian minorities in the ‘near abroad’,161 
unilateral measures increasingly came to the fore. Russia temporarily cut off its gas supply to Estonia and 
in October 1992, President Yeltsin, linking the issue of Russian troops in Estonia with the fate of the 
Russian diaspora, announced the suspension of the troops' withdrawal.162 
 
Another issue that outraged Russia and caused tension between the two states was Estonia’s territorial 
claims on Russia. The territories east to the Narva River and Lake Peipsi, which had become part of 
Estonia as result of the Tartu Peace Treaty of 1920, had been transferred from the Estonian SSR to the 
Russian Socialist Federative Soviet Republic (RSFSR) in 1946. The territorial claim was part of Estonia’s 
legal continuity argument: If Soviet occupation in Estonia had been illegal, so had all territorial changes 
that had been made during the occupation. The territorial claim was of course too much for Russia to 
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 swallow, and it was bluntly refused. The claim resulted in the hardening of Russia’s other policies towards 
Estonia, as the ‘arrogant’ Estonians had to be taught a lesson. The issue stalled border negotiations 
between the two states, as well as the troop withdrawal issue. By the end of 1994 Estonia dropped the 
territorial claim, but until today the border treaty between Estonia and Russia has not been signed.163  
 
To defend itself against Russian allegations, Estonia turned especially to Western countries and 
international organizations. Shortly after independence, Estonia had not only established a multitude of 
bilateral relations, but also joined several international organizations. In 1991 Estonia became a member 
of UN and the OSCE. In 1992 Estonia participated in the founding of the Council of Baltic Sea States 
(CBSS). And in 1993 Estonia was accepted as a member in the Council of Europe (CoE). Membership in 
these organizations was an important symbol for the re-establishment of Estonia’s existence as an 
independent state in the international scene. Moreover, these international organizations as well as 
influential states such as the USA or Nordic countries supported Estonia's independence. However, they 
also called for Estonia to respect minority rights. The Clinton administration's main goal was to keep 
Yeltsin in power, and this demanded for a more critical stance on the Baltics’ minority policies. Even 
though the "US policy of non-recognition of the Soviet annexation is entirely consistent with the Baltic 
requirement that post-war immigrants and their descendants should not all gain citizenship 
automatically",164 US officials did call for the relaxation of naturalization rules to be adopted, as well as 
for promotion of new immigrants’ acquisition of Estonian citizenship. 
 
Western states were especially concerned with Estonian citizenship legislation, as they feared that the 
exclusion of a large part of Estonia's population from political participation would trigger internal disputes 
that could escalate into violent conflict. This could in turn destabilize the Baltic region.165 Seeing a 
possibility to fend off Russian allegations with the help of the international community, Estonia was ready 
not only to accept, but also even to invite international organizations to study the situation of minorities in 
Estonia. Thus, driven by their own concerns, Russian demands and Estonia's readiness, the Council of 
Europe, the OSCE, the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD), the UN, as well as 
several non-governmental organizations dispatched fact-finding missions to Estonia.166 The missions 
visiting Estonia between autumn 1991 and spring 1993 of course particularly focussed on the citizenship 
legislation. These missions "did not agree among themselves as whether the denial of citizenship was a 
violation of human rights, as Russia stated."167 Whereas Asbjörn Eide, rapporteur of the EBRD, came to 
the conclusion that "the denial of citizenship to substantial parts of the resident population is […] likely to 
generate serious human rights problems",168 the rapporteur of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council 
of Europe stated that: 
 
the exclusion of the major part of the non-Estonian minority from the referendum on the constitution and 
from the first parliamentary and presidential elections, although in itself a flaw from the democratic point of 
view, is not a sufficient reason for denying Estonia membership of the Council of Europe.169 
 
Based on the acceptance of the Estonian argumentation that a distinction has to be drawn between long-
standing minorities and immigrants,170 the Council of Europe, on 14 May 1993, invited Estonia to become 
a member.171 However, some member states found it discriminatory that the Russian-speaking population, 
which amounted to 40 per cent of the entire population, had been ineligible to vote. The report of the 
                                                 
163  Estonia demands that Russia recognize the Tartu Peace Treaty, which was signed between Estonia and Russia in 1920. Only 
through this act would it be clear that Russia firstly recognizes Estonia as an independent state that was occupied by the 
Soviet Union, and secondly admits to the illegitimacy of the Soviet occupation.  
164  The Baltic Independent, 19 March 1993, Wind from the West wavers, for now.  
165  Cf. Birckenbach 1997a, p. 11. 
166  See Birckenbach 1997a, pp. 96-421 for a selection of international reports on Estonia. 
167  Birckenbach 1997b, p. 12. 
168  EBRD Progress Report, 11 March 1992, para. 7. 
169  CoE/PA, Doc. 6810, 14 April 1993, para. 40, p. 14. 
170  Cf. CoE/PA, Doc. 6810, 14 April 1993, para. 36, p. 13; and Doc. 6824, 5 May 1993, p. 1. 
171  Cf. CoE/PA, Doc. 6841, 14 May 1993. 
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 rapporteur was also critical on this issue. The Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe therefore 
introduced a monitoring procedure, in order to assess how Estonia (and other new member states) honour 
their commitments as members of the Council of Europe. It continuously assesses the situation with 
respect to the rule of law, human rights and fundamental freedoms in Estonia.172 
 
The Baltic Sea Council also became engaged in similar monitoring, and created, partly as a result of 
Russia’s pressure, the post of High Commissioner for Human Rights and Minorities. This idea was 
originally opposed by most member states, as the responsibilities of the new position overlapped with the 
High Commissioner on National Minorities of the OSCE. 
 
The United Nations also sent a fact-finding mission to Estonia in early 1993,173 but did not carry out 
follow-ups on this issue. In contrast to the UN, the OSCE was involved in Estonia on a regular basis. First, 
a fact-finding mission of the OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR) 
visited Estonia in December 1992, after receiving an invitation from the Estonian government and based 
on Rule Four of the so-called Moscow Mechanism of the OSCE.174 In addition, this mission was 
concerned with the situation of a large number of stateless residents,175 and provided a number of 
recommendations. Moreover, a Personal Representative of the Chairman-in-Office visited Estonia in late 
1992, and reported to the Committee of Senior Officials (CSO). Based on this report, the CSO decided on 
13 December 1992 "to establish a small CSCE Mission in Estonia for a period of six months,[…] in order 
to further promote integration and better understanding between the communities in Estonia."176 
 
The terms of reference for this long-term mission were fixed by the CSO on 3 February 1993,177 and the 
mission started its work in April 1993. Until its termination on 31 December 2001, it acted also as the 
"eyes and ears"178 of the OSCE High Commissioner on National Minorities. The HCNM became the main 
instrument of the OSCE for conflict prevention in Estonia, and the following chapters will therefore 
concentrate on the activities of Max van der Stoel, who had accepted the post of High Commissioner on 
National Minorities in December 1992, and who served in this position until 30 June 2001. One of the first 
things he undertook in his new role was to visit the Baltic states, after being invited by the Baltic 
governments.  
 
 
3.3 HCNM Recommendations on the Law on Citizenship of 1992 
 
During his first visits to Estonia on 12-13 January and 30-31 March 1993, the HCNM met with political, 
cultural and religious leaders of both Estonian and Russian communities, and informed himself on their 
points of views on citizenship questions. He also met with the Russian ambassador to Estonia, Aleksandr 
Trofimov, who claimed that the HCNM had characterized the situation for foreigners in Estonia as 
“bad.”179 The High Commissioner also visited Russia and met with Deputy Prime Minister Sergei 
Shakhrai. Even though he refrained from making public statements about his visits to the Baltics at that 
point, the Russian account of his views was widely reported.180 Russia continued to make complaints to 
the OSCE about the position of Russian-speakers in the Baltics, whereas in the Estonian press the High 
                                                 
172  Cf. CoE/PA, Order No. 485 (1993), Order No. 488 (1993), Order 508 (1995) and Resolution 1031 (1994). 
173  Cf. UN Fact-Finding Mission to Estonia, 31 March 1993. 
174  Cf. CSCE Moscow Meeting, 3 October 1991: "A participating State may invite the assistance of CSCE mission, consisting 
of up to three experts, to address or contribute to the resolution of questions in its territory relating to the human dimension 
of the CSCE. In such case, the State will select the person or persons concerned from the resource list. The mission of 
experts will not include the participating State's own nationals or residents or any of the persons it appointed to the resource 
list or more than one national or resident of any particular State."  
175  Cf. CSCE/ODIHR Report on the Study of Estonian Legislation, December 1992, para. 70. 
176  CSCE 18-CSO/Journal,No. 3 Annex 2, 13 December 1992. 
177  Cf. CSCE 19-CSO/Journal No. 2, Annex 1, 3 February 1993. 
178  Ugglas 1994, p. 26. 
179  The Baltic Independent, 29 January 1993, UN team invited to Estonia. 
180  Ibid. 
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 Commissioner was quoted as denying the existence of any ‘serious’ inter-ethnic conflict. He was ‘slightly 
optimistic’ about the Baltics’ future, and did not see any insoluble problems: "Both sides are aware of the 
importance of a good solution. But only when they are not getting too emotional."181  
 
The High Commissioner's visits were shortly followed by his first letter of recommendation to Estonian 
Foreign Minister Trivimi Velliste. In this letter, the HCNM mainly addressed issues relating to citizenship 
acquisition, and elaborated more general recommendations on dialogue and the exchange of information. 
By the time Van der Stoel took up his office and made his first recommendations to the Estonian 
government, the Law on Citizenship had already been in force for a year, and the first batch of applicants 
were becoming citizens. Thus, it was already rather fixed that if a Soviet immigrant wished to become an 
Estonian citizen, he or she would have to go through the application procedures defined in the law. 
Estonia’s admission to the Council of Europe was seen as an acceptance of the existing citizenship law, 
and also as a positive acknowledgement of Estonia’s domestic policies. Once the original division 
between citizens and non-citizens had been made, and especially after this division had been accepted in 
principle by the international community, everyone’s attention turned to how the Soviet-time settlers 
could obtain Estonian citizenship according to the rules set out in the Law on Citizenship. The High 
Commissioner therefore concentrated the focus of his first letter on how to make the naturalization 
conditions simpler and smoother for Russian-speakers.182 His original goal was to promote naturalization 
among Soviet settlers, to avoid statelessness and, thus, to avoid any serious inter-ethnic tensions from 
arising. As one could read in a Tallinn-based Russian daily, also Russians themselves came to believe that 
the Law on Citizenship was there to stay, and that they should act accordingly:  
 
It would be naïve to expect any relaxation in the citizenship requirements. Let’s admit it – the citizenship law 
is not so severe as it has often been depicted in the press. Only three years for residence, after all. […] The 
essence of the problem seems to be in the negative attitude [of local Russians] towards the language of the 
small Estonian nation, something we have inherited from the times of the big empire. […] We already missed 
the chance of voting in the 1992 parliamentary elections. Now, after Estonia’s admission to Council of 
Europe, there is no sense in continuing this lost battle. After becoming citizens we can protect our interests 
and rights ourselves through the existing bodies of power.183 
 
However, the newly implemented law had its flaws, loopholes, and a more reactionary than thoroughly 
deliberated policy behind it. When the re-enacted Law on Citizenship came into force in February 1992, 
the text of the law was not published in its completeness. Only a Supreme Council decision on 
implementing the law was published in the official law gazette Riigi Teataja.184 This decision specified, 
inter alia, which paragraphs of the pre-war law would not be implemented, but it did not list those 
paragraphs that would be. Some additional paragraphs had also been added to the Law on Citizenship. 
However, the Supreme Council decision on the Law constantly referred to paragraphs in the old law 
without fully articulating them anew. This created a confusing situation, in which the exact content and 
wording of the version of the Law of Citizenship was difficult to determine. Several aspects that appeared 
to be included in the newly established legislation, but that were not meant to be there, were overlooked. 
Also, as mentioned above, some archaic constructions, e.g. citizenship being passed on only by paternal 
line, were left intact in the beginning. These were excluded from the law by amendments only in the 
following years, as these out-of-date tensions that had initially been overlooked became obvious only 
later. When the complete law was finally made public, exaggerated fears and suspicions about the actual 
content of the law arose in those who were not automatically granted citizenship. Consequently, the 
HCNM criticized, inter alia, the lack of information provided by the Estonian government, and urged it to 
inform "the non-Estonian population about the legislation, regulations and practical questions which 
concern citizenship, language requirements etcetera."185 
                                                 
181  The Baltic Independent, 9 April 1993, Europe’s man speaks softly.  
182  Cf. HCNM Letter to Velliste, 6 April 1993. 
183  Authors translation, Estonia, 20 May 1993, Strasburg i grazhdanstvo [Strasbourg and citizenship]. 
184  Riigi Teataja is a state publication on new legislation. 
185  HCNM Letter to Velliste, 6 April 1993, para. 11. 
 30
 The basic procedures for the citizenship application were laid out by the 1992 Law on Citizenship, which 
also listed several conditions that the applicant was required to fulfil or needed to take into account. First, 
the Estonian citizenship legislation does not, in general, allow for multiple citizenship. Thus people who 
apply for naturalization in Estonia would have to give up any other citizenship they held.186 As already 
mentioned, persons wishing to apply for Estonian citizenship were also required to have resided 
permanently in Estonia for at least two years prior to, and one year after applying.187 Permanent residency 
was counted from 30 March 1990 onwards.188 Most Russian-speakers who had lived in Estonia since that 
date were thus eligible to apply for naturalization two months after the Citizenship Law came into force, 
and could receive Estonian citizenship by 1 April 1993. However, in its decision on the re-enactment of 
the 1938 Law on Citizenship, the Supreme Council had stipulated that applications from persons who 
were working, or who had worked in foreign armies or in security and intelligence bodies of Soviet Union 
would not be processed for naturalization. Applications would also not be accepted from persons who had 
committed serious criminal offences, or who had been repeatedly punished under criminal procedure for 
intentionally committed criminal offences. Moreover, every applicant had to sign an oath of loyalty for the 
Estonian state which reads: "In applying for Estonian citizenship, I swear to be loyal to the constitutional 
order of Estonia."189 
 
Persons applying for citizenship were also required to prove that they received a steady legal income in 
order for their application to be taken to consideration.190 This requirement was a slightly worrisome issue 
for the HCNM, as he feared that unemployed people would not be able to apply for citizenship, especially 
as unemployment had been a great worry among Russian-speakers.191 Although the Estonian government's 
interpretation included unemployment benefits as legal income, it did not address the High 
Commissioner’s concerns in this respect directly. Thus, the High Commissioner recommended "it should 
be made explicit that the requirement that applicants have a steady legal income in order to qualify for 
citizenship will not apply for unemployed people."192 However, no further specification was made in 
additional legislation on what was meant by ‘steady legal income’ in order to avoid varying readings of 
the income requirement. Only in the new Citizenship Law of 1995 was the steady legal income 
requirement explicitly pronounced to include also unemployment benefits, social benefits and support of 
another family member with a steady legal income. Through steady legal income, the applicant has to 
guarantee to maintain him/herself and his/her dependants. The enumeration includes a legally earned 
wage, profit, pension, stipend, allowance, social benefits (including unemployment benefits and child 
support), or maintenance by a person with a steady legal income.193 
 
The most important and difficult condition stated in the law was, however, the language requirement: The 
applicant was required to demonstrate his or her knowledge of the Estonian language by taking a language 
test.194 This was the real cornerstone of naturalization, whereas the requirement of the above-mentioned 
loyalty oath could be seen as being void. The oath in itself was not seen as a sufficient proof of loyalty, as 
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194  Cf. Kodakondsus seadus [Law on Citizenship], 1938, para. 6, p. 3.  
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 the "homo sovieticus is used to change[sic.] allegiances without painful reconsiderations and to sign 
documents without reading them."195 Accordingly, exemptions from the language test, as well as other 
special conditions for naturalization, were granted to persons who had applied for Estonian citizenship 
prior to the creation of the Estonian Congress in February 1990.196 Exemptions were also granted to those 
persons who were of special merit to the Estonian state and society.197 These persons were viewed as 
having proven their loyalty to the Estonian state in practice. For humanitarian reasons, disabled and 
elderly people and pensioners were also exempted from some parts of the language test.198 However, the 
language test, as required from most applicants, seemed to be demanding and appeared to be the main 
stumbling block in the naturalization process. Therefore, most criticism on the citizenship legislation was 
directed against the language requirements, which were laid out in more detail in February 1993 in a 
separate Law on Estonian Language Requirements for Applicants for Citizenship.199 The regulations laid 
down in this law, as well as those made by the High Commissioner in this regard will be discussed in 
more detail below. 
 
The language exam, as regulated in the Law on Estonian Language Requirements for Applicants for 
Citizenship, aimed at testing the applicant’s comprehension, speaking, reading and writing skills. All parts 
of the exam were limited to specific formats and topics. For example, comprehension and reading tests 
could include, for example, an announcement or a news item. The discussion part included ten proposed 
topics concerning mainly the applicant’s everyday life or issues related to Estonia (e.g. towns, holidays). 
Finally, in the written part of the exam, applicants could, for example, choose whether to fill out a form, 
write a CV or write an address on an envelope.200 It is important to note that not the applicant’s knowledge 
of the topic was relevant for the evaluation, but rather the capability to understand or express him/herself. 
  
As with some other issues, the HCNM by and large accepted the general framework of the existing 
language and citizenship legislation. He thus recognized the right of the Estonian state to require a basic 
knowledge of the state language as a precondition for citizenship acquisition, and did not call for the 
abolition of the language requirement as such. However, already at an early date the HCNM pointed out 
that fears existed among Russian-speakers that the language requirements could prove to be an 
insuperable obstacle for their naturalization.201 Summing up his recommendations, one can state that the 
HCNM's underlying message was that the language tests should be made easier to some extent, but not in 
a way that this would undermine the overall naturalization process. 
 
Taking the existing legal framework into account, the High Commissioner recommended in particular to 
simplify the naturalization process by lowering the language requirement level. In relation to the early 
versions of the language requirements, the HCMN was especially discontented with the minimum amount 
of 2,500 words that the Estonian language law set as a vocabulary requirement. The HCNM recommended 
that the ability to conduct a simple conversation would be considered sufficient, and recalled that usually 
knowledge of 1,500 words is enough to make oneself understood.202 The ability to conduct a simple 
conversation as the sufficient level for acquiring citizenship was stressed again in Van der Stoel’s 
communication to the Estonian President, as well as in a public statement that was made later in the 
year.203 These recommendations were, however, ignored and the Law on Language Requirements 
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 remained basically unchanged until the introduction of the new Law on Citizenship in 1995, which will be 
discussed in chapter 4.2. 
 
Another particular point of concern for the High Commissioner with regard to the language exam was the 
language requirement for elderly and disabled persons: Van der Stoel recommended that persons born 
before 1 January 1930, as well as disabled persons, should be exempted from the language requirement 
altogether. At the time when the Law on Citizenship was under discussion in 1992, some voices indeed 
advocated the exemption of pensioners from the language test,204 but in the end all specifications and 
exemptions were left out of the Law on Citizenship and the decision on its implementation. However, the 
newly elected parliament included the special conditions on granting citizenship in a separate law on 
language requirements in February 1993. In this law, possible exemptions were also to be granted to 
elderly people.205 The HCNM was glad and hopeful to see that the given law on language requirements 
opened a possibility for exemptions, or at least that it simplified the procedures for elderly and disabled 
persons.206  
 
In fact, the resolution on language requirements for applicants for Estonian citizenship was passed under 
close scrutiny of the international community,207 and the Estonian government partly took Van der Stoel’s 
recommendation into account when it drafted the regulation on the language test’s content and evaluation. 
At this point, however, it should also be noted that the relaxation of the language requirements was also 
affected by Estonia’s wish to ease the country’s entrance into the Council of Europe, which had 
recommended to base the protection of minorities on the policies of the European Convention for the 
Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms.208 As a result of these combined efforts, the new 
regulation established that persons born before 1930 would be exempted from the written test and from 
three discussion topics out of ten.209 Exemptions also applied to invalids, depending on their disability. For 
example, people with sight deficiencies would not have to fulfil the reading and writing part of the exam. 
The language knowledge of Estonian of those people with hearing and speaking defects would only be 
tested through a written exam.210 
 
However, these regulations still fell short of what the HCNM had recommended. Consequently, Van der 
Stoel expressed his dissatisfaction with the fact that elderly people (persons over 60 years) and disabled 
persons were not completely exempted from the language requirements, as he had hoped for and as had 
been recommended already by the ODIHR mission in 1992.211 Van der Stoel continued to voice his 
recommendation to waive the above-mentioned population groups from all language requirements. 
However, he did so without much success.  
 
As the High Commissioner was not only worried about the legal side of the language issue, but even more 
so about the fair and transparent implementation of language testing, he also pointed out that the language 
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 33
 test should be the same for all applicants, and should not be bound to subjective evaluation or varying 
conditions.212 The High Commissioner was especially concerned whether the Law on Language 
Requirements could be open to various interpretations, and whether the uniformity of language testing was 
guaranteed, as the exams were to be carried out locally. He therefore expressed his hope that this problem 
would be remedied by a subsequent point in the legal act, according to which the Estonian government 
would establish more concrete procedures for the language examination.213 Such procedures trying to 
guarantee transparency and uniformity on a national level were established still in the same year.214 Exam 
commissions were to be composed of three persons, who were to be appointed by the Ministry of Culture 
and Education. The Estonian Language Department would appoint chairpersons for the commissions. The 
attestation and appointment of examiners on the national level would guarantee a certain degree of 
uniformity in their actions. The local language centres had to report to the Language Department on exam 
results once a month. In addition, persons from the language centre held the right to observe exam 
procedures and could question the commission's decisions. Such supervision would add to the 
transparency of exam procedures.215  
 
Somewhat complicated, in any case, was the complaint procedure in the case of unfair treatment. The 
plaintiff was required to pass three instances before a final decision could be made. If the examined person 
was not satisfied with the commission’s decision, he or she could turn to the local government for review. 
If the city or county council’s ruling was seen to be dissatisfactory as well, the complaint would be 
forwarded to the Ministry of Culture and Education, and only thereafter would the matter be taken up in 
court.216 Following up on a corresponding remark by the HCNM, the Estonian Foreign Ministry claimed 
that an opportunity to re-take the language test existed if the applicant were to fail the first exam, and that 
no limitations were planned. Since the adoption of these procedures, the High Commissioner no longer 
address his concerns on the transparency of the language testing process, which indicates that he viewed 
the adopted legislation as satisfactory.  
 
At this point, it should also be noted that the High Commissioner further recommended to the Estonian 
government that persons who had failed to receive Estonian citizenship due to lacking language or 
residency requirements should be allowed to re-apply. As already mentioned above, the language exam 
could be re-taken in case of failure before the final decision of granting citizenship. However, the 
procedure following actual rejection of naturalization due to the above-mentioned reasons was not 
specified. This means that persons who had been rejected citizenship could potentially apply again, 
because among the conditions under which Estonian citizenship were to be denied to applicants, failure of 
the language test or failure to meet residency requirements were not mentioned.217 
 
Moreover, the HCNM stressed the need for Estonian officials to pay extensive attention to language 
training, so that people could acquire the necessary language knowledge to pass the test. He also 
recommended greater publicity about the requirements, so that potential citizenship candidates would not 
be scared away in advance. Another concern of the HCNM was also the high costs for language training 
and the language exam. In his letter to the Estonian Foreign Minister in July 1993, Van der Stoel hoped 
that Estonian authorities would ensure that the costs of the language exam would not "constitute a 
prohibitive financial burden for potential applicants."218 In fact, the cost of the language exam as such 
composed only a minor part of this concern. In 1993, the regulation on exam procedures set the price of 
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 the language test to fifteen per cent of the minimum wage, which cannot be considered as being too 
high.219 In addition, students, school pupils, pensioners, disabled persons and the unemployed were 
waived from the fees.220 More excessive were the preparation costs for the actual language training and for 
the preparatory materials. The state had to guarantee only ten hours of language consultations free of 
charge, which was in most cases insufficient for passing the language exam.221 As state language courses 
were offered not only by the State Language Teaching Centre, but also by private language schools, the 
prices for language course were formed in market conditions, and became a profitable business.222 In 
addition, waiving the costs of a repetition of the exam could be decided only individually for each case. In 
order to fill this gap, international organizations such as UNDP and the EU, as well as single countries 
such as the Nordic states, the United Kingdom or Germany, assisted in sharing the costs of language 
training, both in terms of demand and supply.223  
 
 
3.4 Language Training - the Double Responsibility Towards Naturalization and Integration 
 
While other issues related to the Estonian language exam have faded, language training has been and 
continues to grow into an increasingly demanding task. On the one hand, the success rate with regard to 
the language exams is high. On the other hand, it is difficult to determine how many people are not 
applying for naturalization out of fear that they would fail the language test. The number of those who 
have not received appropriate or sufficient language training in order to pass the citizenship exam could be 
quite high.  
 
One aspect of the naturalization process relates to the Estonian language requirements that are demanded 
in order to become a citizen. However, the language question is a much broader issue, and reaches far 
beyond concerns about naturalization. The HCNM has expressed his consideration for language problems 
not only with regard to the naturalization process, but also in respect to the Estonian language as the 
prerequisite to overall integration.224 Van der Stoel's recommendations concerning the knowledge of 
Estonian language have often been viewed as being contradictory. However, they could also be seen as the 
opposite sides of the same coin. While calling for the simplification of the language test, the HCNM has, 
at the same time, always stressed the importance of Estonian-language acquisition and teaching among 
Russian-speakers as the basis of inter-ethnic integration and dialogue. The language requirements for 
citizenship cannot be isolated from the general problem of the low Estonian-language knowledge among 
non-Estonians. Moreover, sociological studies indicate that only few Russians-speakers learn Estonian for 
the purpose of acquiring Estonian citizenship. Reasons that were identified as being much more common 
were that Estonian happens to be the language of the country where they live, and that it is a means of 
communication in their multi-ethnic working environment.225 This subchapter combines these two 
language-related issues - Estonian language knowledge as a prerequisite for naturalization and social 
integration will be discussed respectively.  
 
                                                 
219  Cf. Kultuuri- ja Haridusministeerium [Ministry of Culture and Education], Määrus No. 10 [Regulation No. 10], Riigikeele 
eksami läbiviimise kord [Regulation of the procedures of state language exam], 9 July 1993. In 1995 the exam fee was 
raised to 20 per cent of the minimum wage. Määrus No. 250 [Regulation No. 250], Eesti keele oskuse eksami ning Eesti 
Vabariigi põhiseaduse ja kodakondsuse seaduse tundmise eksami läbiviimise kord [Estonian language and constitution 
exams], 20 June 1995, para. 2. In 1999 the fees for the citizenship application exam was 169 Estonian crowns 
(approximately 11 USD), which is twenty per cent of the minimum wage. Estonia Today: Foreign Ministry’s information 
and fact sheet series: Citizenship and Integration Policy. 
220  Cf. Määrus No. 118 [Regulation No. 118], Naturalisatsiooni korras kodakondsuse taotleja eesti keele eksami tingimused ja 
sisu eelistused [Evaluation of citizenship applicant’s language knowledge], 23 April 1993.  
221  Cf. Kultuuri- ja Haridusministeerium [Ministry of Culture and Education], Määrus No. 10 [Regulation No. 10], Riigikeele 
eksami läbiviimise kord [Regulation of the procedures of state language exam], 9 July 1993.  
222   In 2001 the minimum course price was more than 1000 crowns per package, which is comparable to the minimum wage 
level in Estonia. 
223  See for example EU/PHARE 1999, 2001; or UNDP et al. 1999. 
224  The question of integration will be discussed in more detail in chapter 5.1. 
225  Cf. Rose/Maley 1994, p. 52. 
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 Some statements made by the HCNM related to particular legislative acts, while others touched upon 
wider aspects of the implementation of the law, including also policy options in general. In terms of the 
latter, language training is an important aspect that relates beyond the naturalization process and sets the 
basis for the overall integration project. Even though the HCNM disagreed with the wording and goals of 
the Language Law, he nevertheless recognized the knowledge of Estonian as a central point of the 
integration process. Thus, he on several occasions stressed the need to improve the knowledge of Estonian 
among non-Estonians, and considered Estonian as the focal means of communication in inter-ethnic 
relations. Van der Stoel often stressed that integration is a two-way process, where both the government 
and minorities have rights and responsibilities. One of the main responsibilities of the minorities is to learn 
the state language, and through this knowledge participate actively and equally in society. In his letter to 
the Estonian Foreign Minister, the High Commissioner stated the following: 
 
I am fully aware that the policy I advocate does not only require and effort on the part of the Estonian 
government, but equally a contribution on the part of the non-Estonian population. Adaptation to the reality of 
the re-emergence of Estonia as an independent state requires that at any rate those who have not yet retired 
from work and who do not yet speak the Estonian language make a determined effort to master that language 
to such a degree that they are able to conduct a simple conversation in Estonian.226 
 
Language training and improving the knowledge of Estonian among non-Estonians was an issue where the 
High Commissioner and the Estonian government seemed to reach more agreement on than concerning 
other fields. The HCNM on several occasions stressed the importance of language training, in response to 
which the Estonian government supported the High Commissioner’s concerns.227 Such excitement to 
develop the language-training system from the side of the Estonian government has often been viewed by 
the non-Estonians as if the Estonian government has misinterpreted and taken advantage of the High 
Commissioner’s recommendations in the government’s own interest. Through this perception, the High 
Commissioner’s recommendations justify a dominant status of the Estonian language and exclude the 
possibility of (official) bilingualism in the country. This common interest of the HCNM and the Estonian 
government in the language question has undermined trust in the High Commissioner among Russian-
speakers in Estonia. 
 
Language training was mentioned in one way or another in practically every letter that the High 
Commissioner sent to Estonian authorities. In 1993, Van der Stoel recommended that mass media, in 
particular television, should be used more for teaching purposes. The High Commissioner referred to the 
education system of Kohtla-Järve as a positive example in this sphere.228 In its response, the Estonian 
Foreign Ministry assured that the government was doing all that lay in its power to develop "an effectual 
system of language instruction with qualified instructors, effective teaching materials and methods",229 
using a greater variety of resources, including also mass media.  
 
The Ministry also requested assistance for finding financial support from abroad for its efforts. Estonian 
government officials introduced, for example, two documents that the Ministry of Culture and Education 
had prepared, and which requested foreign funding assistance. In return, the HCNM mentioned the interest 
of other governments in supporting Estonia’s language teaching efforts, and recommended "to take full 
use of these possibilities."230 One could therefore conclude that the High Commissioner’s 
recommendations were directed to draw attention to the new opportunities that had risen from other 
governments’ interest in assisting Estonia in this field. The HCNM also appeared to be inviting the 
                                                 
226  HCNM Letter to Velliste, 6 April 1993. 
227  Estonian officials sound overly enthusiastic about the language concerns in comparison to the otherwise rather cold tone in 
official communication with the HCNM. With regard to the issue of language training, the Estonian Foreign Minister writes 
that, just as the HCNM in his letter "saved the best for last", he has "the pleasure to do likewise". The Minister greets that the 
HCNM also considers language issues to be a priority concern. Luik Letter to the HCNM, 4 April 1994. 
228  HCNM Letter to Velliste, 6 April 1993. 
229  Comments by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Estonia, 6 April 1993. 
230  HCNM Letter to Luik , 9 March 1994. 
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 concerned governments to co-ordinate their activities, possibly in the light of greater effectiveness and to 
avoid unnecessary copying and duplication.  
 
In making an attempt to list some preliminary conclusions with regard to the question of language, one has 
to recognize that the influence of the HCNM in matters of language is rather difficult to assess 
independent of other internal and external factors. Van der Stoel, as most of the Western community, did 
not reprove of Estonian being the sole state language in the country. Also, having a language test as part of 
the citizenship application is quite a widespread practice elsewhere as well, as the High Commissioner 
pointed out.231 Therefore, the High Commissioner’s recommendations did not question the language 
policy in Estonia as such, but only its harshness. The OSCE Mission to Estonia commented that the 
Estonian Language Law was created at a time when Estonian was considered to be a minority language in 
comparison to the Russian language’s position in the Soviet Union. However, when Estonia gained 
independence, the law should have been changed to correspond to the current context, in which Estonian 
again reached the status of being the majority language. This kind of criticism cannot, however, be found 
in the High Commissioner’s communication with Estonian officials. 
 
In relation to language training, the High Commissioner’s influence in triggering the process itself is 
doubtful, as the Estonian government had always been very interested in improving the knowledge of 
Estonian among non-native speakers. In terms of the language exam and requirements, the High 
Commissioner probably played some role. However, the exact formulations were worked out under the 
auspices of several European organizations. The Council of Europe provided expertise on the 
implementation of language requirements in 1993. The standards of language tests for the 1995 
Citizenship Law were worked out in co-operation with linguistic experts from a range of European 
universities.232 
 
 
3.5 New Restrictions, Higher Tensions: The 1993 Law on Aliens   
 
The adoption of the Law on Citizenship in February 1992 left a large number of Estonia's residents not 
only without any citizenship, but also without clarity concerning their legal status in Estonia. There was 
thus a need for new legislation in order to determine the position of non-citizens in Estonia, including also 
their rights and responsibilities. Also the representatives of the Russian-speakers recognized that a law 
regulating the status of foreigners had to be adopted immediately. The law was also important in order to 
accurately determine the size of Estonia’s population, as Soviet-time data was unreliable in this respect. 
Moreover, since 1991, a rather large number of people had migrated out of the country, which was by any 
means enough to change the ethnic distribution of the population considerably. In fact, the drafting of the 
Law on Aliens was started immediately after the adoption of the Law on Citizenship. However, the 
process of drafting and ratifying the new law became a painful and lengthy process. 
 
The main parties in the coalition government that initiated the aliens’ law had called for de-colonization in 
their election campaign, but since in power had started advocating the integration of all immigrants. For 
the right-wing parties it was unacceptable that the planned Law on Aliens would give a legal basis for all 
Russians to stay. In their opinion, such a law would justify Soviet reoccupation, and could lead to 
Estonians becoming an ethnic minority in their own country. Thus, they proposed the Law on Aliens be 
adopted only after a nation-wide referendum had been held.233 This path was not chosen in the end, but the 
law was nevertheless restrictive enough to cause the most serious (ethnic) conflict situation in the 
existence of newly independent Estonia. The non-citizens, whom the law would concern, were very weary 
of its connotation and consequences. Moreover, with the adoption of the Law on Aliens, it finally became 
                                                 
231  Cf. HCNM Letter to Ilves, 21 May 1997. 
232  Cf. Kallas Letter to the HCNM, 7 February 1996. 
233  Cf. The Baltic Independent, 12 February 1993, Estonian group opposes blanket citizenship for Russians.  
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 evident that the existing citizenship policy would continue. Until then, some hope had still existed that the 
citizenship policy could be changed so that Soviet-time settlers would also be considered as Estonian 
citizens, following Russian and international pressure. With regard to the connotation linked to the law, 
Russians took it as an offence that they had to re-establish their status in Estonia, and that they were 
suddenly considered foreigners.234  
 
In terms of consequences, the non-citizen population was afraid that this new legislation would strip them 
of the rights they had enjoyed so far. An even greater fear was that they would be forced to leave Estonia 
in large numbers. The draft Law on Aliens aroused strong opposition, and Russian organizations in 
Estonia threatened with mass public unrest, including even armed opposition, if major changes were not 
made to the draft. The Russian Assembly’s address to Estonian parliament read as follows: 
 
Thousands of people could be deported from Estonia under the law, which is an act of state revenge. The law 
is aimed at edging Russian-speakers out of the country by creating unbearable living conditions for them.235 
 
The most radical response to the developments in 1993 came form the Union of Russian Citizens, which is 
especially active in the Northeastern parts of Estonia. The Union appealed to the Russian Prime Minister 
not to pull out the Russian troops from Estonia, but to use them as a peacekeeping force. The Union also 
organized a great rally in Narva, where unprecedented strong attacks against Estonia’s independence were 
made and Russia was called for to help. During the demonstration, Russian groups threatened to "close 
down power stations, block roads and take up arms if the parliament passed the law on aliens." Moderate 
and radical Russian organizations joined their forces in Tallinn in a similar protest: 
 
The passing of the law on aliens mean there would be a flow of refugees […] as well as both covert and overt 
armed resistance, which seriously question the existence of Estonia as an independent country.236  
 
The section of the draft law which regulated that all former Soviet citizens in Estonia who had not applied 
for the citizenship of Russia or Estonia would have to apply for a residence permit within a year from the 
date the law was passed caused the most unrest among Russian-speakers. Those who would not apply for 
a residence permit during this period would have to leave the country or face deportation. Residence 
permits would be denied, among other categories, to: 
  
- former and present employees of foreign secret and security services; 
- people serving in the armed forces of foreign countries;  
- and retired or reserve army officers, as well as members of their family, if they had been posted to 
serve in Estonia. 
 
In previous months, other controversial legislation had been adopted that had already put the Russian 
population onto their toes. For example, the law on privatization of flats denied former KGB and 
communist officials privatization vouchers. According to the law, these officials would have to pay if they 
wanted to buy their flats, while the rest of the population could privatize their living quarters using 
vouchers. However, after President Meri vetoed the law, MPs agreed to change this questionable clause. 
The legislators agreed that a law of purely economic content should not include any political aspects.  
 
                                                 
234  A point should be made about the name of the law. The English translation of the law is Law on Aliens, which has a very 
negative connotation. As some people have noted, it seems as if one were talking of little green men instead of non-citizen 
residents. (See for example Miller, 8 October 1999). The actual title of the law in Estonian itself is not as offensive: 
Välismaalaste Seadus can be translated more exactly as Law on Foreigners. Also the ODIHR mission report in 1992 referred 
to foreigners and not aliens. The word ‘alien’ is an international legal term used in English, but in Estonian the word is more 
commonly understood as ‘foreigner’. For this reason, the two words will be used interchangeably in this study. However, 
when references to the legislation are made, the term ‘alien’ will stay unchanged. 
235  The Baltic Independent, 18 June 1993, Draft law on aliens rouses strong opposition. 
236  The Baltic Independent, 25 June 1993, Russia slams Estonia’s aggressive nationalism.  
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 Another law that President Meri refused to promulgate for its consequences on the Russian-speaking 
population concerned the language of instruction in secondary schools. The bill foresaw that Russian-
language schools (some 17 per cent of all schools) would adopt Estonian as their language of instruction 
within two to three years, with the exception of schools that were situated in localities predominantly 
inhabited by Russian-speakers (i.e. Northeastern Estonia).237 The HCNM welcomed the President’s 
move.238 The law was later adopted with a similar intent to implement Estonian as the language of 
instruction in Russian secondary schools, but granting a longer transition period until the year 2000. For 
practical reasons, the law was unlikely to be implemented in Northeastern Estonia, and municipal and 
private schools were free to choose their language of instruction. Despite these factors, the Russian 
representatives expressed their dissatisfaction with the law and its general tone, as for example leader of 
the Representative Assembly of Russian Speakers, Hanon Barabaner, stated: 
 
The Estonian leaders have always stressed that Russians living here should integrate into the Estonian state, 
and we in the assembly agree with this. But we now see, in the education law for example, that the demand 
for integration is being mixed up with a demand for assimilation, for sacrifice of cultural and linguistic 
identity. This is a very different thing, and we protest against it. In the end, it will only hinder integration by 
creating confrontation.239 
 
Also the Law on Local Elections roused dissatisfaction among the Russian-speaking population. 
According to the law, non-citizens could vote in local elections, but could not stand as candidates. The 
Russian Assembly appealed to the President not to promulgate the law because of its ‘discriminatory 
nature’, and demanded that non-citizens have the right to become elected at least in the first upcoming 
local elections. 
 
Also the Russian military felt threatened by local decisions. For example, the Tartu town council had 
decided to start deporting Russian military and their family members whose residence permits had expired 
from the locality. The decision would have concerned some six or seven hundred persons.240 A similar 
decision to revoke registration of Russian army officers and their families was passed in the Tallinn city 
council.  
 
As in 1992, when Russia reacted strongly to the Estonian Law on Citizenship, the Law on Aliens and 
other decisions taken by Estonia in early 1993 provoked strong reactions from Moscow, as the "defence of 
the settler communities had become a basic tenet of Russia's external and domestic politics."241 During the 
drafting of the Law on Aliens, Russia had already stepped up its propaganda campaign, and accused 
Estonia of aggressive nationalism. In spring 1993, a Russian delegation had tried to convince the UN 
General Assembly to condemn the Baltics' policy towards the Russian-speaking population.242 Russia also 
tried to deter Estonia’s accession to the Council of Europe, claiming that Estonia’s membership in the 
Council would legitimise the oppression of Russians.243 Similar to 1992, Russia also used the continuing 
presence of Russian troops in order to exert influence: On several occasions it withdrew its promise to pull 
out its forces, openly declaring that its military presence was essential for asserting pressure on Estonian 
minority politics. 244  
 
These statements and strategies were important for Yeltsin’s moderate team for domestic policy reasons, 
as they needed to satisfy the continuously growing nationalist constituencies at home. In spring 1993, 
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240  Cf. The Baltic Independent, 23 April 1993, Troop Watch.  
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242  Cf. The Baltic Independent, 5 March 1993, Rumbles from Russia increase Baltic anxiety. 
243  Cf. The Baltic Independent, 14 March 1993, Council of Europe opens doors to Balts. 
244  Cf. The Baltic Independent, 5 March 1993, Human rights: Russia’s new justification for interference; The Baltic 
Independent, 19 March 1993, Baltic Council caves in to Russian demand.  
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 President Yeltsin introduced direct presidential rule and ran the country by decree until the referendum on 
the new constitution and presidential powers was to be held in Russia. As a result of this move, the hard-
line parliament of Russia considered impeaching the President. Despite the low-point of Baltic-Russian 
relations, the Baltic states supported Yeltsin’s actions. According to Baltic officials, no one else in Russia 
would support them, and that without Yeltsin, relations with Russia would have turned to the worse.245 
Also Russian Foreign Minister Kozyrev had been under heavy fire from hard-line deputies in Moscow for 
allegedly taking a too conciliatory position towards the Baltic states.246 Similarly, statements made by 
Russian Defence Minister Pavel Grachev on halting the army pullout can be linked to the need to keep the 
army friendly, or at least neutral, in the power struggle in Moscow.247 
 
The Estonian government failed to grasp the seriousness of the situation. Prime Minister Mart Laar hoped 
that "Russia would not stage provocations in Estonia, destroying the peaceful and constructive atmosphere 
which exists in the country."248 In the opinion of the Prime Minister, the local Russians were co-operative 
and supportive of government actions, while Russia was the one stirring up tensions and dissatisfaction 
among its diaspora in Estonia. In fact, however, the main threat of unrest originated from the local 
Russians. On 19 June 1993, up to 10,000 people protested against the draft Law on Aliens in Narva and 
threatened, inter alia, to block the railway track to Tallinn and the energy delivery from the Baltic Power 
Plant in Narva.249 Despite the great opposition and protests of the Russians, the Estonian parliament 
passed the Law on Aliens on 21 June 1993. In the following months, the problems relating to the new Law 
on Aliens became very acute, escalating to the decisions of the town councils of Narva and Sillamäe on 28 
June 1993 to hold referenda on the autonomy of these towns. The government considered such referenda 
illegal and as a threat to Estonia’s territorial integrity. It was even under discussion to stop the carrying out 
of the referenda by force if necessary. Other organizations representing the Russian-speaking population 
called for civil disobedience and unrest in other parts of Estonia.  
 
In this context of heightened inter-ethnic tensions, President Lennart Meri refused to promulgate the Law 
on Aliens, and extended his final decision until international organizations, more precisely the Council of 
Europe and the OSCE, had assessed the compatibility of the law with international standards. Just a month 
earlier, in May 1993, Estonia had been accepted to the Council of Europe. The OSCE Mission to Estonia 
had begun its work in Estonia in April, and the HCNM had visited the country in January and March. 
Thus, the country was under close international scrutiny. As Estonia depended on these organizations for 
its international credibility, and also appreciated their evaluations of the inter-ethnic situation as a fair 
counterbalance to Russia’s accusations, the active involvement of these organizations in the internal 
affairs of Estonia opened the way for President Meri to ask the Council of Europe and the OSCE on 25 
June to comment on the Law on Aliens. In fact, the decision to take this step was the result of 
consultations between the Estonian government and the High Commissioner.250 Only on the basis of 
comments provided by the HCNM and the Council of Europe, as well as in the light of the continuing 
lobbying by the OSCE and the CoE, did the parliament later consider changing the bill. The President 
further tried to prevent the looming crisis by establishing a Presidential Roundtable for Ethnic Minorities 
as forum for an institutionalised dialogue - a move that also had been suggested also by the OSCE Mission 
and the HCNM.251 
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 3.6 HCNM Recommendations on the Draft Law 
 
Backing the efforts already undertaken by the High Commissioner, the Committee of Senior Officials of 
the OSCE undertook a rather unusual step by passing a resolution on 30 June 1993 in which it: 
 
invites the High Commissioner on National Minorities to respond promptly, on behalf of the CSCE, to the 
request by the President of Estonia for an expert opinion from the CSCE on the law on the status of aliens. 
The CSO supports the continued involvement of the High Commissioner in Estonia. It invites the government 
of Estonia to take appropriate action in response to the recommendations of the High Commissioner on 
National Minorities contained in CSCE Communication No. 124.252 
 
As a matter of fact, the HCNM travelled to Estonia already on 29 June 1993 for talks, and answered the 
President in an official letter already two days later. His recommendations were further reinforced by a 
letter from the CiO of the OSCE to President Meri, in which the Swedish Minister of Foreign Affairs, 
Margaretha af Ugglas, supported the High Commissioner's point of view.253 In his letter to President Meri, 
the HCNM notes, inter alia, that the Law on Aliens will affect hundreds of thousands of Estonian 
residents. He thus called to take into account the psychological effects of the law, which could lead to 
serious destabilization. The HCNM made several propositions on how to change the law in order to make 
it compatible with the general tone of European legislation on these matters. He also suggested how to 
clarify the law in a way that would abolish the fears of the non-citizen population. All of his 
recommendations will be discussed in detail below. 
 
Most of the clauses the HCNM criticized and called to be amended in one way or another concerned the 
ambiguity of the law’s text. Several passages of the law could be interpreted in contradictory ways, and 
were thus open to varying implementation and subjectivity in decision-making. The HCNM proposed an 
alternative wording in order to increase the transparency and uniformity of the law, and also to avoid 
discrimination in its consequent implementation.  
 
For one, the High Commissioner was worried that the draft law did not guarantee the opportunity to 
appeal in case the issuing of a residence permit was refused.254 Surely enough, the paragraph the HCNM 
was referring to only states the right to go to court if the residence (or work) permit was prematurely 
terminated or not extended.255 However, a separate article that guarantees special rights to persons who 
permanently settled in Estonia prior to 1990 also mentions the right to dispute the decision in court if the 
issuing of a residence (or work) permit was refused in the first place.256 Thus, the HCNM’s worries were 
in fact unfounded. 
 
The HCNM was also concerned about the fact that local governments would be in charge of implementing 
the law. In his opinion, this could lead to varying practices and understandings of the law amongst 
different localities. He therefore recommended to include in the law specific measures that would 
guarantee uniform interpretation.257 However, what the HCNM interpreted as a "key role" of the local 
governments in implementing the law is actually a rather minor responsibility. The law states that the local 
government is in charge of keeping track of residence permit applications, and must inform the relevant 
institutions in the case that applications are not submitted in time, i.e. within the two years following the 
adoption of the law. This means that the local government does not have any actual decision-making 
power in the process of implementing the Law on Aliens.258 The HCNM had been barking at the wrong 
tree. 
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 The High Commissioner did, however, have more validated concerns in relation to some other articles in 
the law - some of which were later changed, possibly due to the HCNM’s pressure. In the draft Law on 
Aliens, several paragraphs listed reasons why residence permits would not be issued. Among them, a 
residence permit would be denied to a foreigner "who does not respect the constitutional system and does 
not observe Estonia’s legal acts," and/or "who with his or her actions has compromised Estonia’s national 
interests or international reputation."259 First of all, the High Commissioner criticized that in these denials, 
no reference was made to the Penal Code or any other legislation, according to which such actions could 
be determined. No criteria were mentioned on how to evaluate whether a person had compromised 
Estonia’s national interests or its international reputation. Moreover, it was not clear from the draft law 
who would decide on whether the above-mentioned offences had been committed. In the HCNM’s 
opinion, only a court could decide on such issues, and thus the refusal to issue a residence permit would 
have to be backed by a court decision. As no reference was made to a court’s involvement, the HCNM 
was concerned that decision-making could be open to severe arbitrariness by bureaucrats, and 
recommended that either these two paragraphs be left out of the law or, alternatively, that these be 
amended thoroughly. Furthermore, he pointed out that a separate provision on criminal offences already 
existed. According to this provision, a residence permit would not be issued to a person who had 
committed a crime for which he or she was sentenced to imprisonment for longer than one year, on the 
condition that the sentence had not yet expired. The offence of treason would thus be punishable 
according to other relevant legislation that had been decided upon by the court, and would therefore 
already be covered in the Law on Aliens by the provision on criminal offences. 
 
In the actual Law on Aliens, the first paragraph, which mentions respect for the Estonian constitutional 
and legal system, was still included in the same wording as in the draft version of the law. However, the 
second controversial paragraph was amended.260 Compromising Estonia’s national interests and 
international reputation as a reason for not receiving residence permit was omitted. The newly worded 
paragraph states that a residence permit will not be issued to an alien whose actions are directed against 
the Estonian state and its security.261 In the end, no reference was made to Penal Code or to a court order, 
but the wording was amended to be less vulnerable to subjective decision-making. The criteria in 
determining whether someone’s actions are directed against Estonian sovereignty and security are clearer 
than those that determine whether Estonian interests or international reputation have been compromised. 
Moreover, the decision on these two points is not left to the Migration Office alone - it has to be made in 
co-operation with the Ministry of Internal Affairs.262 Nevertheless, one could, based on these two 
paragraphs, argue that the law is still open to arbitrary decision-making. Consequently, one could 
conclude that the recommendations of the High Commissioner were not followed up entirely in this 
respect. 
 
Another set of questions addressed by the HCNM related to the legal income requirement and the 
consequential fear of expulsion. Similar to the conditions required for citizenship applicants, person 
applying for residence permits had to fulfil the legal income requirement. According to the Law on Aliens, 
a residence permit can be issued only if the applicant has a legal income that covers his or her living costs. 
The High Commissioner admitted that the requirement of legal income was necessary for new immigrants, 
but hoped that the same condition could be omitted for persons who had settled in Estonia before 1990.263 
Russian residents in Estonia had expressed their concern to the HCNM whether unemployment benefits 
would be considered as legal income. An even more serious fear among the Russian population was that 
of expulsion, as the pure text of the law seemed to indicate such a possibility. Even if unemployment 
benefits were to be considered as legal income, these benefits are paid to unemployed people in Estonia 
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 only for a limited period of time (six months). The law could therefore be interpreted in such a manner 
that those who were unemployed, but who no longer received unemployment benefits, could be expelled 
from the country. Consequently, the HCNM expressed in his letter to Meri the hope that "the law will be 
amended in such a form that these fears are laid to rest."264  
 
Estonian officials tried to accomplish exactly this: First, by spelling out different forms of income that 
were considered as legal and sufficient for subsistence; and second, by making public statements that the 
Estonian government would not pursue the policy of expulsion. The amended Law on Aliens contains an 
enlisting of what is regarded as legal income. Included among other are unemployment benefits, child 
support benefits, other social benefits guaranteed by the state, alimony payments and sustenance by other 
members of the family.265 Unemployment benefits were thus only one type of legal income. Moreover, 
several other forms of subsistence were also considered as income, which meant that unemployed people 
who no longer received unemployment benefits could still apply for residence permits. The parliament did 
not apply a distinction between new immigrants and those who had settled into the country before 1990, 
but the Estonian government did, in a public statement made together with the HCNM, assure 
"categorically that it does not intend to start a policy of expulsion from Estonia of Russian residents."266 
This also applied to unemployed people.  
 
Another point of concern for the HCNM related to the issuing of aliens’ passports. The draft law included 
a paragraph according to which foreigners applying for an alien’s passport would have to prove that they 
could not obtain the passport of their country of origin. In the HCNM’s opinion, such a formulation was 
questionable, as it did not make clear whether and how applicants were required to prove that no other 
passport was obtainable. The process of proving this could turn out to be lengthy or even impossible. 
Thus, the High Commissioner recommended the reformulation of the passage to state that "any resident 
[…] who is not a citizen of another state can receive an alien’s passport."267 In the subsequent law that was 
adopted, the paragraph appears in a slightly amended form. It now states that a foreigner who cannot 
obtain any other passport has the right to an alien’s passport.268 According to a public statement that the 
HCNM issued shortly after the adoption of the Law on Aliens, the Estonian government had also assured 
him that the procedures for obtaining an alien's passport would be kept simple.269 In legislation 
complementary to the Law on Aliens, the feared contradictions have been abolished to a certain extent: 
The Regulation on the Conditions and Order of Issuing Alien’s Passport starts with an article which 
differentiates foreign citizens from stateless persons. The act does not require an applicant to prove that no 
other passport could be obtained – this fact has to be certified only by the applicant’s signature. However, 
stateless people are still required to provide a document attesting their statelessness.270  
 
The reason behind the muddled conditions of issuing aliens' passports can be explained by the general 
Estonian policy of not considering former Soviet Union citizens as stateless. In the line of the argument of 
the Estonian government, persons who were citizens of the former Soviet Union have the right to apply 
for citizenship in any of the Soviet successor states, and are thus not really stateless. In the government's 
opinion, issuing aliens’ passports to all these people would arbitrarily increase the number of stateless 
persons.271 The Estonian government preferred a procedure by which most people would define their own 
citizenship, be it Estonian, Russian, Ukrainian or any other successor state. As the Estonian Foreign 
Minister stated in his letter to the HCNM, by not making aliens’ passports a widespread document, the 
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 government was actually promoting the acquisition of Estonian citizenship.272 The Head of the OSCE 
Mission, however, argued that most non-citizens "do not want Russian citizenship and therefore can not 
travel abroad, a situation if allowed to continue, would be a violation of Estonia's obligation under 
international law."273 
 
For Estonian officials, the alien's passport was more an exceptional document than a general identity 
document. For purposes of internal identification of foreigners (i.e. those Estonian residents who were not 
Estonian citizens) in Estonia, the old Soviet passports were to remain valid for another three years after 
the adoption of the aliens’ law, i.e. until July 1996.274 In order to travel abroad, non-citizens could apply 
for temporary travel documents that guaranteed their right to return to Estonia after travelling.275 Thus, the 
Estonian government did not see a reason to make aliens’ passports available to all non-citizen residents in 
Estonia. At the same time, the HCNM foresaw the aliens’ passports as the main identity documents for 
non-citizens, valid also as travel documents.276 He argued in favour of a prevalent use of these passports 
also in the future. In the course of time, this is exactly what happened, and we will return to this issue in 
the following chapters. It became evident that a large number of people failed to obtain any citizenship, 
and therefore required alternative documentation. Because of the poor quality of old Soviet passports, 
which were also easy to forge, the validity of these documents could no longer be prolonged. Moreover, 
the Council of Europe had offered to help in printing aliens’ passports, of which a hundred thousand were 
made.277 Estonian officials therefore had no other choice but to succumb to this path of events. At present, 
over hundred sixty thousand aliens’ passports have been issued to residents of Estonia.278 
 
 
                                                
3.7 HCNM Mediation in the Crisis of Summer 1993: Referenda for Autonomy in Narva and 
Sillamäe 
 
Some amendments were made to the Law on Aliens, which was promulgated in a revised version only a 
few weeks after the President’s intervention. The parliament was in a hurry to adopt the law so that the 
collection of voters’ lists for local elections, set to be held in autumn, could be begun. According to 
Estonian law, also resident non-citizens can vote in local elections. The Law on Aliens was the basis 
according to which non-citizen residents were to be registered.  
 
As discussed above, the HCNM managed to influence the Estonian legislators on some points, but only to 
a limited extent. The Estonian parliament "had to perform a rather two-faced balancing act, insisting to the 
West that the changes were substantive, while assuring [Estonians] that they were cosmetic."279 In general, 
the amendments made in the Law on Aliens satisfied international observers and Estonians, but not the 
local Russian population. The towns of Narva and Sillamäe therefore decided to go ahead with the 
referenda for autonomy that were scheduled for 16 and 17 July 1993 respectively.280 
 
The dissatisfaction among Russian-speakers was not only caused by the Law on Aliens. Just a few months 
earlier, the Ministry of Culture had cancelled the broadcasting licences of two Russian television channels 
(St Petersburg TV and Russian TV), as these had not renewed their licence applications and had not paid 
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 transmission fees. Russians in Estonia were left with only one television channel broadcasting from 
Russia, the Ostankino TV.281 It is clear that the economic and administrative arguments for cancelling the 
broadcasting rights of the two channels were reasonable, but the situation was viewed differently by the 
general public, who saw the act as yet another violation by the Estonian government against Russian-
speakers.  
 
The HCNM was requested to assist in this conflict over the autonomy referenda, in order to solve the 
political standoff between the Estonian government and the political leaders of the Russian-speaking 
population, which continued despite the changes in the Law on Aliens. 
 
The worst-case scenario did not occur, as the HCNM managed to convince both sides to withhold from 
drastic action. The HCNM came to visit Estonia on several occasions during this period, and met with all 
relevant parties. He mediated between government officials, the representatives of Narva and Sillamäe 
city councils and the Russian Representative Assembly, which resulted in compromises on both sides. In a 
public statement made on 12 July 1993, the HCNM passed on the assurances he had received from the 
Estonian government and from the representatives of the Russian community.282 This statement was 
published in both Estonian- and Russian-language newspapers in Estonia. A great deal of the opposition to 
the Law on Aliens among the Russian-speaking population was due to poor second-hand information, 
creating exaggerated fears. By then, this fact had also been understood by the Estonian government. In this 
context, the assurances that were made in the High Commissioner’s public statement brought clarity to the 
situation and put to rest some of the anxieties. With his mediation, the High Commissioner committed 
both Estonian officials and representatives of the Russian community to intensify and continue their 
dialogue, as he continued to insist upon throughout his involvement in Estonia. In the future, the exchange 
of standpoints of the government and Russian community members can therefore hopefully take place in 
the absence of third party intervention and mediation.  
 
What is now required is a more detailed analysis on the assurances given to the High Commissioner by the 
two parties. The Estonian government guaranteed, among other things, that the procedures of applying for 
residence permits and aliens’ passports would be made simple and would run smoothly. It once again 
stated that expulsions would not be carried out, and that this would apply also to the unemployed. The 
HCNM and the Estonian government also explained that those people applying for residence permits 
would still retain the possibility to apply for Estonian citizenship in the future. Moreover, the government 
promised that in the future, application for Estonian citizenship would be easier: Naturalization 
requirements would be simplified, and particularly the language test would require a level of simple 
conversation and be even easier for elderly and handicapped persons. In addition to these more general 
promises related to the legislation on citizenship and aliens, assurances of moderation were made on the 
inflammatory situation concerning the autonomy referenda. The Estonian government promised not to use 
force to prevent the autonomy referenda in Narva and Sillamäe from taking place, even though it 
considered these referenda as illegal. The government also committed itself to the improvement of the 
economic situation in the Northeastern region, where the share of Russian-speakers is overwhelming and 
which, due to its structure and scale of industry, was hit harder by the economic restructuring process than 
other parts of the country.283 In return, the representatives of the Russian community assured that they 
would abide to the ruling of the National Court on the legality of the referenda. Despite carrying on with 
referenda plans, the leaders of Russian-speakers pledged to respect Estonian constitutional order and 
territorial integrity.284  
 
Initially, the Russian representatives had proposed to the government that persons who had presented their 
candidacy for the upcoming local elections and who were not Estonian citizens could acquire citizenship 
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 in a facilitated mode in order to be able to run for office. As already mentioned, according to Estonian 
legislation, non-citizen residents could vote in the local elections, but not stand as candidates for local 
office - this right was limited to Estonian citizens only. However, in the Northeastern area of Estonia, the 
share of citizenry among the population was very limited. The number of local candidates was 
consequentially also extremely low. There were fears that due to poor and unrepresentative choice, those 
elected would start considering themselves irreplaceable and would succumb to undemocratic modes of 
governing. Therefore, the government promised to the HCNM to also consider the possibilities of 
facilitating citizenship acquisition for non-citizens who had presented themselves as candidates for the 
upcoming local elections.285 Estonian representatives had made a similar promise prior to Estonia’s 
accession to the Council of Europe. This pledge caused a row in the parliament. As the law on local 
elections was adopted only in May 1993, the legislators were not ready to amend it already at such an 
early date. Thus, the plan was carried out later and only in a very restricted and selective mode. 
 
In epilogue, the referenda in Narva and Sillamäe did take place,286 and over 95 per cent of participants 
supported the autonomy for the towns.287 However, according to different estimates, only about half of the 
entitled voters actually went to the polls. As agreed, the town councils waited for the Estonian Supreme 
Court’s ruling and, as expected, the court decided that both referenda were illegal and thus their results 
were declared null and void. By that time local elections had taken place in Estonia, as a result of which 
the membership of the Narva and Sillamäe town councils had changed dramatically. As most members of 
the old town councils did not qualify for Estonian citizenship, they were barred from running again. And 
as far as the Estonian government decided to grant citizenship to Russian-speaking candidates in the run-
up of the elections, it restricted this gratitude to moderate candidates.288 Thus, the new local 
representatives in the town councils were moderate Russians who were more co-operative with the central 
authorities and did not object to the ruling of the Supreme Court.289 As a result, the situation in Narva 
became more relaxed after the 1993 Local Elections. Calls for autonomy also faded: In March 1996 only 
17 per cent of respondents supported autonomy or some other kind of special status for Narva, whereas 80 
per cent stated that Narva should remain a regular city in Estonia.290  
 
The government’s guarantee not to interfere by force in the referenda is even more important in the light 
of another chain of events that took place around the same time. In the Estonian-language media, the so-
called "Pullapää crisis" received much more attention than the tensions surrounding the adoption of the 
Law on Aliens. One small section of the Estonian defence forces decided to resign from the army, because 
they did not agree to the firing of their leader. In turn, the government decided to dissolve the voluntary 
defence unit. Its members resisted orders from the army headquarters and the government for three days, 
barricading themselves in the garrison. Luckily, on the fourth day the crisis was resolved peacefully and 
the rebel soldiers left the garrison, leaving their arms behind.  
 
The possible connection between these two crises has not been studied, but it is more than plausible that 
the resistance at Pullapää was intended to coincide with the referenda and with possible demonstrations 
after the adoption of the Law on Aliens. Several politicians of the time, for example Tunne Kelam, have 
stated that they suspect that the resistance was at least partially co-ordinated from abroad, i.e. by Russian 
intelligence. The émigré politicians in the Estonian government and army leadership, Minister of Defence 
Hain Rebas and Commander-in-Chief of the Estonian Defence Forces Aleksander Einseln, wanted to use 
force to solve the situation. However, other members of the cabinet could not foresee that one Estonian 
would have to fight against or kill another Estonian. Moreover, the media portrayed the rebels as heroes. 
Breaking their resistance by force and causing possible bloodshed would have portrayed the government 
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 and the army in a very unpopular light. In the worst-case scenario, the situation could have evolved into a 
civil war due to tensions among Estonians themselves. Therefore, if both crises had erupted into violent 
confrontation, the situation would have definitely escaped the government’s control. In that case, Moscow 
could have used the rhetoric of the necessity of peacekeeping by Russian troops, as it did in many other 
former Soviet republics.291 Estonia would have once again been subordinated to Russian influence.  
 
Perhaps the situation was more ready to explode due to the coinciding of the two crises than anyone has so 
far suspected. In this current study, it is impossible to determine whether these events were just a pure 
coincidence and wholly unrelated to each other, or whether a conspiracy plot to destabilize the country 
existed. In any case, the Pullapää rebellion should not be disregarded altogether in the analysis of ethnic 
tensions in summer 1993 in Estonia. 
 
 
3.8 HCNM Recommendations on the Implementation of the Law on Aliens: Application 
Procedures 
 
As a result of international mediation, the much-contested Law on Aliens had come into force under 
circumstances in which the Russian community had accepted it to the extent that it would not instigate 
more public unrest and further tensions. The practical regulation on the procedures of applying and issuing 
residence permits had also been adopted. Thereafter, in the course of implementing the law, the same old 
problems that had been expressed during the adoption of the law surfaced again, and new additional 
shortcomings also became apparent. There were still some ambiguities in the law that had been used in the 
implementation regulation to the disadvantage of the non-citizen population. For example, at first it was 
not evident that all non-citizens would initially be issued only temporary residence permits. A more 
practical problem became clear when Estonian officials realized that all procedures were much more time- 
and resource-consuming than had originally been expected. Thus, the one-year deadline set in the law, as 
well as subsequent regulations for the applicant to file his or her application for a residence permit, turned 
out to be unrealistic. In addition, fears surfaced among the non-citizens that the application procedures 
would be complicated, expensive and generally discriminatory. The HCNM learned of all of these issues 
while visiting Estonia in February 1994, and consequently wrote about them to the Estonian Foreign 
Minister.292  
 
In his letter, the HCNM pointed out that "in order to avoid perhaps unnecessary concerns" the Estonian 
government should provide "non-citizens with information about Governmental policies concerning them, 
and especially about the way the Law on Aliens will be implemented."293 Thus the HCNM was mainly 
inviting the government to distribute more information and explanations concerning the residence permits 
in order to show that many of the fears of the Russian population were groundless. Other 
recommendations that the HCNM made concerned the practicalities of implementation that the 
government had already been considering as well. 
 
 
3.8.1 Temporary or Permanent Residence Permits? 
 
The most alarming issue in relation to the new residence permits lay in the fact that all applicants were at 
first to be issued only temporary residence permits with a validity of five years. Moreover, an application 
for a permanent residence permit could only be made if a person had lived in Estonia for at least three out 
                                                 
291  Russia used the argument of peacekeeping on several occasions to avoid the withdrawal of its troops from the Baltics. For 
example in 1993, President Yeltsin called for a mandate "to act as a guarantor of peace and stability" on the territories of the 
former Soviet Union. See The Baltic Independent, 5 March 1993, Rumbles from Russia increase Baltic anxiety. 
292  Cf. HCNM Letter to Luik, 9 March 1994. 
293   Ibid. 
 47
 of the last five years with such a temporary permit.294 The High Commissioner was alarmed because it had 
been his:  
 
firm understanding that the Law on Aliens […] provides for the possibility of permanent residence permits for 
persons who settled in Estonia prior to July1, 1990, and who continue to sojourn in Estonia on the basis of 
permanent registration in the former Estonian SSR.295  
 
Members of the Russian-speaking population were afraid that such ‘temporary residents’ would be 
stripped of the same rights as ‘permanent residents’. Even though the government and the HCNM had 
stated that these fears were groundless, Van der Stoel did recommend to include a legal provision to 
guarantee the same rights during the interim period.  
 
At first, the government’s reply to this recommendation was that an article in the Law on Aliens already 
offered such a guarantee. The article states that persons who settled in Estonia prior to 1990 will retain the 
same rights and duties as set for them in earlier legal acts. Thus, their right to work, to pensions, to 
participate in the privatization process, etc. would not be affected.296 However, at this point it should be 
noted that in relation to work, an important difference exists between temporary and permanent residence 
permits, and that none of the involved parties pointed this out. Namely, persons with permanent residence 
permits do not need a separate permit to work, whereas temporary residents do. Thus, even though 
temporary residents kept their right to work, they had to apply for work permits to exercise this right. 
Applications for work permits could be submitted simultaneously with residence permit applications, but 
some additional papers had to be provided, such as a letter from the employer. However, shortly 
afterwards the government adopted an amending regulation concerning the issuance of temporary and 
permanent residence permits to persons who settled in Estonia during the Soviet period. First, the 
regulation stated that these persons could submit applications for permanent residence already when 
applying for temporary residence permits, thus saving them from some procedural hassles in the future. 
Second, those who chose to submit the two applications together would be issued a certificate proving that 
they had already applied for a permanent residence permit. The certificate would also include a text stating 
that persons who settled in Estonia prior to 1990 would be guaranteed the same rights and duties as those 
held by Estonian citizens.297 It is difficult to determine whether these certificates were just part of the 
governmental campaign to better inform the persons concerned, or whether the government accepted the 
High Commissioner’s recommendation that this issue should be legally provisioned. It is also possible that 
the role of these certificates was to calm the propaganda campaign from Moscow that non-citizens in 
Estonia were being deprived of their social and economic rights. By this time, with each day Moscow was 
declaring more vehemently that it refused to withdraw its troops from Estonia until the rights of Russian 
residents in Estonia were respected. Thus, the regulation that all non-citizens first needed to apply for 
temporary residence permits and that a permanent residence permit could be issued only after the 
applicant had been in the possession of a temporary residence permit for at least three out of the past five 
years remained intact. The main reasoning behind this differentiation between temporary and permanent 
residence permits was not to undermine the process of repatriation, and to avoid granting people with 
weak ties to Estonia a big incentive to stay. Finally however, the great majority of Russian-speakers 
received a permanent residence: A total of 277,253 residence permits were issued between 1993 and 
1995,298 and 261,2600 permanent residence permits were issued by 2000,299 leaving just members of 
certain groups, such as members of former militaries, without a permanent residence permit.  
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 3.8.2 Application Procedures 
 
Although the question of residence permits was downscaled from a mass to a minority problem by 2001, 
the application process as such was problem-ridden. Government decrees that regulated the application 
procedures and the issuance of residence permits differentiated the process between those settled in 
Estonia prior to 1990 and all others. For the first group, the procedures were greatly simplified, a fact that 
the High Commissioner recognized. Nevertheless, he recommended to further simplify the procedures as 
much as possible. In his opinion, an exchange of the previous permanent registration for the new residence 
permit, requiring no further additional certificates or fees, would have been appropriate.300 In total, there 
were three main aspects in the process that the HCNM pointed out as excessive and unnecessary: The 
requirement to submit different certificates, the fact that only Estonian language would be used in the 
process and the requirement to pay application fees.  
 
As to the first point, the government tried to convince the HCNM that the number of documents required 
to apply for a residence permit remained limited.301 Indeed, this was true: In addition to the old Soviet 
passport with an Estonian SSR residence permit inside, the applicants had to provide only the application 
form, the receipt of having paid the application fee and two photographs. Applicants also had to provide a 
certificate about their family status, but this was usually mentioned in the Soviet passport anyway. For the 
work permit, applicants also had to submit a letter from their employer.302 Thus, although the Estonian 
government did not follow the recommendations in a strict sense, it chose a way according to which no 
additional certificates to the existing identity document were actually required. As for the application fee, 
it amounted to a total of 50 Estonian Crowns (EEK), which cannot be considered excessive in the light of 
an average income of 1,200 EEK.303 The same holds true for the costs of an alien's passport, which 
amounted to 100 EEK at the time. Moreover, pensioners and minors did not have to pay anything.304  
 
Another recommendation the HCNM made on how to simplify the application procedure concerned the 
question of language. The application forms were in Estonian and also had to be filled out in Estonian. 
Van der Stoel remarked in this regard that a high number of applicants did not understand the official state 
language, and that Russian translation forms would be helpful.305 The Estonian government reacted to this 
comment by again assuring that the language issue would not be an obstacle in the application process, as 
Russian translations of the registration forms were available at all registration points. Also, they claimed 
that the entire staff of the Migration Office dealing with residence permit applications was fluent in both 
Estonian and Russian, and could thus assist applicants.306 Again, it seems that Estonian officials had 
already independently implemented what the HCNM was recommending. However, the OSCE Mission to 
Estonia reported that its office in Narva was overburdened with the task of helping applicants to fill out 
their forms.307 Russian and English were sanctioned as languages to be used in the application process 
only on 11 December 1999.308 However, the concerns of the Russian-speaking population, as well as the 
practical problems in filling out the forms correctly, derived not only from the language question, but also 
more from the poor information about the application procedures. The government admitted this and 
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 promised to co-operate closer with representatives of non-Estonians, among other in order to provide 
accurate and sufficient information about the registration procedure.  
 
 
3.8.3 Postponement of Application Deadlines 
 
The Law on Aliens had determined that all non-citizens had to submit an application for residence and 
work permits in the course of one year starting from the adoption of the law - a clause that appeared to be 
quite unrealistic. The preparations for the application procedures had taken considerably longer than 
expected, and the full-scale reception of applications did not start until spring 1994. At this time, only a 
few months remained until the original deadline that was set for July. With around 400,000 applications in 
sight, the HCNM recommended to the Estonian government that the application deadlines should be 
postponed, for example by another six months. Consequently, all other related deadlines would also have 
to be postponed accordingly, such as the validity period of old Soviet residence permits and documents. 
The OSCE warned Estonian officials that "if the registration were to be made impossible by the lack of the 
necessary administrative machinery, this would constitute a denial of rights."309 A motion to postpone the 
deadline had also been put forward by the Presidential Roundtable for Ethnic Minorities in Estonia.310 In 
his response to the HCNM, Foreign Minister Jüri Luik wrote that the Estonian government was also 
planning the postponement of deadlines, and that it considered this unavoidable. However, government 
officials stressed the importance of timing such a postponement.311 The legislators were planning to make 
changes to the regulations at the last possible moment, in order to collect as many applications as possible 
in time and in order to signal to people that abiding by the law is important. This is exactly what was 
done: The application deadlines and validity dates of Soviet resident permits and documents were 
postponed in May 1994, a little over one month before the initial deadline expired. Given the continued 
problems in the bureaucratic application process, the new deadline had to be prolonged by another full 
year. Thus, people could submit their residence and work permit applications until 12 July 1995, and the 
new permits had to be issued in two years time, by July 1996. Consequently, the old Soviet residence 
permits were also going to remain valid for another two years, until 1996. Old Soviet passports were to be 
recognized as internal identification documents until this same date.312 In assessing the question of the 
application deadlines, one could conclude that the Estonian government not only implemented the 
recommendations of the HCNM, but also extended the deadlines even in a way more favourable for the 
applicants than the High Commissioner himself had proposed it. However, the fact that the decisions on 
the prolongation of the deadline had been issued deliberately at the 'last moment' caused continuous 
anxieties among the Russian-speakers. 
 
 
3.8.4 Russian Army Pensioners and their Families 
 
The main fears of most of those people whom the aliens’ law concerned were put more or less to ease by 
the amended Law on Aliens and by the information campaign that followed. The Estonian government 
had again assured that expulsions would not take place, that unemployed people could also apply for 
residence permits and that application procedures would be kept simple. At the same time, the situation of 
retired army officials remained unclear. In the draft Law on Aliens, it was stated that residence permits 
                                                 
309  Lieven 1994, p. xxv. 
310  Cf. HCNM Letter to Luik, 9 March 1994. 
311  Cf. Luik Letter to the HCNM, 4 April 1994. 
312  Cf. Ajutise reisidokumendi seadus [Law on Temporary Travel Documents], 18 May 1994, and määrus No. 202 [Regulation 
No. 202] Vabariigi Valitsuse 21. septembri 1993. a. määruse No. 288 osaline muutmine [Partial changing of the 
governmental regulation No. 288 of 21 September 1993, 7 June 1994. The validity of Soviet internal passports was 
prolonged once more, until May 1997, because the distribution of aliens' passports had not been completed. See HCNM 
Letter to Kallas, 28 October 1996. Määrus No. 33 [Regulation No. 33], Endise NSV Liidu sisepassi Eesti Vabariigis isikut 
tõendava dokumendina kehtetuks tunnistamine [Cancellation of former USSR internal passport as an identification 
document in Republic of Estonia], 11 February 1997. 
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 would not be granted to "any alien who has served in a career position in the armed forces of a foreign 
state or has entered the reserve forces or retired from a career position in the armed forces of a foreign 
state, nor to his or her family members, who have entered Estonia in conjunction with the service or 
retirement of a member of such armed forces."313 The HCNM expressed his concern that this clause could 
affect a large number of Russians and lead to their expulsion from Estonia.314 Estonian legislators kept 
their original position on this point in the new, amended version of the law, but the government promised 
in the High Commissioner’s public statement that ‘humanitarian considerations’ would determine its 
attitude towards army pensioners and their family members.315 
 
The position of Estonian legislators on this point can easily be understood, as a considerable number of 
Russian troops remained stationed in Estonia at the time of the drafting and the adoption of the Law on 
Aliens. The Russian troops were supposed to leave Estonia by August 1993, but the negotiations between 
Estonian and Russian officials over the withdrawal were constantly stalled. And during spring 1993, 
Russia’s position on troop retreat had significantly hardened as a result of the internal crisis in Russia. 
Most alarmingly, the number of Russian troops in Tallinn had risen, even though their presence in other 
parts of Estonia was diminishing.316 Thus, the Estonian side was not eager to make concessions to the 
members of an army that it considered as an occupation force that was unwilling to leave. In this respect, 
the Russian strategy to exert pressure on Estonia was counter-productive, as it resulted in a hardening of 
the Estonian position regarding Russian-speakers in general and former and active militaries in particular. 
 
Moreover, while it could still be expected that active army representatives would eventually leave Estonia, 
the same could not be hoped for from retired army officials. Many Soviet army officials retired at a rather 
young age. It is believed that some were not more than thirty-five years old. A similar situation applied to 
reserve officers. Thus, one can not think of Soviet army pensioners as one does of a largely elderly 
population. Among Estonians there was a widespread fear of the so-called "fifth column" - former Soviet 
or Russian military officials, men in their prime age, who could work for Russian intelligence, trigger a 
provocation to cause instability in Estonia, or, in the gloomiest scenarios, give support in the case that 
another invasion was planned.317 The Estonian defence plan considered "the retired Russian officers as 
one of the main internal threats to the country’s security." 318 According to Estonia’s Defence Minister 
Hain Rebas, over 70 per cent of the retired Russian army officers residing in Estonia held weapons in their 
possession.319 It was also believed that the Russian army purposefully discharged a certain number of 
army officials from active duty during the transition period, prior and after the declaration of Estonia’s 
independence, in order to keep them in Estonia even when the rest of the army would have to leave.  
 
The High Commissioner tried to take this last concern into account when making his recommendation on 
how to change the particular paragraph. He proposed that the restriction of not granting residence permits 
could be limited to those army officials who had been demobilized after 1991. However, such a restriction 
would have applied only to a small minority of army officials residing in Estonia, leaving most of the 
army contingent free to apply for residence permits. The overall numbers of army officials, whether 
retired or in reserve, was not known. As Russia refused to provide such information, Estonian officials 
were even more cautious of their presence. To be certain, a considerably large group of people, whom 
                                                 
313  Välismaalaste seadus [Law on Aliens], 8 July 1993, art. 12 para. 4.6. and para. 4.7. 
314  Cf. HCNM Letter to Meri, 1 July 1993. 
315  Cf. HCNM Statement, 12 July 1993. 
316  Cf. The Baltic Independent, 12 February 1993, Balts resist troop influx. In early 1993, Russian army leaders had asked 
Estonian officials for permission to actually increase the number of Russian troops and to carry out large-scale military 
exercises in Estonia. In April 1993, the Russian military carried out exercise maneuvers aimed at "capturing and keeping 
strategically important targets in the Baltic States until the arrival of main forces", see The Baltic Independent, 20 April 
1993, Russian officers practice recapturing Baltics. 
317  For example, in spring 1993 Russia had adopted a new law guaranteeing additional privileges to Russian servicemen in the 
Baltics to defend the constitutional rights of citizens in these countries, see The Baltic Independent, 19 March 1993, Troop 
Watch. 
318  The Baltic Independent, 19 March 1993, Troop Watch. 
319  Cf. ibid. 
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 Estonia could only consider a threat to the statehood and national security, would remain behind. 
Moreover, had Estonian legislators granted all (or most) former Soviet army officials the right to apply for 
Estonian residence permits, they would have accepted the presence of the occupation forces on Estonian 
territory as legitimate and, thus, also given legitimacy to the Soviet occupation of Estonia in general. 
 
Therefore, the questioned clause remained intact in the amended and promulgated Law on Aliens. The 
following paragraph in the law does, however, give some leeway to army officials, according to which the 
Estonian government can make exceptions and grant residence permits to retired officers of a foreign 
army. While the rest of the decision-making on residence permits was left to the Migration Office, the 
applications by former Soviet army officials were to be reviewed and decided upon by the government.320 
The question was thus left relatively open and to be determined by a separate act of government. 
However, following the crisis of summer 1993, the Prime Minister mentioned the members of the Soviet 
armed forces and their families in relation to Estonia’s commitment to the non-expulsion policy. It was 
added that humanitarian considerations would be the basis of the Estonian government’s attitude towards 
Soviet army servicemen.321 A further reassurance was made that only cadre (or professional) army 
servicemen were to be considered as former members of the Soviet armed forces. This excluded those 
who had gone through the compulsory military service in their youth.  
 
In December 1993 the Estonian government adopted a decree regulating the issuance of residence permits 
to retired career officers of foreign armed forces and their family members.322 The regulation applies only 
to those officers who retired from the army prior to 20 August 1991, i.e. before the declaration of Estonian 
independence. In addition, the regulation foresaw that residence permits could be issued only to those 
retired servicemen who were born before 1930, i.e. who were 63 years of age or older at the time when the 
regulation came into force. The servicemen could also continue to reside in Estonia if their spouses or 
minor children were Estonian citizens or legal residents of Estonia. A special government commission was 
established to deal with the foreign army servicemen. The commission included the Minister of Ethnic 
Affairs, the head of the Migration Office and representatives from the Ministries of Defence, Interior 
Affairs, Social Affairs and Foreign Affairs. Other experts could also be invited to participate in the work 
of the commission. Since November 1994, due to pressure from the Russian Federation, an OSCE 
representative,323 holding the right to make comments and suggestions, was included in the commission.324 
For the residence permit application, the army servicemen had to provide more documents than those 
required from other people. In addition to what was demanded from others, the army servicemen had to 
produce a medical certificate and proof of legal income and residence. Those married or with minor 
children also had to show a marriage certificate and their children’s birth certificates. Finally, servicemen 
applying for residence permits had to confirm with their signatures that they would respect Estonia’s 
constitutional system and legislation; that their actions would not threaten the Estonian state and its 
security; that they had not worked in the intelligence or security forces of any foreign state; that they do 
not participate in any (illegal) armed formations abroad or in Estonia; that they had not been convicted for 
criminal offence to imprisonment for longer than one year; and that they did not and would not obtain a 
gun.325  
 
                                                 
320  Cf. Välismaalaste seadus [Law on Aliens], 8 July 1993, art. 12 para. 5. 
321  Cf. HCNM Statement, 12 July 1993. 
322  Cf. Määrus No. 379 [Regulation No. 379], Välisriigi relvajõududest erru arvatud kaadrisõjaväelastele ja nende 
perekonnaliikmetele elamislubade andmise kord [Issuance of residence permits to career officers retired from foreign armed 
forces and their family members], 1 December 1993. 
323  Captain Uwe Mahrenholtz was appointed by the CSO on 4 November 1994 (see CSCE 28-CSO/Journal No. 3). 
324  Cf. Määrus No. 416 [Regulation No. 416], Välisriigi erukaadrisõjaväelastele ja nende perekonnaliikmetele elamislubade 
andmist korraldava valitsuskomisjoni põhimäärus [Ratification of governmental commission organizing issuance of 
residence permits to retired servicemen of foreign army and their family members], 7 November 1994. 
325  Cf. Määrus No. 379 [Regulation No. 379], Välisriigi relvajõududest erru arvatud kaadrisõjaväelastele ja nende 
perekonnaliikmetele elamislubade andmise kord [Issuance of residence permits to career officers retired from foreign armed 
forces and their family members], 1 December 1993. 
 52
 Thus, the option of applying for residence permits was available to some of the former Soviet army 
servicemen: To those who had retired prior to Estonia’s independence, who were 63 years of age or older, 
or whose family members were Estonian citizens or legal residents of Estonia. Estonian legislators feared 
that instability could result from all servicemen being granted residence permits without special clauses. 
However, it seems that the limitations of the regulation actually increased the threat of instability. Several 
organizations representing the Russian population called for civil unrest and armed resistance in order to 
voice the Russian population’s dissatisfaction with the decree. Nor was Russia satisfied with these 
limitations, and made the issue of retired servicemen the main stumbling block in the Estonian-Russian 
troop withdrawal agreement.  
 
 
3.9 July Agreements and Russian Troop Withdrawal from Estonia 
 
Prior to the regulation of the Estonian government on army pensioners, Russia had tried to halt the 
withdrawal of its troops by complaining about the human rights situation in Estonia. However, as over ten 
different missions had visited Estonia and found no human rights violations, Russia’s accusations in this 
respect were unfounded.326 In the light of continuing Russian accusations concerning human rights 
violations in Estonia, and the renewed linkage between these violations and the withdrawal of Russian 
troops,327 the OSCE Mission to Estonia reiterated its point of view that there was currently no evidence for 
gross human rights violations in Estonia, and urged that Russia respect the 31 August deadline for 
withdrawing its troops.328 In this context, Russia realized that it would be easier and more viable to make 
the troops withdrawal agreement dependent on some more concrete issue, such as the legal guarantees for 
army pensioners. Russia pursued similar tactics in negotiations with Latvia and Lithuania, namely by 
attaching additional self-interested conditions to the troop-withdrawal deals. With Lithuania, Russia 
managed to make a favourable deal concerning the transit between the Kaliningrad enclave and Russia 
proper through Lithuanian territory. As a result of negotiations with Latvia, Russia remained in control of 
the Skrunda radar plant for a further five years, and Russian army retirees were guaranteed residence and 
social rights in Latvia. The other Baltic states succumbed to these concessions simply in order to get rid of 
the Russian troops on their territories. The Russian army left Lithuania already by the end of 1993. Latvia 
and Russia signed their agreement in spring 1994, and Russia promised publicly to withdraw its troops 
from Latvia by August 1994. Estonia was the last of the Baltics to demand for unconditional withdrawal 
of Russian troops. The Lithuanian and Latvian agreements undermined the Estonians' uncompromising 
position. Estonia was also running out of time: The Russian troops were supposed to leave Estonia by 31 
August 1994, but Russia had stopped the withdrawals already during the spring, and even in July 
continued to state that Russian troops would not leave until human rights were respected in Estonia and 
the rights of army retirees were guaranteed.329 
 
There was also international pressure, especially from the US, for Estonia to accept concessions regarding 
the retired army officers. Already a year earlier, Presidents Clinton and Yeltsin had made a joint 
communiqué, in which they referred to the critical importance of full protection of Russian minorities, and 
President Clinton had indirectly accepted that this affects the timely pullout of Russian troops. Even 
though Estonia objected to these allusions and accused the US of an obsession to keep Yeltsin in power, 
Estonian politicians ultimately had to succumb to a compromise deal.330 
 
                                                 
326  Lieven 1994, p. xxiii. 
327  Cf. The Baltic Independent, 21 January 1994, Russia declares 'vital interests' in the Baltics. Troops to stay? And The Baltic 
Independent, 11 February 1994, First Kozyrev, now the others and The Baltic Observer, 17 February 1994, Luik remains 
optimistic despite Kozyrev statements. 
328  Cf. CSCE Mission to Estonia, Activity Report No. 49 (31 January 1994) and No. 63 (23 May 1994). 
329  Cf. The Baltic Independent, 15 July 1994, Yeltsin says 'nyet' to pullout from Estonia. 
330  Cf. The Baltic Independent, 9 April 1993, Meri slates Clinton over Yeltsin ‘lies’. 
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 Also the OSCE recommended for some concessions to be made, but did so primarily through the 
Chairman-in-Office and the OSCE Mission to Estonia.331 The High Commissioner’s involvement in the 
agreements on troops' withdrawal and the army pensioners’ social guarantees was minimal, as the issue 
was not directly related to his mandate. However, he did publicly support the withdrawal of the troops and 
brought the issue up during his meetings in Moscow. In one interview the High Commissioner commented 
the situation in the following way: 
 
There exists not only the problem of minorities, but also of the troop withdrawal. Because of my mandate I 
have nothing to do with it, but this is of course an element that also determines the nature of the relations. […] 
In Moscow I have been assured constantly that they are sincerely willing to withdraw their troops from the 
Baltics, and that the fear the army will stay is absolutely unfounded.332 
 
At the same time, Russian officials tried to obtain the High Commissioner’s support to keep the army 
pensioners in Estonia. During his visit to Moscow, Russian Deputy Prime Minister Trofimov told Van der 
Stoel that Western countries should invest in the Baltic states and employ retired Russian troops and their 
family members in these enterprises.333 The High Commissioner’s credibility in Estonia suffered during 
this period. The local OSCE Mission had supported linking the troops’ withdrawal to social guarantees of 
army pensioners, and as a result relations between the Estonian public and OSCE became strained. Even 
though the HCNM was not directly involved, the unpopularity of the mission also affected his position.  
 
On the Estonian political scene, some government officials began to carefully state that some concessions 
might be necessary in order to finalize the agreement, thus indicating that the government was considering 
a compromise. However, the opposition vigorously attacked these statements both from left and right. The 
government was therefore in a difficult situation. The compromise agreement in Estonia could cause an 
internal crisis in the country, and could decrease the popularity of the government coalition. Even if some 
compromise agreement could be signed, it would probably not be ratified in parliament.  
 
Several rounds of negotiations throughout spring and early summer between Estonian and Russian 
officials had produced no positive results. Even meetings between higher-level politicians, such as the 
Foreign Ministers of the two countries, did not appear to have any effect. Finally, on 26 July 1994 
Estonian President Lennart Meri travelled in person to Moscow to meet his counterpart Boris Yeltsin. US 
President Bill Clinton had pushed for such a meeting to take place. As Yeltsin mentioned to the press, he 
was meeting President Meri as a favour to President Clinton, and did not hope for any solutions to be born 
out of the meeting. Surprisingly, however, the two Presidents did come to an agreement concerning the 
Russian troop withdrawal from Estonia and the social guarantees of the Russian army pensioners in 
Estonia. Lennart Meri and Boris Yeltsin signed a deal on the social guarantees of the Russian army 
retirees on the same day, on 26 July 1994. In return, Russia promised to withdraw its troops from Estonia 
by to the previously agreed date of 31 August 1994.  
 
A lot of criticism was raised against these agreements on the Estonian political scene. However, as the 
Agreement was signed by the heads of state, it took effect immediately and could be overturned only after 
it failed ratification in parliament.334 The latter process would, however, take a while. So the fact that the 
agreement was signed by the Presidents turned out to be the best way to manage swift and timely 
liberation of Estonia from the Russian troops. Russian officials stated that they realized that Estonian 
legislators could withdraw from the made promises by refusing to ratify the so-called July Agreements, 
but the withdrawal of Russian troops was going ahead and they were relying on a ‘gentlemen’s 
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 agreement’ on behalf of the Estonians. Estonia did indeed keep its end of the bargain, as subsequent 
legislative acts and the ratification of the Estonian-Russian Agreement in the Estonian parliament indicate. 
 
The most important provision of the Agreement stipulated that all former Soviet army servicemen (and 
their family members) were granted the right to apply for residence permits, irrespective of their age and 
when they retired. Thus, also those who were young or who had retired after Estonia became independent 
could legally stay in Estonia. This fact again raised Estonian fears of the so-called fifth column that had 
been expressed in previous years. Moreover, the July Agreements contained several points which were in 
contradiction to the existing legislation in Estonia. This point will be discussed further below. Public 
opposition to the ratification of the Agreement was therefore rather clear. However, the opposition against 
the ratification of the deal was finally undermined by the fact that according to the Estonian Constitution, 
international treaties take prevalence over domestic laws. 
 
Alongside its contradictions to Estonian legislation, several other aspects of the Agreement can also be 
characterized as slightly strange: Some issues are mentioned in very general terms, while others are 
defined in ridiculous detail. In general, the Agreement illustrates the ignorance of the Russian negotiators 
about existing legislation in Estonia. The Agreement spells out some protective precautions for the army 
pensioners which are already guaranteed to all legal residents of Estonia by the Estonian Constitution, as 
well as by more specific legislation. Thus, the main concession made that all Russian army pensioners and 
their family members can apply for Estonian residence permits would have sufficed to guarantee their 
social and economic rights. Once legal residents of Estonia, they would enjoy the same rights as all other 
resident permit holders or citizens of the country. These rights included the right to private property, 
medical care, higher education and participation in the privatization process (receiving also privatization 
bonds). However, all these issues are nevertheless mentioned in the Estonian-Russian Agreement. As a 
very general point, the Agreement states that army pensioners and their family members will be 
guaranteed civil, political, social, economic and cultural rights according to international human rights 
norms.335 Russia found it necessary to include this guarantee in the agreement even though many different 
international missions had already determined that Estonian legislation concerning aliens was by and large 
in accordance with the international standards (the question of who was to be considered as alien was still 
debatable). Some aspects of the above-mentioned rights are then further elaborated in the Agreement. For 
example, the Agreement states very specifically that army pensioners will have the right to possess, use 
and control their property, including houses, apartments, holiday houses and garages (sic!) on equal terms 
with Estonian citizens.336 The Russian side also saw it necessary to include that army pensioners and their 
family members have the same right to higher education as Estonian citizens. This was not denied by any 
other law in Estonia. Another concern of Russian negotiators was pensioners’ access to medical treatment 
in Estonian medical institutions. This point was specially noted in the Agreement, even though Estonian 
legislation guaranteed social rights to all legal residents of Estonia, and the Estonian government had 
repeatedly promised not to limit these rights in the future.337 
 
Even though all the above-mentioned rights were guaranteed to all legal residents in Estonia anyway, the 
Estonian side agreed to include them in the Agreement in order to reassure Russia that these rights would 
be respected in the future as well. In any case, this was not the reason why Estonian politicians and the 
public criticized the deal. The critique was directed to several other articles in the Agreement that were 
clearly contradictory to existing Estonian legislation, as well as to the fact that the rights granted to 
Russian army pensioners exceeded those held by Estonian citizens. According to the Agreement, the 
former army servicemen could, for example, privatize their living quarters, independent of who actually 
owned the property.338 This clause was considered to be in vile contradiction to the restitution law. This 
meant that persons who had a right to restitution could not reclaim their pre-war possession if a Russian 
                                                 
335  Cf. ibid., art. 6. 
336  Cf. ibid., art. 7. 
337  Cf. ibid., art. 9. 
338  Cf. ibid., art. 8.1. 
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 army pensioner was living in it. Anger was aroused by the fact that Soviet army officials would still be 
able to live in the houses and apartments of people whom they had deported to Siberia. For Estonians, a 
clause in the Agreement that caused even more rage concerned other rules of privatization. Presidents 
Meri and Yeltsin had agreed that army pensioners’ years served in the Soviet military would be 
considered as working years, and would thus be counted towards their privatization coupons.339 Even 
Estonian citizens themselves could not do that! In the Estonian privatization system, the number of 
privatization coupons each person received was counted according to how many years the person had 
worked. Thus, people with longer employment service received more privatization coupons. But the years 
served in the Soviet army (even the compulsory service) were not taken into account, no matter whether 
the person was an Estonian citizen or not. The July Agreement, however, favoured Soviet army 
servicemen over Estonian citizens and other legal residents in Estonia by granting them the right to 
include years served in the army towards their privatization bonds. 
 
While Estonia had agreed to guarantee the social and economic rights to army pensioners, the Russian 
Federation was to cover most of costs of the social benefits. The Russian Federation had agreed to pay out 
the monthly pensions, which could not be lower than the minimum pension rate established in Estonia.340 
Also the medical costs of army pensioners were to be covered from Russian sources, and Estonia simply 
had to guarantee their access to Estonian medical care.341 This meant that even though Soviet army 
pensioners were to stay in Estonia, their subsistence would not burden the Estonian budget. The agreement 
on social guarantees of retired servicemen would have been much more difficult to swallow if the 
Estonian taxpayers would have had to cover the living costs of people they considered as occupiers.  
 
Another important clause, which showed that Estonian negotiators had succeeded in including some 
guarantees for the Estonian state was included in the Agreement. Both in the introduction and the 
conclusion of the deal, there is a reassurance that none of the given guarantees and rights justify actions 
that could endanger either state’s sovereignty, security or territorial integrity. In other words, the 
commission of the Estonian government retained a possibility to refuse the issuance of residence permits 
to individuals they considered dangerous to the Estonian state and independence.342 However, in order to 
avoid abuse of this clause in practice, the parties agreed that the government commission in charge of 
issuing residence permits would include the above-mentioned OSCE representative.343  
 
Russia committed itself to provide a list of all persons concerned within 30 days, and to update it each 
year.344 The Agreement was estimated to affect around ten thousand people. There was still some 
confusion concerning the validity of the deal, as Yeltsin had not yet signed the Estonian version of the 
agreement. However, in the end most Russian troops withdrew from Estonia by 31 August 1994, as had 
been agreed. Those left behind to dismantle the nuclear reactors at Paldiski submarine port finished their 
job the next year. Thus by September 1995 Estonia was free from active foreign troops on its territory. 
 
In Estonia, some legislative acts based upon the social guarantees agreement came into force in the 
following months. The government commission started its work in the end of 1994. The agreements were 
finally ratified in the Estonian parliament in December 1995, and in the subsequent year the government 
adopted a regulation concerning residence permits of Russian army pensioners, which was modified 
according to the Estonian-Russian treaty. 345 
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 3.10 Summary 
 
Summing up, one can conclude that Estonia had managed to steer successfully through the crisis 
situations, which emerged after 1991 due to the radicalization in the citizenship and aliens' policies. The 
Russian troops, which were perceived as the main destabilizing and threat factor by Estonians, had finally 
withdrawn in 1994, and the danger of a "Transdniestrian" scenario in the Northeast had been successfully 
diverted. The danger of military escalation in Estonia, if it had ever been realistic at all, was certainly no 
longer an issue after 1994. However, the underlying conflict between Estonians and non-Estonians 
remained unresolved. The Estonians had succeeded in upholding their core principles in the citizenship 
and aliens' legislation, which in turn, led to continuous dissatisfaction and frustration among the Russian-
speaking population.  
 
Between 1991 and 1994, the High Commissioner was involved in Estonia in short- as well as in long-term 
conflict prevention. His intensive shuttle-diplomacy in June and July 1993, followed up by the public 
statement of 12 July 1993, was crucial for defusing the crisis surrounding the autonomy referenda in 
Narva and Sillamäe. His continuous involvement before as well as after the crisis, on the other hand, 
helped to start a sustainable conflict management process, which evolved around the interpretation and 
implementation of laws and norms. In his recommendations to the Estonian government in 1993 and 1994, 
the HCNM elaborated, however, not only on the consistency of the Estonian legislation with international 
norms, but stressed also the need to take the psychological effect into account that the new citizenship and 
aliens' legislation had on the Russian-speakers. Indeed, an important role that the HCNM played during 
the summer crisis in 1993 was to increase the subjective feeling of personal security among the Russian-
speakers by (a) providing them with proper information and (b) in reassuring them that no mass 
deportations would take place and that they would have a future in Estonia. The public statement of 12 
July 1993, in which the HCNM listed the assurance he had received from the Estonian government and 
the representatives of the Russian community, was crucial in this regard, as it was published also in the 
Estonian Russian-language press. The fact that these assurances had been given not only as such, but to an 
international representative, also reinforced their value. 
 
As for the concrete recommendations the High Commissioner issued in 1993 and 1994, it is important to 
note that they have been implemented only partially. The High Commissioner had accepted the general 
framework of the existing language and citizenship legislation, and also accepted the core principles of the 
Law on Aliens. In his recommendations, he concentrated on increasing transparency and uniformity in the 
legislation affecting the Russian-speaking population, on easing the naturalization process by lowering the 
language requirements, as well as on simplifying the application process with regard to the residence 
permits. His recommendations directed at an increase of transparency and uniformity had been largely 
implemented. However, his calls for making the language test easier, a simple exchange of the old Soviet 
registration for a new Estonian residence permit and the issuance of aliens' passports to all non-citizens 
residing in Estonia, were, however, not followed up to the degree the HCNM had initially hoped for. The 
prevailing perception among Estonians during this time was that the Russian-speakers were disloyal to the 
Estonian state and should, therefore, leave the country. Consequently, the reluctance to provide them with 
a permanent residence permit or even to open them the way to Estonian citizenship was still strong, 
especially among voters and parliamentarians who were less exposed to international pressure than the 
government. The main success of the HCNM in the period of radicalization between 1991 and 1994 was 
thus to prevent a tense situation from escalating, and to lay, through his recommendations, the foundation 
for a sustainable conflict transformation. 
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 Chapter 4. The Stabilization Period from 1995 to 1997 
 
 
                                                
The time around the year 1995 was the low point in Estonian minority politics. The restrictive legislation 
concerning non-Estonians had been implemented and had served its original purpose to defend the 
position of Estonian language and culture in the newly born state. However, continuing along the same 
lines would have led to a dead end. In 1995 only 49 per cent of Russians were empathic to the Estonian 
government, whereas the support among Estonians lay at 82 per cent. In early 1996, when asked how 
relations between Estonians and Russians in Estonia would develop, around 45 per cent of non-Estonian 
replied that relations would remain the same, and another 45 per cent estimated that relations would 
worsen. At the same time, an overwhelming majority of both Russians and Estonians replied that no or 
little ethnic tensions existed in the country.346 As it became increasingly apparent that most Russian 
speakers would remain in Estonia, it was also recognized that Estonia required a new approach towards 
minorities. This approach was to aim at cohabitation and integration. Internal developments that resulted 
in the formation of a new majority in the Riigikogu, as well as the start of Estonia's accession process to 
the European Union, influenced Estonia's policy towards its non-Estonian residents positively. However, 
certain improvements notwithstanding, a real breakthrough was not attained in this period.  
 
The following chapter will start with a brief discussion on the developments and shifts in Estonia's 
political system between 1995 and 1997. On this background, the following main changes in Estonia's 
legislation regarding non-citizens and minorities will be discussed: The new Law on Citizenship, the 
question of aliens' passports, the 1996 amendments to the Law on Aliens and Estonia's accession to the 
Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities. This will be followed by a short analysis 
on Estonia's relation to the EU, other international organizations and Russia. The chapter will close with a 
discussion on the Report on the HCNM's Recommendations, elaborated by the Estonian Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs in 1997.  
 
 
4.1 Internal Developments from 1995 to 1997 
 
At the beginning of 1995 a change of power occurred in Estonia. The more nationalistically minded 
coalition of the Pro Patria Union, the Estonian National Independence Party and the Moderates, which had 
formed the coalition governments since 1992 under the Prime Ministers Mart Laar (September 1992 - 
October 1994) and Andres Tarand (since October 1994), was ousted by more centre-oriented parties in the 
parliamentary elections of March 1995. The new government was formed by the Coalition Party, the Rural 
People's Party and the Centre Party. It had not been elected on the nationalist card, but on the basis of 
more economic- and social-oriented issues. Consequentially, it could pursue a more pragmatic policy 
towards the Russian-speaking population. Moreover, the election block "Our Home is Estonia", set up by 
two parties of the Russian-speaking electorate, the Estonian United People's Party and the Russian Party in 
Estonia, passed the 5 per cent barrier and sent six Russian-speaking parliamentarians to the new Riigikogu. 
Thus, in contrast to the first post-independence parliament, Russian-speakers were represented in the 
Riigikogu after 1995. And although not included in the new government, they were at least able to 
articulate the interests of the Russian-speaking population on a more official level than in previous years, 
when the Presidential Roundtable had been the only body that served this purpose.347 
 
However, as in previous years, Estonian politics remained unstable and several coalition crises and 
government reshuffles followed. One of the coalition partners, the Centre Party, was forced to leave 
government after a few months as the result of an eavesdropping scandal. The secret police searched a 
private security service company and found tapes with conversations between leading politicians. One of 
 
346  Cf. Kirch et al. 1997, p. 46, 62, 64. 
347  Cf. Arter 1995, pp. 258-261. 
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 the conversation partners on all recordings was the leader of the Centre Party, Minister of Interior Edgar 
Savisaar. Even though Savisaar’s advisor Vilja Laanaru took the blame for recording the conversations, 
Edgar Savisaar himself was accused. As a result, he was asked to step down from the position of the 
Minister of Interior. In the end, the whole government stepped down. The new government was formed in 
November 1995 by the Coalition Party, the Rural People's Party and the Reform Party.  
 
A year later, in autumn 1996, newly independent Estonia witnessed its second presidential elections. After 
five rounds, Lennart Meri was elected President for a second term. As the Coalition Party had not 
supported the candidate of the Rural People's Party, Arnold Rüütel, frictions appeared in the coalition 
government. Moreover, following the local elections of 1996, the Centre Party got into power in Tallinn 
and the coalition parties turned out to hold opposite positions in the power structures in the Tallinn city 
government. This affected their relations also in the central government, placing the coalition under even 
greater pressure. The relations between the Coalition Party and the Reform Party in particular turned sour 
after local elections in October 1996. Finally in 1997, the government had to resign once again, and a new 
minority government came into office under Prime Minister Tiit Vähi from the Coalition Party, who found 
replacements for all ministerial positions that the Reform Party had left empty. In order to guarantee the 
support of other parties in the parliament, particularly that of the Estonian Progressive Party faction, the 
position of the minister dealing with ethnic issues was granted to a member of that party, Andra 
Veidemann. Ms. Veidemann was characterised as a person with strong conviction and determination, and 
who helped to develop minority-related policies to a great extent.  
 
 
4.2  The New Law on Citizenship of 1995 
 
As put forward in chapter 3.1, the Citizenship Law that came to force in 1992 was a copy-and-paste 
document of the law dating back to 1938. The entire text of that law was never fully published. Only the 
changes and cuts with regard to the old law were made public in the regular edition of Estonian 
legislation, Riigi Teataja. For this reason, the law remained quite ambiguous and contained many 
contradictions. Thus there was an acute need for a proper Law on Citizenship, which would reflect the 
current conditions of Estonia and, foremost, would be compiled in one whole text.  
 
The new Law on Citizenship was supposed to liberalize the naturalization process, as pressured for by the 
international community. However, in general the content of the new law turned out to be the same as the 
earlier one had entailed. Moreover, there were new additional conditions introduced, which were not 
mentioned in the previous law. For one, the residence requirement was increased from two to five years. 
More importantly, the new law established that citizenship applicants were required to pass an exam on 
the Estonian Constitution and the Citizenship Law, and also the language requirements were revised.  
 
With regard to the differentiated residence requirements, it should be recalled that the initial residence 
requirement for a person to apply for Estonian citizenship was two years before the application, as well as 
one year thereafter.348 In the 1995 Law on Citizenship, this criterion was raised to five years of residence 
before an application for citizenship could be made. Already during the drafting of the law in 1994, the 
High Commissioner expressed his concern over how this change could affect the people who had settled 
in Estonia before the declaration of independence. Van der Stoel expressed his hope that the permanent 
registration in the Estonian SSR since 30 March 1990349 would be considered as the starting point for 
calculations: 
 
                                                 
348  Cf. Ülemnõukogu [Supreme Council], Kodakondsuse seaduse rakendamise kohta [Decision on Implementing the Law on 
Citizenship], 26 February 1992, para. 6, pt. 2. 
349  This is the same date according to which residence permits are considered in the Law on Aliens, dating from 1993. 
 60
 It is, in my view, especially important that the law will make clear, beyond any doubt, that the residence 
criteria of five (plus one) years of permanent residence counted from 30 March 1990 will be based on the time 
of actual residence in Estonia, and that the period spent in Estonia will be calculated both on the basis of 
permanent registration in the former Estonian SSR and on the basis of residence permits, permanent or 
temporary, under the new Law on Aliens. Thus non-citizens who have been residing in Estonia since at least 
30 March 1990 would fulfil the residence requirement on 30 March 1995. 350  
 
The Estonian government actually assured at an early stage that residence would indeed be counted from 
30 March 1990. In his response to the High Commissioner, Estonian Foreign Minister Luik specified that 
even though the new law required five years of prior residence in Estonia for the case of permanent 
residence permits, this clause would not be applied to people who had settled in Estonia before 1990.351 
The draft law presented to the High Commissioner foresaw that until 2005, those persons would have the 
right to apply for Estonian citizenship also with temporary residence permits, on the condition that they 
resided in Estonia permanently and legally according to the Law on Aliens.352 In the final promulgated 
version of the Law on Citizenship, the special application conditions for residents prior to 1990 were non-
expiring, i.e. even the time limit of 2005 was omitted.353 
 
Another important modification of the citizenship legislation was the exam on the Constitution and the 
Law on Citizenship. The new Citizenship Law saw the introduction of an additional requirement for 
citizenship applicants. This exam was added to the already established language test. Lengthy public 
discussions had centred on the issue that citizenship applicants should know more about the country 
whose subjects they intended to become. More nationalist forces supported the inclusion of a wider range 
of topics in the exam, such as history and culture, as was the case in Latvia or the USA. However, the 
moderate voices got an upper hand in the discussion, and were able to limit the questions only to the basic 
legislation of Estonia. The legal test has many advantages over a more profound exam on history and 
culture. For one, the main clauses of the Constitution are a more objective matter for testing one’s 
knowledge than history and culture, which are subject to various interpretations and are in general very 
broad topics. Secondly, the legislators wanted the exam to concentrate on issues that would be of direct 
benefit to the new citizens, primarily the citizen’s constitutional rights, liberties and obligations.354 The 
subject of the exam was therefore further limited to only a few chapters of the Constitution that concern 
citizen’s fundamental rights, liberties and duties, as well as general provisions about the state and the 
people, the responsibilities of the parliament, government, President and courts.355 Finally, the 
introduction of an additional exam lessened the burden of the language exam, which was often accused of 
being subjective, testing a person’s knowledge of facts rather than his/her language skills.  
 
However, the legislator’s good intentions to make the constitutional exam focus on issues of direct 
relevance to new citizens were not carried out in reality. The time to prepare the questions for the exam 
was limited to a few months.356 The bureaucratic staff of the Citizenship and Migration Office prepared 
the test and compiled rather mechanic reformulations of constitutional paragraphs into questions. Many 
questions are relevant, such as: ‘Who holds the supreme power of the state?’ (answer: the people); ‘Is 
                                                 
350  HCNM Letter to Luik, 8 December 1994. 
351  Cf. Luik Letter to the HCNM, 23 December 1994. 
352  Permanent residency is defined by the 1995 Law on Citizenship as having been in Estonia at least 183 days in a year, and 
not having stayed abroad for more than 90 days in a row (Kodakondsus seadus [Law on Citizenship], 19 January 1995, para. 
11). Residing in Estonia according to the conditions of the Law on Aliens includes residence permits, visas and other kinds 
of permission (Välismaalaste seadus [Law on Aliens], 8 July 1993, para. 9.1, amendend by: Väljasõidukohustuse ja 
sissesõidukeelu seadus [Law on the Obligation to Leave and the Prohibition on Entry], 21 October 1998.). 
353  Cf. Kodakondsus seadus [Law on Citizenship], 19 January 1995, para. 33. 
354  Cf. Ilves Letter to the HCNM, 4 June 1997. 
355  Cf. Kodakondsus seadus [Law on Citizenship], 19 January 1995, para. 9. The constitutional exam concerns chapters I, II, III, 
IV, V, VI, XIII.  
356  The new Law on Citizenship was adopted in January 1995 and Minister of Interior regulation No. 15 Eesti Vabariigi 
põhiseaduse ja kodakondsuse seaduse tundmise eksami küsimused [Questions of the exam on the Constitution and the Law 
on Citizenship of the Republic of Estonia] was enacted on 11 July 1995. 
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 censorship allowed?’; ‘Is the home inviolable?’; etc.357 However, a multitude of questions can hardly be 
considered as beneficial for a new citizen in his or her every-day life. Such questions include: ‘Who 
declares a state of emergency?’; ‘Who declares a state of extraordinary situation?’; ‘Will the government 
step down in case of a Prime Minister’s death?’; etc.358  
 
On the other hand, the test is quite simple, despite the fact that it concerns legal texts. Around half of the 
questions require just yes/no or single-word answers. All questions (and answers) are readily available for 
citizenship applicants, together with Russian translations and explications.359 All applicants are also 
entitled to preparation classes. Finally, the texts of the Constitution and Citizenship Law can be used 
during the exam.  
 
The High Commissioner stated clearly and strongly that the constitutional and language exams are in line 
with policies of many other countries, also within the OSCE community.360 In his opinion, it could even 
be seen as desirable to guarantee that the new beneficiaries of citizenship will also know the basic 
principles of the state.361 Thus, he did not disagree with the process in itself, but the HCNM did make 
repeated recommendations in relation to the exams’ conditions and implementation. In general, he 
continuously called for the Estonian government to make the exam on the Constitution considerably 
easier. In the opinion of the High Commissioner, the level of difficulty of the questions was highly 
uneven: Whereas many of the questions were indeed quite simple, a number of them were difficult even 
for persons holding university degrees.362 In addition, the fact that the exam had to be passed in Estonian 
made the test even more difficult for most citizenship applicants, who only had limited knowledge of the 
Estonian language.  
 
In the opinion of the Estonian government, the High Commissioner had been influenced too much by the 
Russian press, which frequently stated that only persons with university degrees were able to answer the 
questions in the constitution exam. According to Estonian Foreign Minister Kallas, the exam was not as 
difficult as the High Commissioner had been made to believe. Considering that examinants could use the 
texts of the Constitution and of the Law on Citizenship during the exam, the only real requirement was 
sufficient language knowledge to locate the right passage in the legislation.363 The percentage of persons 
passing the exam was very high, usually ranging above ninety per cent. In addition, also the OSCE 
Mission in Estonia recognized that passing both language and legal exam is possible for everybody with 
some preparation.364  
 
At the time, the only point raised by the HCNM that the Estonian Foreign Minister considered worthy of 
attention and reviewing concerned the exemption of elderly people from the constitution exam.365 
However, neither the Estonian legislators nor the HCNM himself returned to this issue in later 
communication.  
 
                                                 
357  Cf. Siseministeerium [Minister of Interior], määrus No. 15 [Regulation No. 15], Eesti Vabariigi põhiseaduse ja 
kodakondsuse seaduse tundmise eksami küsimused [Questions of the exam on the Constitution and the Law on Citizenship 
of the Republic of Estonia], para. 1 p. 1, para. 2, p. 16, 23.  
358  Cf. ibis. para. 3, p. 20, 21, 32. 
359  The act listing the questions of the exam was published in the regular publication of Estonian legislation, Riigi Teataja. 
Additionally and more effectively, a bilingual booklet with all the questions, answers and short explanations was published 
by the Jaan Tõnisson Institute and with the help of the Foundation on Inter-Ethnic Relations. The latter booklet is distributed 
for free to all examinants, and these praise it highly. The High Commissioner himself had asked the Foundation on Inter-
Ethnic Relations to fund the publication of this brochure. 
360  Cf. HCNM Letter to Ilves, 21 May 1997. 
361  Cf.HCNM Letter to Kallas, 11 December 1995. 
362  Cf. HCNM Letter to Kallas, 11 December 1995. 
363  Cf. Kallas Letter to the HCNM, 7 February 1996. 
364  Cf. OSCE Mission in Estonia, Activity Report No. 93, 23 January 1996. 
365  Cf. Kallas Letter to the HCNM, 7 February 1996. 
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 A year later in 1997, in an analysis of the High Commissioner's recommendations compiled by the 
Estonian Foreign Ministry, the responsibility for the changes in the constitution exam was shifted back to 
the High Commissioner. According to the report, Estonian legislators were not able to consider any 
amendments in the exam unless the High Commissioner did not identify more specifically which aspects 
or questions of the exam he considered as problematic. In his reply, Van der Stoel was quick to point out a 
few questions that he found to be too difficult, such as: ‘Who decides the question of handling over a 
citizen of Estonia to a foreign state?’; ‘Who has responsibility for securing (people's) rights and 
freedoms?’; and ‘Name three basic obligations of each citizen established in the Constitution of the 
Estonian Republic?’. In his view, it made little sense to ask citizenship applicants questions that citizens of 
many European countries and also Estonian citizens would have had difficulties with. Despite the fact that 
citizenship applicants could use the texts of the Constitution and the Law on Citizenship, the High 
Commissioner was of the opinion that answering such questions is hard, because understanding and 
interpreting complicated legal texts requires training.366 Nor did the HCNM find the argument convincing 
that over ninety per cent of examinants pass the constitution exam successfully. In his opinion, it would be 
better to ask how many of non-citizens were not applying because they considered the constitution test too 
difficult. In this connection, Van der Stoel referred to a study conducted by the International Organization 
for Migration (IOM) with the support of UNDP in 1996,367 which demonstrated that seventy per cent of 
the non-citizens assessed stated that they would not be able to pass the constitution exam, and 95 per cent 
of them wanted the Law on Citizenship to be changed.368 
 
The particular questions that the High Commissioner pointed out failed to indicate the difficulty of the 
whole test. Especially the two latter questions, which concern the protection of citizen’s rights and 
freedoms, as well as naming citizen’s basic obligations would be very beneficial knowledge for any 
citizen. Moreover, these are issues which are covered in the curriculum in civics class in Estonian high 
schools. Thus not only the ‘new’ citizens were expected to acquire such knowledge, as citizens ‘by birth’ 
also learned this at school. In his reply, Estonian Foreign Minister Toomas Hendrik Ilves upheld the 
opinion that the questions mentioned by the High Commissioner were relevant and that they had the new 
citizens’ best interests in mind.369 However, all three questions that the HCNM had pointed to, alongside a 
few others, were removed from the list of exam questions only some months after the High 
Commissioner’s letter to the Minister of Internal Affairs.370 Nevertheless, despite the Estonian Foreign 
Minister's repeated promises to simplify the constitutional exam, the content of the test has not been 
changed so far. Although the review and reformulation of the constitutional exam have been in process 
since 1999, this issue remains one of the very few that the High Commissioner and other international 
observers still criticise the Estonian government of.  
 
Next to the new constitutional test, the language requirements for citizenship applicants were also an issue 
which related to the new Law on Citizenship. The HCNM brought up the issue again in 1994, when the 
parliament started drafting the new Citizenship Law, as this was also to include the language requirements 
for naturalization. The HCNM reminded the Estonian government in particular that he had received back 
in July 1993 the assurance that:  
 
Directives will be issued to ensure that the language requirements will not exceed the ability to conduct a 
simple conversation in Estonian and the requirements will be even lower for persons over 60 and invalids.371 
 
                                                 
366  Cf. HCNM Letter to Ilves, 21 May 1997. 
367  Cf. IOM 1997. 
368  Cf. ibid. 
369  Cf. Ilves Letter to the HCNM, 4 June 1997. 
370  Cf. Siseministeerium [Minister of Interior], määrus No. 22 [Regulation no. 22], Siseministri 11. juuli 1995. a. määruse No. 
15 Eesti Vabariigi põhiseaduse ja kodakondsuse seaduse tundmise eksami küsimused osaline kehtetuks tunnistamine [Partial 
invalidation of the Ministry of Interior Regulation No. 15 Questions of the Exam on the Constitution and the Law on 
Citizenship of the Republic of Estonia], 3 November 1997. 
371  HCNM Letter to Luik, 8 December 1994. 
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 Following the adoption of the law, Van der Stoel again raised his concerns over the high number of words 
that the language test required, and expressed his hope that the test would be made easier. This time 
however, his recommendation mentioned knowledge of only 800 words as sufficient to conduct a simple 
conversation.372 The High Commissioner’s recommendation to make the language test easier and his 
criticism towards the requirement to know 2500 words had nevertheless already born fruit. In the new 
Law on Citizenship, the earlier requirement to know a certain number of words was replaced with a less 
mechanical testing of a person’s language understanding and communication capabilities. Only a list of 
words, which had been approved by the Council of Europe, could be included in the language test. Since 
1995 the language exams, although still organized on the basis of reading and listening comprehension, as 
well as speaking and writing capabilities, primarily test the applicant's ability to understand the content of 
the message. Less stress is placed on the ‘art of expression.’373 According to the Estonian Foreign 
Ministry, the language requirements in the 1995 Citizenship Act are at the minimum conversational 
level.374 Also Van der Stoel concluded that, all in all, "after the various changes made to it, the language 
test could not reasonably be considered too high."375  
 
In this regard it is important to note that the High Commissioner’s reference to the minimum word 
knowledge requirement for passing the language test in his letter from December 1995 was a thorn in the 
Estonian perception of the HCNM for two reasons. Firstly, the minimum word amount that the HCNM 
proposed had fallen from 1500 words to 800 words, thus making his recommendations somewhat 
inconsistent.376 Secondly, the High Commissioner’s reference to word count as the basis of language 
requirements was in general out-of-date at the time: Standards based on a fixed number of words for 
evaluating language proficiency were a part of the Citizenship legislation of 1992, but were disregarded in 
1995. Thus, by making this reference after the adoption of the law, the HCNM's competence was put 
under doubt. 
 
As far as the question of language requirements for the elderly and disabled people is concerned, an issue 
re-addressed by the HCNM repeatedly in his letters to Estonian officials in 1993 and 1994, it has to be 
noted that the exemptions from language requirements remained by large the same as in the earlier law. 
However, the law of 1995 sets better standards for exempting some people born before 1930 and certain 
categories of invalids from the language exam, by including these clauses in the main text of the Law on 
Citizenship. Further concessions were made to category I invalids and some category II invalids, who 
were exempted from all language requirements.377 Nevertheless, the HCNM's recommendation to exempt 
elderly people from all language requirements has not had any effect so far.378 
 
Returning to the question what happens when an applicant fails the language test, it is interesting to note 
that in the 1995 Law on Citizenship no reference is made as to what will happen if a person fails the test, 
and what opportunities exist to repeat the language exam. According to the Estonian Foreign Ministry, 
everyone may take a pre-test.379 In any case, the average success rate in the Estonian language exam has 
been very high,380 which indicates that the Estonian government has been able to create favourable and 
fair conditions for the language test. 
                                                 
372  Cf. HCNM Letter to Kallas, 11 December 1995. 
373  Kallas Letter to the HCNM, 7 February 1996. 
374  Estonia Today: Foreign Ministry’s information and fact sheet series: Citizenship and Integration Policy, 7 January 1999. 
375  Zaagman 1999. 
376  First figure mentioned in 1993 and the second in 1995. HCNM Letters to Velliste, 6 April 1993, and to Kallas, 11 December 
1995. 
377  Cf. Kodakondsus seadus [Law on Citizenship], 19 January 1995. Category II invalids who are exempted from language 
requirements include those who are permanent invalids and who are unable to complete an examination in accordance with 
the general requirements due to the state of their health. Persons with sight disabilities are exempted only from reading and 
writing requirements. Persons with hearing and speech defects do not have to fulfill the listening and speaking requirements. 
Estonia Today: Foreign Ministry’s information and fact sheet series, January 1999, Citizenship and Integration Policy. 
378  Cf. This recommendation from 1993 was repeated again in 1997. 
379  Cf. Estonia Today: Foreign Ministry’s information and fact sheet series, January 1999, Citizenship and Integration Policy.  
380  Cf. Järve/Wellmann 1999, p. 53. During the years from 1995 to 1999 over 80 per cent of applicants passed the test. Estonia 
Today: Foreign Ministry’s information and fact sheet series, January 1999, Citizenship and Integration Policy. 
 64
 In total however, the new Law on Citizenship, which was supposed to promote citizenship applications 
and speed up the process of naturalization in Estonia, did not reach its goal. Whereas the 1995 law was 
enacted in order to improve citizenship legislation, taking into account also the High Commissioner’s 
recommendations, the new naturalization conditions were perceived to have become stricter than they had 
previously been. 35,041 persons had become naturalized after undertaking the full-scale regular 
procedures according to first Law on Citizenship,381 but only 6,225 applicants became Estonian citizens 
according to the new law by 1 April 1997.382 Moreover, out of this number, many applications during 
1996-1997 were made on behalf of children, who under the new law could be registered as citizens 
without having to pass the exams.383 Thus, there had been a serious fall in citizenship applications and 
accordingly also in naturalizations under the new provisions. This fall was mainly due to the fact that 
citizenship applicants perceived the new provisions as being more difficult, especially with regard to 
passing the tests. This assumption is backed by a content analysis of Russian-language newspapers that 
was conducted in Estonia during 1995-1996, which showed that two thirds of the articles on the 
citizenship issue were negatively oriented.384  
 
 
4.3 The HCNM's Concern about Statelessness: Promotion of Naturalization and Reduction in the 
Number of Stateless People 
 
The issue of non-Estonians residing in Estonia without Estonian citizenship surfaced in 1992 and has 
been, certain improvements notwithstanding, an important issue ever since. When the 1938 Law on 
Citizenship was re-enacted in 1992, around 520,000 inhabitants in Estonia, almost 40 per cent of the 
population, became de facto stateless. According to estimations made by the High Commissioner, this 
number was reduced to about 210,000, or more than 14 per cent of the total population, by 1 April 1997.385 
This reduction is explained by the fact that approximately 125,000 people had successfully applied for 
Russian citizenship and 90,477 persons had received Estonian citizenship by 1 April 1997.386 By 2001 the 
number of stateless persons was reduced further to around 178,000.387 Of those persons who had received 
Estonian citizenship after 1992, 25,251 were ethnic Estonians and 23,326 non-Estonians who did not have 
to pass naturalization tests.388 The latter were merited for their contribution to Estonia’s independence, for 
example by having applied for Estonian citizenship prior to elections of the Estonian Congress in February 
1990. This had indicated their support for Estonian independence.389 For such persons, the requirement of 
Estonian language knowledge was waived by an amendment to the law in February 1993.390 This special 
treatment was cancelled by another amendment on 22 November 1994.391 
 
As the above-mentioned figures show, the number of people who had acquired Estonian citizenship since 
1991 was still significantly smaller than the number of Estonian residents who were not citizens. As the 
High Commissioner’s main concern in relation to minority issues in Estonia was from the beginning the 
                                                 
381  In the new Law on Citizenship, the number of people who could be granted citizenship for their merits to the Estonian State 
was limited to five persons annually (Kodakondsus seadus [Law on Citizenship], 19 January 1995, para. 10 p. 3, amended 
by: Kodakondsuse seaduse § 10 muutmise seadus [Law amending the Law on Citizenship], 18 October 1995.), but shortly 
after this figure was increased to ten persons per year.  
382  Cf. HCNM Letter to Ilves, 21 May 1997.  
383  The new law simplified citizenship acquisition for children with one parent that was an Estonian citizen, as well as for 
orphans and adopted children. This issue will discussed in more detail under the subchapter on citizenship for children. 
Kodakondsus seadus [Law on Citizenship], 19 January 1995, para. 13-15.  
384  Cf. Kirch et al. 1997, pp. 101-102. 
385  Cf. HCNM Letter to Ilves, 21 May 1997. 
386  See chapter 4.2. 
387  Cf. EU 2001, Progress Report, p. 23. 
388  Cf. HCNM Letter to Ilves, 21 May 1997; Pettai/Proos 1999. 
389  Cf. Raun 1997, p. 347.  
390  Cf. Eesti Vabariigi Ülemnõukogu otsuse “Kodakondsuse seaduse rakendamise kohta” muutmise seadus [Law amending the 
Supreme Council’s decision ‘On the implementation of Law on Citizenship’], 18 February 1993, para. 1. 
391  Cf. Kodakondsust käsitlevate õigusaktide osalise muutmise ja kehtetuks tunnistamise seadus [Law partially amending and 
invalidating the legislative acts concerning citizenship], 22 November 1994, para.2, p.1. 
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 great number of non-citizens in comparison to citizens, he stressed on many occasions the inevitability 
that the great majority of non-Estonians would continue to live in Estonia, and that the Estonian legislation 
should reflect this: 
 
On the one side, many Russians cannot be considered as a sort of migrant workers, since they have roots here 
and consider Estonia as their own country, and on the other side is their uncertainty about what the future will 
bring. The problem for many Russians is that they can’t return to Russia. A small part of them does, but most 
won’t be able to find housing and jobs if they do. So they say ‘let’s stay here. Let’s try to give ourselves and 
our children a future here.’ […] The uncertainty makes them hesitate to choose their citizenship. […] As far 
as Estonian citizenship is concerned, they have justified or unjustified doubts about whether it will be 
accepted or not and about what the rules are, how much they’ll have to know the Estonian language.392 
 
Many of the HCNM's recommendations aimed at promoting the process of naturalization, which is the 
obvious solution to reducing the number of stateless persons in Estonia. However, ever since the re-
enactment of the 1938 Law on Citizenship, there have been crucial differences between the Estonian 
government and the OSCE on this issue. The OSCE, and especially the High Commissioner, have had to 
deal with a double concern - the reduction of statelessness and the high number of people in Estonia 
acquiring Russian citizenship. On the other hand, the Estonian government was not concerned with the 
number of Russian citizens in Estonia.  
 
As a matter of fact, already in October 1992, 17,000 persons in Estonia had applied for Russian 
citizenship. Especially Northeastern Estonia, where the vast majority of the population is Russian, had 
been a problematic area in this respect. In 1992 only two per cent of Narva’s population (of 85,000) had 
applied for Estonian citizenship. At the same time, already twice as many had obtained Russian 
citizenship.393 The survey conducted by IOM with the support of UNDP in 1996 indicated that another 
wave of applications for Russian citizenship could follow after the adoption of the new Law on 
Citizenship.394 The High Commissioner considered this possibility very alarming.395  
 
According to Estonian estimates, the number of Russian citizens had already risen to over 89,000 by 
1997.396 This number was calculated on the basis of Estonian residence permits being placed in Russian 
passports. At the same time, the Russian Federation claimed the number to be significantly higher, at 
around 120,000 persons.397 However, the Russian embassy in Tallinn refused to share any official data on 
this matter with Estonian officials, and one should also take into account that many Russian-speakers who 
had applied for Russian citizenship at the Russian embassy had left Estonia. The Statistical Office of 
Estonia estimated that around 40,000 Russian citizens left Estonia during 1992-1996.398 Thus, it might be 
realistic to assume that at least 80,000-90,000 Russian citizens lived Estonia in 1997.  
 
The little-contested reasoning behind the tendency for applying for Russian citizenship is that the 
application process for Russian citizenship is very simple in comparison to Estonian naturalization 
requirements. According to Russian legislation, any former citizen of the Soviet Union can acquire 
Russian citizenship on the basis of a simple application that can be submitted also to Russian embassies 
abroad. For these reasons, the High Commissioner throughout the years believed that the interest in 
acquiring Estonian citizenship was higher than the actual numbers of applications indicated. He therefore 
argued for the simplification of naturalization conditions in Estonia.399 In 1997 he even referred in his 
letter to the Estonian Foreign Minister to the above-mentioned IOM survey, supporting his belief with poll 
results. According to the study, 62.5 per cent of stateless people in Estonia would have liked to acquire 
                                                 
392  The Baltic Independent, 9 April 1993, Europe’s man speaks softly. 
393  Cf. ODIHR Report on the Study of Estonian Legislation, December 1992.  
394  Cf. IOM 1997. 
395  Cf. HCNM Letter to Ilves, 21 May 1997. 
396  Cf. Estonia Today, 23 February 1999. 
397  Cf. HCNM Letter to Ilves, 21 May 1997. 
398  Cf. Kirch et al. 1997, p. 54. 
399  Cf. HCNM Letter to Velliste, 6 April 1993. 
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 Estonian citizenship, 11.4 per cent had considered this possibility, and 18.1 per cent would apply for 
citizenship if the application conditions changed. Moreover, 84.2 per cent would have liked their children 
to have Estonian citizenship.400 
 
In contrast to the HCNM, Estonian officials did not, however, see a problem in the rapidly growing 
number of Russian citizens residing on Estonian territory, and were more ready to accept that non-
Estonians residing in Estonia would become Russian citizens than to accept them as Estonian citizens. The 
most illustrative example of the Estonian government’s position in this respect was expressed in Estonian 
Foreign Minister Riivo Sinijärv’s letter to the High Commissioner in 1996: 
 
[that] individuals living in Estonia continue to apply for Russian citizenship should not be the cause of 
concern, as […] the main goals should be to decrease the number of stateless individuals.401 
 
The Estonian government has always shown its commitment to reduce the number of stateless people, but 
not necessarily to do so by simplifying the Estonian naturalization process. Throughout the years, 
Estonian officials have not been interested in increasing the number of Estonian citizens through people 
who can also apply for other countries’ citizenship (having in mind citizens of former Soviet Union). The 
argument has been that the application for Estonian citizenship is the free choice of an individual, which 
the government cannot influence. People who are willing to go through the naturalization process and who 
accept the requirements of acquiring Estonian citizenship show and feel a true commitment and loyalty to 
the Estonian state and its independence. Moreover, those persons who have acquired Russian citizenship 
can always change citizenship once a feeling of belonging to Estonian State develops.402 On the contrary, 
in the opinion of the High Commissioner, facilitating the process of acquiring citizenship would help to 
develop this feeling of loyalty among non-Estonians.403 This is where the basic difference between the 
Estonian government and the High Commissioner lies. The first considers an application for Estonian 
citizenship as an act of loyalty to Estonia from the side of non-citizens. The latter regards Estonian 
citizenship as a precondition for developing a feeling of loyalty among non-Estonians. 
 
As has been demonstrated by the numbers above, in addition to those applying for Russian citizenship, a 
great number of people did not apply for any citizenship. A reduction in the number of stateless residents 
was a continuous recommendation of the High Commissioner to Estonia. Already in 1992, the 
ODIHR/OSCE Mission noted with concern that Estonian officials voiced the expectation that a 
considerable share of the Russian-speaking population in the country should remain stateless, or that they 
should become citizens of other states.404 Although the government since then declared to be equally 
committed to the reduction of statelessness by drafting new policies and legislation (at least in their 
statements405), many people in Estonia remained stateless and their legal status remained one of the main 
concerns of the HCNM. As it became clear to him that the citizenship law was basically untouchable, the 
HCNM concentrated his efforts on making recommendations to the draft Law on Aliens, and later to 
amending the Law on Aliens. His overall goal was to decrease the number of people applying for Russian 
citizenship, as well as to simplify the status of stateless people. In this regard he welcomed, for example, 
the government’s efforts to solve problems relating to non-citizens by making aliens’ passports a more 
common (travel) document. This, he hoped, would help to avoid new applications for Russian 
citizenship.406  
 
 
                                                
 
 
400  Cf. HCNM Letter to Ilves, 21 May 1997. 
401  Sinijarv Letter to the HCNM, 27 November 1996. 
402  Cf. ibid. 
403  Cf. HCNM Letter to Velliste, 6 April 1993. 
404  Cf. ODIHR Report on the Study of Estonian Legislation, December 1992, para. 23. 
405  Comments on the recommendations by the HCNM, 6 April 1993. 
406  Cf. HCNM Letter to Kallas, 11 December 1995. 
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 4.4 Aliens' Passports 
 
Alongside the issue of the citizenship exam, the High Commissioner also concentrated his efforts on the 
promotion of aliens' passports. As most of the Russian-speakers were still without Estonian citizenship, 
the pressure to avoid ethnic anxieties remained with the legislation and with policies relating to non-
citizens. The High Commissioner saw the alien's passport as a solution to several mundane problems of 
the Russian minority. On the one hand, he foresaw the alien's passport as a travel document and as a 
means to guarantee non-citizens the right to travel abroad and to return to Estonia. On the other hand, the 
High Commissioner promoted also the use of the alien's passport as an internal identification document, 
especially as the Estonian government was planning to cancel old Soviet-time documents. In general, the 
High Commissioner wanted the alien's passport to be a widely used document, and not merely an 
exception that would be issued only in rare cases, the policy striven for by the Estonian government.  
 
In July 1994 Estonian legislators introduced a temporary travel document to guarantee stateless persons 
the right to travel.407 However, this document was valid only for one journey, and persons wanting to 
travel more often had to apply for travel documents repeatedly. Therefore, Van der Stoel recommended to 
the Estonian government to use aliens' passports as travel documents for all those who were not at the time 
citizens of any other state.408 In his opinion, such a step would help to reduce the number of persons 
applying for Russian citizenship solely in order to solve their travel problems. Estonia would, however, 
have to guarantee the right to return for all those travelling with aliens' passports, which meant that other 
states would then recognize the document as well.409 Sociological surveys conducted in early 1996 
indicate that around two thirds of Russian citizens had opted for Russian citizenship in order to travel, as 
they wanted to visit their relatives in Russia.410 Making aliens' passports more widely available was 
therefore seen as a step forward. However, as Russia required (and continues to do so) visas from alien-
passport holders, it would not necessarily mean that they would be free from all travel difficulties. 
 
Shortly after the High Commissioner's letter, the use of aliens' passports was considerably increased and 
the category of persons eligible to receive aliens' passports was expanded. Estonian Foreign Minister Siim 
Kallas was very happy to inform Van der Stoel about his government's decision. The regulation states that 
the alien's passport could be issued to: 
 
− a foreigner who has been certified to be a stateless person, who has a right to residence permit in Estonia 
and who has no other travel document; 
− a foreigner who is a citizen of another state and has a right to residence permit in Estonia, but can not 
obtain a passport from the state of his or her citizenship; 
− a foreigner who resides in Estonia on the basis of a Soviet residence permit, who has a right to residence 
permit in Estonia and who has no valid passport or a similar document; 
− a foreigner who has residence permit of Estonia and has no valid passport or a similar document; 
− a minor less than 15 years old who is not Estonian citizen nor a citizens of any other state, but whose 
parent(s) have become Estonia citizen(s) [...].411 
 
The largest category benefiting from the change in the regulation was the third one: people who reside in 
Estonia on the basis of permanent registration in the former Estonian SSR. According to the Law on 
Aliens, these persons have a right to continue residing in Estonia, given that they fulfil the conditions of 
the residence permit of the Republic of Estonia. However, they are not considered stateless according to 
Estonian legislation, as Russia considers itself a successor state of the Soviet Union, and all those with 
                                                 
407  Cf. chapter 3.6. 
408  Cf. HCNM Letter to Kallas, 11 December 1995. 
409  Cf. ibid. 
410  Cf. Kirch et al. 1997, p. 56. 
411  Cf. Määrus No. 16 [Regulation No. 16], Välismaalase passi väljaandmise tingimused ja kord [Ratification of the conditions 
and form of issuing alien's passport], 16 January 1996, para. 12.  
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 Soviet citizenship can automatically obtain Russian citizenship. Thus, people could apply for aliens' 
passports without being considered officially stateless, which had before been the case. 
 
Not only was the number of persons eligible for aliens' passports increased significantly, but the document 
was also made valid for travel purposes. The regulation states that while the residence permit in the 
passport is valid, a person in possession of an alien's passport can reside in Estonia, as well as leave and 
return to Estonia.412 The document therefore guarantees non-citizens the right to travel and to return to 
Estonia. However, the passport does not guarantee the beholder Estonian diplomatic and consular 
representations' protection abroad.413  
 
After the adoption of the regulation, the Estonian Foreign Minister called the High Commissioner to 
encourage member States of the OSCE to recognize the Estonian alien's passport. Van der Stoel did this 
without delay. On 14 February 1996, the HCNM made a plea to the OSCE community, drawing their 
attention to the matter: 
 
[T]he Estonian Government decided to enable inhabitants of Estonia who are in possession of a residence 
permit but who do not have Estonian citizenship to obtain an aliens passport. This decision is of great 
importance for the approximately 300,000 mainly Russian speakers in Estonia who have not yet obtained 
Estonian citizenship. It enables them to be provided with a permanent travel document. This document 
permits them to freely leave the country and to return to Estonia. As the old system of temporary travel 
documents caused many difficulties for non-citizens of Estonia, I consider this to be a major step forward. 
 
However, this important step forward would be of little practical consequence if the international 
community would not recognize this alien passport as a legal travel document. According to the Estonian 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, so far only seven countries have recognized the validity of this document, 
notwithstanding the fact that Estonia has committed itself to permit the return of all those travelling with 
these documents. In practice, this means that holders of the aliens passport can only travel to seven 
countries. This could entail that potential applicants for this document would look for other means to be in a 
position to travel to a greater number of countries, such as applying for citizenship of a third country, 
notwithstanding the fact that they intend to continue living in Estonia.414 
 
Despite the High Commissioner's appeal, the number of OSCE member States who recognize the alien's 
passport has risen very slowly. Five years later, in 2001, only 18 out of 55 member States allow holders of 
Estonian aliens' passports to enter their territory. Only two of them, Latvia and Lithuania, do not require 
those in possession of aliens' passports to have a visa to travel, while citizens of Estonia travel visa-free to 
almost all countries in Europe. Among Eastern European countries, only the Baltic states and Russia 
recognize the document. However, the situation is not much better with regard to many other countries. 
For example countries like Canada or Greece have still not recognized aliens' passports as valid travel 
documents.415  
 
Nevertheless, the international recognition of aliens' passports turned out not to be the main problem. By 
the end of 1996, it became clear that issuing aliens’ passports was a major task, and relevant authorities 
had difficulties in fulfilling their task in time. There were considerable delays in providing both residence 
permits and aliens’ passports. The Citizenship and Migration Office was committed to decide on the 
                                                 
412  Cf. Määrus No. 16 [Regulation No. 16], Välismaalase passi väljaandmise tingimused ja kord [Ratification of the conditions 
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 issuance of residence permits by 12 July 1996, and old Soviet internal passports were to remain valid until 
the same date.416 Considering the delays, the Estonian government continued to recognize Soviet passports 
until November 1996 at first, and then extended the date even further. The High Commissioner welcomed 
the government's decision to continue recognizing Soviet internal passports for internal identification in 
Estonia until other documents were ready and distributed, but stressed his worry about the slow process of 
issuing new documents. Once again, Van der Stoel expressed his concern that the situation could create 
more uncertainty and confusion amongst non-citizens, and push them into applying for Russian 
citizenship. By October 1996, over 113,000 persons had applied for aliens' passports, and only 18,000 
passports had been printed. On this background, the High Commissioner, even though recognizing that the 
issuance of aliens' passports was complicated and thorough, urged the Estonian authorities to speed up the 
process as much as possible.417  
 
The situation in the late summer and early fall of 1996 was indeed somewhat unsettling. Not only were 
there delays in passport distribution, but also some other disturbing affairs caught the attention of Russian-
speakers. In August, the Minister of European Affairs resigned and blamed the government of too much 
leniency towards Soviet army pensioners. In response, the government planned not to prolong the 
residence permits of those army pensioners who posed a security threat to Estonia. In the end, the 
overwhelming majority of the reservists were nevertheless granted residence permits.418 In September, 
members of the nationalist organization ‘Russia’s National Unity’ were found guilty of illegal arms 
possession, and were convicted in the Northeastern region of Estonia. In October, the court case of Pjotr 
Rozhok, a Russian extreme nationalist, continued in Tallinn. The leader of the Union of Russian Citizens 
in Tallinn had been expelled from Estonia because of his extreme nationalist propaganda and incitements 
to violence. The court, however, found the deportation to be illegal.  
 
Thus, there was an imminent need to make at least the alien-passport distribution run smoothly. The 
Estonian government excused the delays by several factors. First, the officials had to check the accuracy 
of information on the applications.419 There had been several cases of Russian citizens applying for aliens' 
passports, even though the documents were meant for persons without any citizenship. The Estonian 
government found the Russian authorities, especially the embassy, to be highly unco-operative in 
providing information on Estonian residents who had acquired Russian citizenship. Russian officials 
alleged that such a list could be used for persecutions.420 Therefore, the Estonian Minister of Foreign 
Affairs asked the High Commissioner to mediate and to call the Russian embassy in order to provide a list 
of Russian citizens residing in Estonia.  
 
Other major problems were of technical nature. The quality of blank passports was very poor, so that the 
officials had to change the provider and order new passports that were due to arrive in November 1996. 
Additionally, the information database was out-of-date and a new program was ordered in order to speed 
up the distribution process.421 
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 By May 1997, when the Soviet internal passports finally lost their validity, the production of aliens' 
passports had finally reached a level that satisfied demand. However, the distribution of the documents 
was still lagging behind.422 According to the High Commissioner, some 50,000 applicants had still not 
received their new identification papers.423 Even though both the Estonian government and Van der Stoel 
assured that other documents, such as drivers' licences and pensioner's identification documents would be 
accepted for identification within Estonia, the High Commissioner was concerned as these documents 
could not be used for travel purposes. Thus, he repeated his recommendation to speed up the process of 
distribution of aliens' passports.424  
 
The Estonian government considered the High Commissioner’s assessment to be unfair. Even though 
50,000 persons had not yet received alien passports, 100,000 applicants already had. Moreover, the 
authorities had launched and financed an extensive media campaign in order to inform people about the 
expiration of Soviet passports and the importance of picking up (or applying for) new documents. 
According to the government, all those who showed any desire to obtain an alien's passport had received 
one.425 In any case, the process of distributing the passports was largely completed by the end of 1997, and 
has not been an issue since then.426 
 
 
4.5 The Amended Law on Aliens and the Question of Residence Permits 
 
Next to the (near) completion of the distribution of the aliens' passports, the autumn of 1997 witnessed 
another beneficial development in the situation of Soviet-time settlers in Estonia. A significant change was 
made in Estonian legislation: The Law on Aliens was amended so that temporary residence permits could 
be exchanged for permanent ones faster than the previous legislation had set out. The law had previously 
stipulated that persons who had lived in Estonia on the basis of temporary residence permits for at least 
three out of the last five years could apply for permanent residence permits.427 This clause remained intact, 
but was complemented by another paragraph, according to which persons who had applied for temporary 
residence permits by July 1995 could apply for permanent residence permits already starting in July 
1998.428 This was an advantage for a considerable number of non-citizens. Given that most of the Soviet-
time settlers had applied for residence permits much closer to the deadline of July 1995,429 and taking into 
account that the procedures of an application could take up to a year, the majority of non-citizens would 
not have had the possibility to change their temporary permits to permanent ones before 1999 - or even 
later. In fact, only 716 permanent residence permits had been issued in 1997, although 4,030 temporary 
permits had been issued in 1993, and even 36,076 had been issued in 1994. Thus, as the former member of 
the OSCE Mission to Estonia, Tatjana Ansbach, has reported,430 it seemed that Estonian authorities 
accepted the application contra legem just after the applicant had resided in Estonia for five years. The 
new regulation was, thus, even more welcomed as it assured that the great majority of non-Estonians 
residing in Estonia could finally enjoy the security of a permanent residence permit. Thus, the fear of 
deportation, which caused so much unrest and insecurity in 1993, could be overcome. 
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430  Cf. Ansbach 1996, p. 221, footnote 34. 
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 The reasons for carrying out the amendment were of both political and technical nature, depending on the 
point of view of particular political parties in Estonia. The amendment was initiated at the time when the 
Centre Party was in government, and their leader, Edgar Savisaar, was Minister of Interior.431 Their 
political agenda during the transition period originally included the zero-option for citizenship, and in 
general their political base was quite widespread, including also Russian-speakers. Thus, the amendment 
proposal was a continuation of their earlier line of minority politics, and an attempt to improve the 
situation of aliens in the country.432 After the Centrist Party left the government, the Coalition Party 
continued to promote the amendment. At the same time, the more nationalist forces in parliament, such as 
the Pro Patria party, considered such yielding and softening of minority politics to be unnecessary.433 
Moreover, in their opinion the amendment would grant permanent residency to almost all non-citizens in 
Estonia, without any effort having been made by applicants, and with no requirements having been set by 
the authorities.434 Even though there was great resistance to the amendment in parliament and it took three 
readings to be accepted, it was finally adopted.435 
 
The government had decided that residence-permit applications, which were filed after the 1995 deadline 
would also be considered, but only on a case-by-case basis and with supplementary sanctions for breaking 
the law.436 The amendment in the law can therefore be viewed as a type of ‘award’ for those persons who 
had respected Estonian laws and who had applied for residence permits in time. It can also be seen as a 
levy, as the process of issuing permits and aliens' passports had taken longer than planned. In addition, the 
original Law on Aliens included two paragraphs on the special treatment of persons who had resided in 
Estonia prior to 1990. Paragraph 20 specified the preferential rights of persons who had settled in Estonia 
during the Soviet period, in comparison to other foreigners.437 Paragraph 21 addressed the simplified order 
of applying for a residence permit. The amendment was to cancel these paragraphs and make the treatment 
of Soviet settlers dependent on the legislation and residence permits of the Republic of Estonia, instead of 
dependent on references to the Soviet period.  
 
However, basing the particular rights on the application deadline of 1995 instead of the residence before 
1990 demanded some additional specifications, in order not to limit the rights people had held before the 
change in the law. Thus, the amendment stated that persons who had applied for a residence permit before 
July 1995 would not need a work permit for employment in Estonia and could vote in Estonian local 
elections, as persons with permanent residence permits could also do. In the opinion of the nationalist-
minded opposition, this would make the concept of work permits completely obsolete, and would 
unnecessarily complicate the local elections process. Their attempts to exclude these sentences from the 
amendment law were, however, not successful.438 
 
Finally, the Citizenship and Migration Office justified the amendment using technical arguments. As the 
temporary residence permits were usually issued for five years, and as most non-citizens had received 
their permits in 1996, most of the re-applications would be crammed into a rather limited timeframe 
around 2001. By allowing applications for permanent residence permits to be submitted already in 1998, 
the re-application procedures would be spread over a period of three years. This would spare the 
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 residence-permit holders and the relevant permit-issuing authorities from long queues and heavy 
workloads. According to Minister of Interior Robert Lepikson, this could diminish potential social 
tensions.439 Reasons that would appeal to the sceptical opposition forces were also publicised. For 
example, exchange at an earlier date would allow for the addition of a security code to the permits, which 
in turn would make it easier and more effective to control the migration processes. This would help to 
implement the rest of the law more effectively. Also, it would be easier to keep track aliens’ ties with 
foreign states and cancel residence permits if the beholder had been away from Estonia for more than 183 
days in one year, and had not registered his or her absence as the law required. In his words:  
 
it is not a secret that a certain number of foreigners, who hold Estonian residence permits, actually reside 
permanently in other states. This amendment would help to avoid creation of such pseudo-residents.440  
 
The same amendment included another set of changes that benefited the citizens of the European Union 
and the European Free Trade Association. The Law on Aliens set a quota of immigration to persons 
wanting to settle in Estonia since 1990, i.e. every year the number of people applying for residence 
permits in Estonia could not be more than 0.1 per cent of Estonia’s total population.441 According to the 
new amendment, citizens of the EU, Norway, Iceland and Switzerland could settle in Estonia without 
being counted in the quota limit. The limitation had started to stall the development of economic relations 
between Estonia and the EU, as international business partners of Estonian companies could be denied 
residence permits if the quota was full for the respective year. The nationalist forces in parliament did not 
welcome that the quota would increase the number of settlers from other parts of the world (i.e. Russia 
and the East) if citizens of EU would not count for the quota.442 Thus, the draft could not be passed in 
parliament until a compromise was reached and the yearly immigration quota consequently was reduced 
to 0.05 per cent of Estonia’s total population.443 
 
While the High Commissioner welcomed the government's proposal to start issuing permanent residence 
permits earlier than originally planned, and hoped that this decision would be implemented, there is no 
record that he actually recommended the change.444 The High Commissioner was not mentioned during 
the parliamentary debates. However, other pan-European organizations had played a role in the concerned 
change in the Law on Aliens. Apparently, the previous government followed up a promise given on the 
matter to the Council of Europe, and initiated the amendment draft in order to speed up the transition to 
permanent residence permits.445 It seems also that this particular amendment was triggered by the looming 
invitation to the accession talks with the EU, and was adopted foremost because of the exemption of EU 
citizens from the immigration quota. During parliamentary debates, the proponents stressed on several 
occasions that the amendment was a necessary step in order to promote Estonia’s accession to the EU, and 
was hence required in order to harmonize Estonian legislation with European Union regulations.446 
However, the opposition forces, especially Pro Patria, considered the amendment and Estonia’s accession 
to the EU to be completely unrelated and independent of each other. Moreover, in their opinion, increasing 
the number of new settlers from the East would actually breach Estonia’s successful accession to 
European Union.447 Not surprisingly, at the other end of the political spectrum, the Russian deputies in the 
parliament also opposed the amendment law as it decreased the immigration quota. They claimed that the 
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 new quota would be in opposition to the liberalization of minority politics, which the European Union 
expected of Estonia as it seriously limited the right to family reunification.448 The practice of often 
applying the immigration quota in cases of family re-unification had, as a matter of fact, already been 
criticized by the OSCE Mission to Estonia in 1993.449 It was, however, not taken up by the HCNM. 
Notwithstanding the silence of the High Commissioner on this issue, it was brought up by the Russian-
speakers themselves, and on 18 May 2000 the Supreme Court of Estonia reached a final judgment on the 
matter: 
 
In its ruling, the Court held that exertion of the immigration quota with respect to residence applications 
purposing the family unification did not apply provisions of the Estonian Constitution and European 
Convention on Human Rights.450 
 
Although the respective law has not been changed until today, the Citizenship and Migration Board 
obeyed to this ruling and issued residence permits for cases of family re-unification, beyond the limits set 
by the immigration quota. Whereas the HCNM continued to remain silent on this issue, the European 
Union demanded further efforts to continue to ensure that the issue of reunification of families was 
properly resolved.451 
 
In general, one can consider the process of re-registration of all Estonian residents as a successful 
enterprise, which offers a relatively reliable picture of the new demographic situation in Estonia. Citizens 
of Estonia or of foreign states have adequate documentation. Stateless persons are the hardest to keep 
track of, but considering that some 150,000 of an estimated 210,000 stateless persons applied for alien 
passports, and over 320,000 non-citizens applied for residence permits by the 1995 deadline, they are also 
relatively well documented. In 1997 the Ministry of Interior estimated the number of illegal residents to lie 
at around 50,000 people.452 In consequent years, ‘amnesties’ have been granted to persons who missed all 
of the application deadlines. However, these amnesties did not prove to be as successful as one would 
have hoped for. Estimates today are that still up to 30,000 people remain unaccounted for,453 while 
according to official statistics 164,785 non-citizens have been provided with aliens' passports.454  
 
 
4.6 The Ratification of the Council of Europe’s Framework Convention for the Protection of 
National Minorities 
 
While important changes were made to the domestic legislation concerning the non-citizens in Estonia, an 
important international legal document, the Council of Europe’s Framework Convention for the Protection 
of National Minorities, was also ratified in the Estonian parliament. Obstacles and complications defined 
this latter process of ratification.  
 
Estonia had signed the Council of Europe’s Framework Convention for the Protection of National 
Minorities on 2 February 1995 - just after it was adopted. Already in autumn 1996, the Estonian 
government presented it to parliament for ratification. Just shortly before the issue came up in parliament, 
the High Commissioner addressed the ratification of the Convention in a letter to the Estonian Foreign 
Minister Siim Kallas. He was concerned about the formal reservation, which the government intended to 
include in the convention, in order to clarify that the convention would apply only to the citizens of 
Estonia. The text of the declaration contained the following: 
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451  Cf. EU 2001, Progress Report, p. 22. 
452  Later calculations set the number of illegal persons lower, at 30,000 people. Tammer 2001, p. 39. 
453  Cf. EU 2000, Progress Report p. 18. 
454  See http://www.vm.ee/eng/estoday/2000/Integration%20statistics.html (30 November 2000). 
 74
  
The Republic of Estonia understands the term "national minorities", which is not defined in the Framework 
Convention for the Protection of National Minorities, as follows: are considered as "national minority" those 
citizens of Estonia  
 
- who reside on the territory of Estonia; 
- maintain longstanding, firm and lasting ties with Estonia; 
- are distinct from Estonians on the basis of their ethnic, cultural, religious or linguistic characteristics; 
- are motivated by a concern to preserve together their cultural traditions, their religion or their language, 
which constitute the basis of their common identity.455  
 
The High Commissioner doubted whether such a declaration was in line with the meaning of the 
Framework Convention, as its article 6.1 refers explicitly to all persons living on the territory of a state: 
 
The Parties shall encourage a spirit of tolerance and inter-cultural dialogue and take effective measures to 
promote mutual respect and understanding and co-operation among all persons living on their territory 
irrespective of those persons’ ethnic, cultural, linguistic or religious identity, in particular in the fields of 
education, culture and the media.456 (Emphasis added by the author) 
 
The HCNM pointed out that Estonia had not previously made any reservations to several OSCE 
documents concerning national minorities, which entail many similarities to the Council of Europe 
Framework Convention on National Minorities. He also drew attention to resemblance between the 
Convention and UN Declaration of 13 December 1985 on the Human Rights of Individuals who are not 
Nationals of the Country in which they live, granting them certain rights, such as to retain their own 
language, culture and tradition.  
 
Even though the High Commissioner did not refer to his own institution, he personally favored the wider 
understanding of national minorities. As he had stressed on numerous occasions, he refrained from 
offering a definition of national minorities, claiming he could recognize a national minority when he saw 
one. Having made continuous recommendations on the Estonian legislation affecting the aliens, he 
certainly recognized non-citizens of Estonia as part of his mandate, and thus as members of a national 
minority. 
 
All in all, it was not in the High Commissioner’s power to recommend that the Convention be adopted 
without any reservations. However, he did hope that the added declaration would not signify that Estonia 
would withdraw from its previously made international and domestic commitments to respect and protect 
minorities. In his opinion, the reservation needed to be supplemented with adequate explanations and 
reassurances that Estonia would not restrict its policies concerning non-citizens in Estonia, nor limit their 
existing rights. Otherwise suspicions and concerns over the government’s intentions could arise among the 
non-Estonian population.457  
 
Nevertheless, the Russian parliamentary deputies expressed exactly these kinds of fears during the debate 
preceding the ratification of the Convention. Nikolai Maspanov pointed out that some 75 per cent of 
minority representatives in Estonia would not be protected by the Convention, and that their political 
rights would be breached if the additional declaration was adopted. Thus, Sergei Issakov, another Russian 
deputy, argued that the Estonian state did not need to protect its national identity, preserve its culture, and 
ensure the right to education in Estonian, etc. He was implying that persons not covered by the 
Convention would be denied basic rights, such as the right of association. In the opinion of the Russian 
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 deputies, the ratification of the Convention with such a declaration would not support stability and peace 
in the country, and would lead to protests by hundreds of thousands of non-Estonians, as sociological 
studies had indicated.458  
 
Chairman of the Constitutional Committee, Mart Nutt, was of the opposite opinion and claimed that no 
European state wished immigrants to become national minorities, because such a development was 
considered the very source of instability. He also criticized that Russian deputies had taken the liberty to 
speak for all minorities in Estonia, especially as no historical minority in Europe would favor the idea of 
granting the status of a national minority to new immigrant groups. During parliamentary debates, 
members of the Reform party stressed that no previously existing rights would be breached, and that it 
would be inflammatory and irresponsible to claim otherwise.459 For example, the above-mentioned right of 
association applied to all persons in Estonia, and the Convention would not take that right away. 
According to the government, Estonian legislation guarantees all human rights and freedoms of non-
citizens in the country, for example by the Law on Aliens, but foremost by the Constitution. Article 9.1 in 
the Estonian Constitution stipulates: 
 
The rights, liberties, and duties of everyone and all persons, as listed in the Constitution, shall be equal for 
Estonian citizens as well as for citizens of foreign states and stateless persons who are present in Estonia.460 
 
Russian deputies saw the definition of national minorities that the government was proposing as too 
restrictive, not respective of the situation in Estonia and also out-of-date internationally. For example, the 
Commissioner on Democratic Institutions and Human Rights of the Baltic Sea Council, Ole Espersen, had 
on several occasions favored a definition of national minorities reaching beyond mere citizens. Also the 
UN was moving in the same direction, as the UN Human Rights Committee in its declaration of the 49th 
Session found that members of national minorities do not necessarily have to be citizens of the state, but 
can also be permanent residents.461 Thus, the Russian deputies proposed another wording of the 
declaration to be adopted, and the definition of members of national minorities to include also permanent 
non-citizen residents. Only according to such a definition would the Convention give Russians the legal 
basis to seek for protection of their rights. 
 
According to the government, the definition of national minorities, as spelled out in the reservation of the 
Convention, stemmed from other Estonian legal documents, primarily from the Law on Cultural 
Autonomy. This law dates back to 1923, and is heavily embedded in the particularities of the inter-war 
period. Most minority groups in Estonia today deem the law absolutely inapplicable and desolate, because 
it grants cultural autonomy only to citizens of Estonia. Russian deputies pointed out this general attitude 
towards the law. The position of the Foreign Ministry on this issue was a classical catch-22. Changing the 
definition of national minorities in the Convention would require major revisions to be made in Estonian 
domestic legislation, but making a reservation to the Convention would, at the same time, confirm the 
very same definition by an international document.  
 
While Russian deputies had appealed to such international organizations as the Baltic Sea Council and the 
UN to support their arguments, Estonian deputies found refuge in the Council of Europe. The expert 
opinion of the Council of Europe was that no universal definition of national minorities existed. However, 
in international practice, only citizens of the state are usually considered as members of a national 
minority. Moreover, the definition of national minority as citizens was intended to be included in the 
Framework Convention itself, but one member, Turkey, opposed this. Thus, the scope of the Convention’s 
application was left to be decided by the contracting parties. Since then, several other states, such as 
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 Germany and Luxembourg, who have ratified the Framework Convention, have made reservations to the 
document which are very similar to the Estonian ones.  
 
Both the Minister of Foreign Affairs and the Chairman of the Constitutional Committee stressed that it 
was politically very important to obtain the greatest possible support for the document in parliament, as 
ratification would improve Estonia’s reputation in the Council of Europe and in Europe in general. 
Nevertheless, only 60 MPs voted for the document, and eight parliamentarians who were present did not 
participate in the voting at all. In the end, five Russian deputies found it impossible to vote in support of 
the convention in its present form.462 To conclude, most parliamentarians found it necessary to adopt the 
Convention on national minorities, but their opinions differed greatly with regard to the formal 
reservation.  
 
On the same day when the Convention was ratified in parliament, the coalition government fell apart. The 
High Commissioner received an answer to his concerns only after the Convention was already ratified, 
and the reply came from a new Minister of Foreign Affairs, Riivo Sinijärv. The new minister defended the 
reservation made, and indicated how Estonia’s laws exceed its international commitments anyway: 
 
As you are already aware, Estonia’s legislation in the areas of alien and minority protection is more 
progressive in many respects than comparable statutes in the majority of western European states, going well 
beyond the requirement of the UN Declaration of 1985 and exceeding many of the prescriptions in the 
Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities. The requirements of the Framework 
Convention have in large part already been fulfilled by Estonia; however, by ratifying the Convention Estonia 
hopes to create a degree of international momentum which could in turn influence other countries to approve 
the Convention.463 
 
He also reassured that existing rights of non-citizens were not cancelled. Such basic rights and freedoms 
as equality before the law, right to education, freedom of information, freedom of the media, right of 
ethnic minorities to establish institutions of cultural self-government, and use of minority languages for 
administrative purposes were guaranteed to the citizens of foreign states and stateless persons in Estonia 
on an equal basis with Estonian citizens. The ratification of the Framework Convention did not affect 
these constitutional rights. Moreover, Estonia did not limit the meaning or commitments of the 
Framework Convention, as Estonia had made a ‘declaration’, not a ‘reservation’, to the document. A 
formal reservation would have meant that Estonia abstained or modified some part of the Convention’s 
text. By adding a declaration, Estonia only specified some terms for a clearer implementation of the 
document, without making actual restrictions to the meaning and content of the Framework Convention.  
 
 
                                                
4.7 Estonia and the Outside World: Relations to International Organizations and to Russia 
from 1995 to 1997 
 
After the main developments between 1995 and 1997 regarding the rights of non-Estonians, in particular 
those of non-citizens, have been discussed in the last seven subchapters alongside the recommendations of 
the High Commissioner, it is now worthwhile to take a somewhat closer look at the international 
environment that influenced these events. To begin with, it is interesting to note that the CBSS 
Commissioner for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights, Ole Espersen, elaborated in public on a law 
that the HCNM addressed only in confidential letters to President Meri.464 The law concerned is the 1996 
Law on Local Elections.465 Even though this law was not in the center of public attention in Estonia, it was 
 
462  Cf. Stenogrammid [Parliamentary debate], 21 November 1996. 
463  Cf. Sinijarv Letter to the HCNM, 27 November 1996. 
464  Cf. OSCE Mission to Estonia, Spot Report, 18 June 1996. 
465   This issue came back on the political agenda in 1998 and will be discussed more detailed in chapter 5.3. 
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 important because it introduced language requirements for candidates running for local council elections. 
The CBSS Commissioner followed this up and stated the following: 
 
On 2 May 1996 I wrote to the Estonian President through the good offices of the Minister for Foreign Affairs 
concerning the Law on Local Elections adopted by the Parliament on 17 April 1996. I urged the President not 
to promulgate this law which in my opinion contained provisions which ran counter to the Constitution and to 
the spirit and letter of several human rights instruments, inter alia the UN Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights and the ECHR and Protocol No. 1. The President’s subsequent decision not to promulgate the law on 
the grounds that it provided for preliminary selection (on the basis of linguistic skills) among Estonian 
citizens standing for election, thus violating the important principle of free elections, is to be commended. 
The law was returned to Parliament for reconsideration according to Article 107 of the Constitution. It was 
then amended and promulgated and it now permits a satisfying implementation.466 
 
Back in April 1995, the CBSS Commissioner had affirmed that human rights were not violated in Estonia, 
but in the following years, he made many recommendations on Estonian citizenship and aliens' policies. 
Whereas the CBSS Commissioner seemed to become more critical towards Estonia during this period, 
other international organizations relaxed their critique on Estonia after 1996. In its 1995 Memorandum on 
the Honouring of Obligations and Commitments by Estonia,467 the Council of Europe voiced some 
criticism to Estonia, as the country had not yet ratified the European Conventions on Human Rights and 
the Prevention of Torture and Inhuman and Degrading Punishment or Treatment.468 With regard to 
minorities, the rapporteur of the Council of Europe stated that Estonia's treatment of its historic national 
minorities could be called exemplary, but that problems remained with regard to the treatment of the non-
historic Russian-speaking minority.469 In this respect, strong critique was voiced towards the 1995 Law on 
Citizenship, as Estonian authorities had not taken into account some of the critical comments the Council 
of Europe had made during the drafting of this law. The rapporteur criticized, inter alia, that "the new 
citizenship law strengthens the requirements for the naturalization of resident aliens",470 which in the 
Council of Europe's opinion is contrary to the aim that Estonia should be pursuing. Like the HCNM, the 
Council of Europe also referred to the citizenship and constitution tests, as well as to the strict language 
requirements.471 With regard to the Law on Aliens, the report asked, as the HCNM had done, for the 
automatic issuance of temporary residence permits to those who had settled in Estonia before 1 July 1990, 
and suggested that the temporary travel document should be valid for multiple entrances. 472 
 
Estonia finally ratified the European Convention on Human Rights March in 1996, although without the 
extra protocol abolishing capital punishment, despite the hopes of the Council of Europe. However, in 
December 1996 the parliament amended the Penal Code and abolished capital punishment. In autumn 
1996, the Convention on National Minorities was in turn. This was also ratified with an additional 
declaration that limited the definition of national minorities to citizens of Estonia. Although the above-
mentioned problems towards the Russian-speaking minority remained, Estonia was exempted as one of 
the first Eastern European states in January 1997 by the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe 
from external supervision in the area of human rights.473 Just a month earlier in December 1996, the 
United Nations General Assembly had decided to omit from its agenda the question of human rights in 
Estonia, an issue that Russia had repeatedly drawn UN attention to.474 The HCNM also turned more 
positive towards Estonia. In January 1997 he sent an open letter to a Russian-language daily newspaper in 
Estonia, announcing that Estonia had made significant process in guaranteeing human rights, and that 
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 since the start of his involvement in 1993, he had not found any evidence in support of systematic 
persecution of minorities or violation of human rights.475  
 
Also Estonia's relationship with the European Union, which became one of the most important 
international players in Estonia in the following years, developed positively between 1995 and 1997. The 
issue of an association between the Baltic States and the (then) European Community (EC) was raised as 
early as 1991/92 when the first Trade and Co-operation Agreement was negotiated. European integration 
was already at the top of the agenda of the Estonian government at the time.476 The EC was quite reserved 
on this issue in the beginning, but finally began negotiations on the Europe Agreements with Estonia and 
the other Baltic states in August 1994. The Europe Agreement between Estonia and the European Union 
was initialed on 12 April 1995, signed on 12 June 1995 and ratified by the Estonian parliament on 1 
August 1995.477 Estonia was now included in the EU pre-accession strategy,478 but the EU still reserved 
the right to suspend the agreement unilaterally, for example in the case of violent domestic conflict 
between Estonians and the Russian-speaking minority.479 Given that the European Union did not rule out 
such a dangerous development, and given that the EU in general is compelled to prevent 'turbulent 
neighborhoods',480 the EU became more active in this respect in 1995. For one, beginning in 1996, the 
European Union supported the language training for Russian-speakers in the framework of its PHARE 
programme, in order to facilitate the naturalization process. This had, in the EU's understanding, been 
hampered mainly by the inadequacy of resources available for Russian speakers to learn Estonian.481 
Secondly, the EU addressed problems related to the Russian-speaking minority in its Agenda 2000, which 
was elaborated by the European Commission in July 1997 and which set the criteria for Estonia's EU 
membership. In this document the Commission stressed, among other things, that "Estonia needs to take 
measures to accelerate naturalisation procedures to enable the Russian-speaking non-citizens to become 
better integrated into Estonian society."482 
 
Moreover, in 1998 the EU began issuing progress reports on Estonia, as it did on other applicant countries 
as well. These reports raised quite detailed questions regarding the Russian-speaking minority. In this 
regard, it is also important to note that the EU conducted its foreign policy with a view to solving 
outstanding problems in Estonia also in the framework of the OSCE and other regional and sub-regional 
institutions, such as the Council of Europe and the CBSS.483 Thus, by committing itself to the process of 
European integration, Estonia was forced to take the recommendations of the EU as well as these other 
organizations into account. It is therefore fair to claim that the co-operative intentions of the Estonian 
government were, to a large extent, influenced by the starting integration process towards the European 
Union, and that the government was interested in co-operating with other pan-European organizations, 
such as OSCE and Council of Europe, in order to make a good impression on the member States of the 
European Union.  
 
However, relations with Russia did not develop equally well. The Estonian-Russian July Agreements were 
heavily criticized by some of the Ministers in the new Estonian government. This could have seriously 
affected the Agreements' ratification in parliament. In response, Russian President Yeltsin dissolved the 
delegation for the Estonian-Russian negotiations. Nevertheless, the July Agreements were ratified in 
December 1995. Though the border negotiations were reinstated in July 1996, and several complicated 
border sectors were agreed upon, no general agreement was reached. In September 1995, Prime Minister 
Tiit Vähi declared that Estonia would not make demands on territories lost to Russia. This opinion had 
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 been spreading already earlier, but it was now made official. In November 1996 Estonian negotiators 
agreed to leave the Tartu Peace Treaty out of the Border Agreement altogether, if the 1991 Agreement 
between Estonia and Russia would also not be mentioned. According to this Agreement, Estonia would 
have to grant citizenship to all Russians in Estonia. The Estonian government approved the Treaty, and 
even though the Minister of Foreign Affairs was given the credentials to sign it on behalf of Estonia, no 
deal was born out of it. 
 
Another spike in Estonian-Russian relations came with Russia’s accession to the Council of Europe. 
Estonian delegates had voted against Russia’s membership, mainly because of the situation in Chechnya. 
The Estonian Prime Minister later strongly criticized the actions of Estonian delegates, and accused them 
of undermining Estonia's economic interests. In addition, Russia demanded compensation for the rubles 
confiscated in Estonia during the currency reform of 1992. In this year, Estonia had adopted its own 
currency, the Estonian crown. Estonia refused to discuss this issue. An additional negative effect on the 
Estonian-Russian relations was caused by the fact that the city of Narva had reduced its water supplies to 
its neighbouring town in Russia, Ivangorod, in March 1997, due to the latter’s outstanding debts. 
 
It is possible that compromises concerning the border treaty were made in order to lessen Russia’s 
opposition to NATO enlargement. However, this strategy did not bear fruit immediately. President Yeltsin 
threatened that NATO enlargement could even lead to war. When NATO finally made its enlargement 
decision public, it did not specify any particular states. NATO Secretary General Javier Solana visited 
Estonia in April 1996 in order to investigate Estonia’s readiness to join the Alliance. In June 1996, US 
President Bill Clinton wished for the Baltic states' accession to NATO in a public address. Nevertheless, 
by 1997 it was clear that the Baltic states would be left out of the first round of NATO enlargement.  
 
In February 1997, the Russian Foreign Ministry adopted a new doctrine on Russia’s politics towards the 
Baltics that aimed at good neighbourly relations, co-operation, economic integration and exchange, each 
state’s national security and respect for human and minority rights. These aims were to be achieved 
through the following steps: 
 
1) safeguarding of region security; 
2) protection of compatriots (Russians) rights in the Baltic states; 
3) development of economic contacts; 
4) demarcating the border between Russia and the Baltic states following to international law; 
5) preventing the spread of illegal criminal activity from the Baltic states and 
6) cultural co-operation.484  
 
Estonians widely considered this doctrine as a neo-imperialistic attempt to establish control over the Baltic 
states, after Russia had lost its grip on slandering the Baltics in the eyes of international organizations. 
Thus, relations with Russia remained strained during the period of 1995 to 1997, and the need for Western 
support, including even protection against the Russian allegations that the human rights of Russian-
speakers were violated in Estonia, was still visible. However, with the beginning of the EU accession 
process and the long-term prospect of joining NATO in a further enlargement round, the importance of the 
OSCE vanished in this regard. 
 
 
                                                
4.8 Conclusions Drawn by the Estonian Foreign Ministry and the HCNM 
 
The conclusions on the High Commissioner’s involvement in Estonia by the end of the periods discussed 
so far were actually provided by the Estonian Foreign Ministry and the High Commissioner themselves. 
The European Commission had declared that it would evaluate Estonia’s readiness to EU accession in the 
 
484  Kirch, A./Haabsaar 1997, pp. 91-92. 
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 question of minority politics on the basis of High Commissioner’s recommendations. Therefore, in spring 
1997 the Estonian Foreign Ministry prepared an overview of all of the High Commissioner's 
recommendations, and how these had been implemented by Estonia.485 The document was presented to the 
members of the OSCE Permanent Council, where all states of the European Union are also represented. 
The analysis was meant to illustrate to EU members that Estonia had respected all recommendations made 
by the High Commissioner, and that Estonia had thus fulfilled its responsibilities in the field of minority 
politics and legislation, and could start accession talks with the EU.  
 
The document divided the High Commissioner’s recommendations since the beginning of his involvement 
in 1993 into four categories: suggestions made on technical problems, on public relations, on humanitarian 
considerations and on core issues. In the category of technical proposals, Estonia pointed out that the High 
Commissioner’s concerns that persons who had failed the language test or who were unemployed could 
not apply for Estonian citizenship were unfounded, as the language test could be retaken unlimited times 
and unemployment benefits also counted as a legal income that was required for citizenship application. In 
relation to residence permits, the HCNM twice recommended to prolong the deadlines of applications, in 
1994 and in 1995. On both occasions the deadlines were indeed extended.  
 
In the category of public relations, the document listed all of the HCNM’s calls to provide more 
information on minority policies and legislation. Van der Stoel had suggested to apply more widely 
known language-test requirements, language-training possibilities and to ensure that the practical 
information on all citizenship application procedures was available in the Northeast of Estonia in 
particular. As researchers Marika Kirch and others found, little communication or exchange of viewpoints 
took place between Estonian and Russian public sphere: 
 
Russians who live within a Russian-speaking majority generally have poor access to detailed information 
about the Estonian society they live in. They are in a state of informational and psychological isolation, which 
generates fear for the future and makes their entire society unstable.486 
 
Again, in the opinion of the Foreign Ministry, Estonia had implemented all of the HCNM's 
recommendations. Information on residence permits and citizenship applications was spread through mass 
media, both in print and broadcast. Information centres were also opened in the Northeastern region for 
this purpose. The centre in charge of language tests provided adequate information on language 
requirements. Language-training programmes were available on television and in classroom format, and 
these were supervised by the Ministry of Education.  
 
Thirdly, humanitarian considerations were presented in the analysis of the High Commissioner's work. On 
several occasions, the HCNM had expressed his concern for the elderly, disabled and the poor in the 
process of residence permit and citizenship applications. In his opinion, the elderly and disabled should 
not have to fulfill the language requirement for naturalization. In return, Estonian authorities made partial 
exemptions to the groups in question, but they did not fully implement the HCNM's recommendations in 
this regard. Van der Stoel also stressed that application fees should not be prohibitive. Again, the 
government had established reduced rates (or complete exemptions) for pensioners, the unemployed, 
students and other more vulnerable social groups. These groups usually had to pay only 10 per cent of the 
regular fees.  
 
Finally, the Foreign Ministry's analysis focused on issues of real substance. In response to the HCNM’s 
constant recommendation to decrease the number of stateless persons, the Ministry concluded that the 
number of naturalized citizens was constantly growing, and lay well beyond the number of births in 
Estonia. In order to promote citizenship applications, the language requirements had been reviewed many 
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 times, and the naturalization exam had been made very simple. However, the government refused to 
consider changing the citizenship policy from the ius sanguinis to ius soli principle, which would grant 
automatic citizenship to all children born to stateless parents. The government claimed this would have 
been a substantial alteration. The HCNM’s recommendations had also touched upon the importance of 
institutionalizing inter-ethnic dialogue. Again, the government found that the establishment of the 
President’s Round Table on Minorities, as well as the imminent opening of an ombudsman’s office,487 
satisfied this requirement. The analysis also declared that all recommendations made on the Law on 
Aliens and the Law on Local Elections had been implemented without further explanation. The 
recommendation to postpone the implementation of the Law on Public Service in Northeastern Estonia 
had been taken into account, and policemen and other public servants of the region were given extra time 
to learn basic Estonian and pass the language tests by January 1999.488 The use of Estonian in the internal 
affairs of private companies was never implemented, contrary to what the HCNM had feared. The 
government also assured in the overview that all legislative acts that concerned minorities had been passed 
to the Council of Europe for evaluation, so that discrimination could not occur on the grounds of 
nationality or ethnicity.  
 
Most of the recommendations and their implementation analysed in the Foreign Ministry’s presentation to 
the Permanent Council concerned the years 1993 and 1994. During the period 1995-1997, the 
recommendations of the High Commissioner and the liberalization attempts by the Estonian authorities 
were not as compatible. While the High Commissioner talked about the unfavorable implications of the 
citizenship exam, the Estonian government stubbornly explained that the exam was necessary and useful 
for the future citizens. To ease the situation as much as lay in his power, the HCNM asked the Foundation 
on Inter-Ethnic Relations to publish booklets that entailed the exam questions and answers. In relation to 
the ratification of the Council of Europe’s Framework Convention on Protection of National Minorities, 
the High Commissioner’s implicit hope had been that the additional declaration defining the national 
minorities only as citizens of the state would not be included. However, it was. Nevertheless, the Foreign 
Ministry gave the HCNM assurances that no existing rights of the non-citizens would be breached as a 
result. 
 
At the same time, the Estonian government made an independent step to provide non-citizens with 
permanent residence permits earlier than planned, and the HCNM could afterwards but happily welcome 
the decision. During this period, some other minor liberalizing changes were also made to the legislation 
on aliens. The HCNM and the Foreign Ministry did not consider these changes worthy of mention. For 
example, the conditions according to which former convicts and Soviet army pensioners could receive 
residence permits were relieved.489 
 
With regard to the question of aliens' passports one can, however, detect clear links between the HCNM’s 
recommendations and the Estonian government’s actions. It had been the HCNM’s long-standing wish 
that aliens' passports be made widely used documents in Estonia, both for domestic identification and for 
travel purposes. This recommendation was finally implemented in 1996. However, the joy was short as 
technical complications concerning the distribution of aliens' passports arose soon thereafter. The HCNM 
made pleas to the Estonian government to speed up the issuing process, but officials were obstructed by 
the poor quality of the passport blanks and the enormity of the information to be processed. Only by 1997 
did the situation ease up and most people were finally issued new identification documents.  
                                                 
487  The ombudsman will be discussed in more detail in chapter 5.4. 
488   In 1997 some 200 policemen in Northeast Estonia were facing loss of employment due to their lack of knowledge in 
Estonian. 
489  Cf. Määrus No. 368 [Regulation No. 368], Välismaalastele elamis- ja töölubade andmise, pikendamise ning tühistamise kord 
[The order of issuing, prolonging and canceling of residence and work permits], 7 December 1995, para. 38. Määrus No. 
309 [Regulation No. 309], Vabariigi Valitsuse 14. mai 1996. a. määruse nr. 130 Välisriigi relvajõududes kaadrisõjaväelasena 
teeninud välismaalastele ja nende perekonnaliikmetele elamislubade andmise ja pikendamise korra kinnitamine muutmine 
[Changing the Regulation No. 130 on issuing and prolonging the residence permits to retired servicemen of foreign army 
and their family members], 13 December 1996. 
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The HCNM admitted that Estonia had made considerable progress in establishing and implementing 
legislation that guaranteed the rights of the non-Estonian population. He restated that he had not found 
violations of human rights in Estonia, and that minorities in Estonia were not persecuted. Van der Stoel 
was confident that as Estonia had never followed a policy of expulsion, it would not do so in the future 
either. He confirmed that the language test could no longer be considered as too demanding, but stressed 
again the importance of intensively continuing the language-training efforts. In addition to the 
establishment of the Presidential Roundtable and the ombudsman's office, he also welcomed the 
appointment of the Minister for Inter-Ethnic Affairs, which will further promote the flow of information 
between the officials and minority representatives.  
 
There were only two concrete questions that the HCNM thought Estonia could still work on: the 
constitution exam and granting citizenship to stateless children. Both of these issues were part of his larger 
concern for the high number of stateless persons and citizens of Russia in Estonia. In the opinion of Van 
der Stoel, Estonia could still further promote the naturalization process by simplifying the constitutional 
exam. He did not envisage it necessary to abolish the test as such, but only the most difficult questions 
were to be excluded. He also found that Estonia is bound by international commitments to grant 
citizenship to children born in Estonia to stateless parents, and this policy could thus be implemented 
without actually dropping the ius sanguinis principle.490  
 
                                                 
490  Cf. HCNM Letter to Ilves, 21 May 1997. 
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 Chapter 5. The Liberalization Period Since 1998 
 
 
1997 was a turning point in Estonian politics, both domestically and internationally. As already indicated, 
Estonia was invited to accession talks with the European Union, alongside Cyprus, Hungary, Poland, the 
Czech Republic and Slovenia. This was a major recognition of Estonia’s successful democratization and 
economic development. Consequentially, Estonia became even more confident about its minority politics, 
and by and large accepted advice from no-one else but the EU. Thus, after 1997 the effectiveness of the 
HCNM was dependent to a high degree on whether or not his recommendations were backed by the EU. 
For example, the Estonian Foreign Ministry and the High Commissioner fought heavy battles over 
granting citizenship to stateless children born in Estonia. Both dived into lengthy argumentations on why 
this could or could not be implemented respectively. Only with the pressure of the EU did Estonia agree to 
change its legislation and offer a simplified opportunity for stateless children in Estonia to acquire 
Estonian citizenship.  
 
The liberalization of the citizenship legislation was, however, coupled with the tightening of the language 
law, which was a major drawback in Estonian minority politics during this period. Only after renewed 
international protests were the restrictions abolished bit by bit, finally leading to an actual liberalization of 
language questions. Another breakthrough concerned the ombudsman's office, which was finally 
established in 1999.  
 
All of the above-mentioned steps were taken were carried out under the auspices of the national 
Integration Programme, which had been developed step by step since 1996. Once Estonia realized the 
importance of its own initiatives to solve minority-related issues and to promote its chances of EU 
accession, an overarching Integration Programme was launched and liberalization was striven for. 491 
 
This chapter on the period from 1998 to 2001 will first elaborate on the Integration Programme, and will 
then address the issue of granting citizenship to stateless children, the language question and the 
ombudsman institution. 
 
 
5. 1  Integration Programme 
 
Already in his first letter to the Estonian Minister of Foreign Affairs, the HCNM had recommended to the 
Estonian government that it should pursue a policy aimed at:  
 
the integration of the non-Estonian population at by a deliberate policy of facilitating the chances of acquiring 
Estonian citizenship for those who express such a wish, and of assuring them full equality with Estonian 
citizens.492 
 
The Estonian government responded to the HCNM that it "supports the recommendation of the High 
Commissioner to take early action to improve a visible policy of dialogue between the Government of 
Estonia and the non-citizen population."493 A concrete strategy in this respect was, however, not 
forthcoming. Only after 1997 did the Estonian government pursue a more active integration policy. In 
order to support the government’s efforts, the UNDP office in Tallinn convened a working group in May 
1997, consisting of several well-renowned Estonian scientists. After intensive consultations with other 
experts, the group drafted a document titled "Integrating non-Estonians into Estonian Society: Setting the 
Course."494 The document was not drafted as a systematic plan of action, but as a mere "guiding support 
                                                 
491  Cf. Government of the Republic of Estonia, State Programme “Integration in Estonian Society 2000-2007”, 14 March 2000. 
492  HCNM Letter to Velliste, 6 April 1993. 
493  Comments by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Estonia on the Recommendations submitted by the HCNM, 6 April 1993.  
494  Cf. UNDP, 15 September 1997.  
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 material for working out a domestic integration strategy."495 The next step was the nomination of Andra 
Veidemann as Minister responsible for Interethnic Relations. For the first time, a member of the Estonian 
government became officially responsible for the integration process. This was even continued under the 
conservative government of Mart Laar in 1999, when Katrin Saks was appointed to the post. On 10 
February 1998, the Estonian government adopted a policy paper called "The Integration of Non-Estonians 
into Estonian Society – The bases of Estonia’s national integration policy", and on 31 March 1998 an 
"Integration Foundation"496 was established in order to co-ordinate and conduct projects targeted at the 
integration of non-Estonians into Estonian society. The policy paper resulted in an "Integration Strategy", 
which was presented to the public on 6 April 1998 together with the OSCE Mission to Estonia.497 Finally, 
on 14 March 2000 the Estonian government adopted a State Integration Programme for the period from 
2000 to 2007. This programme aims to serve as an action plan for social integration through government 
institutions, county governments, local governments and other institutions and organizations. It was 
characterized by the OSCE as a significant development, as it aimed not only at the linguistic and socio-
economic integration of non-Estonians, but also at their legal and political integration "defined as the 
formation of a population loyal to the Estonian State and a reduction in the number of residents without 
Estonian citizenship."498 Notably, the new document no longer spoke of integration of non-Estonians into 
the Estonian society, but of the integration of Estonian society in its entirety.499 
 
As indicated above, the Estonian Integration Programme was developed with the help of prominent 
Estonian scholars. Already for several years, Estonian researchers on ethnic relations had been working on 
possible integration tactics. The first project, dated 1996, focused on the integration of Russian-speaking 
youth into Estonian society, concentrating on issues of multicultural education and cultural adaptation 
programmes. The project resulted in concrete policy measures, which were published and also 
implemented.500 One of the scholars, Mati Heidmets, presented an integration model visioning the 
formation of multicultural and multilingual minorities, i.e. minorities with their own strong ethnic identity, 
but ones that were well-adapted to the Estonian cultural environment.501 The initiative of Estonian 
scholars has been viewed as a very important step towards internalizing the need for inter-ethnic 
integration of Estonian society. The steps taken by researchers were an important sign that Estonian 
society itself was taking over the initiative to solve ethnic problems in the country.502 
 
Thus, in contrast to the early 1990s, when the idea that the Russian-speakers would finally leave Estonia 
was still widespread, by the end of the decade it was widely accepted that the great majority of Russian-
speakers would remain in Estonia. At the same time, the Estonian government had observed that by the 
beginning of 1998 a "mental shift has occurred among the majority of non-Estonians, including the 
acceptance of Estonian independence as inevitable fact."503 It also recognized the danger emanating from a 
continued alienation of the non-Estonian population.504 Thus, a positive change of perception, in a 
direction recommended to the Estonian government already in 1993 by the HCNM, had finally taken 
place by 1998. However, moderate Russian-speakers, such as Alexei Semjonov from the Tallinn-based 
Legal Information Centre for Human Rights, criticized the new approach that demanded for integration as 
a prerequisite for participation, instead of aiming for integration through participation, as had been 
actually intended by the HCNM in 1993.505  
 
                                                 
500  Cf. Kirch, et al. 1997, p. 33.  
495  Ibid., p. 1. 
496  Cf. http://www.meis.ee (21 May 2002). The foundation was originally named "Non-Estonian Integration Foundation". 
497  Cf. OSCE Mission to Estonia, Activity Report No. 112. 
498  Cf. OSCE Annual Report 2000, p. 27. 
499  Cf. Poleshchuk 2001b, p. 32. 
501  Cf. Heidmets 1997, p. 338. 
502  Cf. Mätlik, Tanel, Adviser to Minister Katrin Saks, Author's interview, 22 September 1999. 
503  Government of Estonia, The Integration of Non-Estonians into Estonian Society, 10 February 1998, p.1.  
504  Ibid. 
505  Cf. Semjonov 2000 and his remarks at a ECMI Seminar 1998, summarized in Järve/Wellmann 1999, p. 12. 
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 Nevertheless, the Nordic countries and the United Kingdom supported the Integration Programme through 
a special project, launched in August 1998 and implemented together with the UNDP.506 Also the 
European Union allocated more than 4,5 million Euros for the period from 1998 to 2003 for language and 
integration projects via PHARE.507 As a matter of fact, the EU had demanded in its Agenda 2000 that 
Estonia should integrate the non-Estonian population better into Estonian society.508 Thus, there was not 
only international pressure but also, and even more significantly, a widespread international support for 
integration. The HCNM on his part kept a low profile with regard to concrete integration projects, leaving 
it to the OSCE Mission and the EU to play a more visible part. However, the HCNM was not entirely 
passive either. He supported the integration process indirectly through The Hague-based Foundation for 
Inter-Ethnic Relations, which, for example, published two brochures on the naturalization process.509 
Moreover, this Foundation organized, on the initiative of the HCNM and in close collaboration with the 
OSCE Mission to Estonia, a seminar in Tallinn in July 1999 on "Integration, Educational and Linguistic 
Rights." 
 
These positive developments notwithstanding, one has to note, however, that there still remains an 
important point of difference among Estonians and Russian-speakers with regard to the integration 
process. Even though Estonians recognize that integration is a two-way process that requires efforts from 
Estonian society as well as from the Russian community, the general opinion is still that the newcomers 
have to integrate into the Estonian society.510 While Estonians view the naturalization process as an 
indication of loyalty to the Estonian state, for non-citizens who become Estonian citizens the process as a 
mere ‘official exercise’.511 This difference has not yet been overcome, which indicates that the integration 
process itself has just started. However, it seems that it has reached a sufficient degree of internal support 
both from the Estonian and the non-Estonian side.  
 
 
5.2 Granting Citizenship to Stateless Children 
 
Next to the start of a general integration policy, a major step in minority politics during the liberalization 
period concerned granting Estonian citizenship to stateless children. Ever since Estonia became a member 
of the OSCE, and since the latter got involved in the minority politics of Estonia, the issue had been on the 
agenda. This question has revolved around the longest and most detailed controversies and discussions 
between the Estonian government and the High Commissioner. The Estonian Citizenship Law, dating 
from 1992, states that children will acquire Estonian citizenship through the process of naturalization 
together with their parents.512 In general, the naturalization conditions for persons who settled in Estonia 
during the Soviet occupation were accepted as such, and the international recommendations concerned 
mainly the simplification of these conditions. However the international community always stressed that 
the same process could not be applied to minor children whose parents were stateless, as this would be 
contradictory to international law.513  
 
At the earliest in 1992, the ODIHR report on Estonia pointed out that Estonia has a commitment to the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, according to which every child has a right to 
nationality. Therefore, the report recommends registering as Estonian citizens all children born of former 
USSR nationals who would otherwise be stateless.514 The report does not specify the time nor place of 
                                                 
506  Cf. UNDP et al. 1999; OSCE Mission to Estonia, Activity Report No. 143. 
507  Cf. EU/PHARE 1999, 2001. 
508  Cf. EU 1997, p. 20. 
509  Cf. Zaagman 1999, p. 33. 
510  Cf. Kirch et al. 1997.  
511  Kirch et al. 1997, p. 58.  
512  Cf. Ülemnõukogu [Supreme Council], Kodakondsuse seaduse rakendamise kohta [Decision on Implementing the Law on 
Citizenship], 26 February 1992, para. 4.  
513  Cf. Wiegandt 1995, p. 123. 
514  Cf. CSCE/ODIHR Report 1992, para 71.  
 87
 birth of these children. According to the report, implementation of this recommendation would be in 
conformity with the Estonian Citizenship Law’s paragraph 3.6.515 As mentioned above, this law is a 
reformed version of the Law on Citizenship that was in force in 1940. The 1940 version still included the 
right to Estonian citizenship at birth for children born in Estonia to stateless parents (para. 3, points 6-7). 
However, the resolution of the Supreme Council on implementation of the Citizenship Law restates just 
generally the birthrights to Estonian citizenship in paragraph 3. Thus, in fact, for a whole year after the 
promulgation, the law granted the right of Estonian citizenship, at birth, to children born to stateless 
parents. However, in March 1993 the decision about the implementation of the Law on Citizenship was 
amended, so that the enumeration of the right to Estonian citizenship at birth ends with point 5. Thus the 
stateless children born in Estonia are left out of the law. In 1993 the High Commissioner mentioned the 
issue again in two of his communiqués with the Estonian government.516 He recommends granting 
Estonian citizenship to children who would otherwise be stateless, but limits this recommendation to 
children born in Estonia. In support of his argument, the HCNM refers particularly to article 3 point 6 in 
the Citizenship Law, which by the time when the recommendation was written had already been decided 
to be cancelled.517 In addition, he did, however, also refer to other legal documents that the ODIHR report 
had mentioned, as well as to the Convention of the Rights of the Child (article 7, para. 2) that had been in 
force in Estonia since 1991. 
 
The issue of granting citizenship to stateless children is included in the High Commissioner’s 
recommendations again only in 1997. Thus, a rather long break occurred during which the issue did not 
receive any attention on behalf of Van der Stoel. Even prior to the adoption of the new Law on Citizenship 
in 1995, when the High Commissioner made some other recommendations, the concern for the children of 
stateless persons was not expressed in available official communication. It is possible that the issue still 
remained on the agenda during this period, but there is no official record of recommendations on stateless 
children. Alternatively, the issue could have faded in the face of other, greater problems that arose in 
consequent years, for example in relation to the aliens' law and other aspects of the new Law on 
Citizenship.  
 
Nevertheless, the High Commissioner’s concern for stateless children arose with new vigour again in 
1997. In that year, the Estonian Foreign Ministry prepared the aforementioned document, which provided 
an overview of the High Commissioner’s recommendations up to that date. The Estonian authorities 
claimed to have implemented most of these recommendations. In the document, the Foreign Ministry also 
put forward an argument that Estonia had no legal obligations to naturalize children born in Estonia, thus 
opening up the topic to debate again. The High Commissioner’s letter from 21 May 1997 is largely a 
response to these assertions.518 Among others, Van der Stoel brought up again the recommendation to 
grant Estonian citizenship to children who otherwise would remain stateless. The Estonian government 
had not implemented this policy by then. The letter includes a long articulation of Estonian international 
commitments, and in response, the High Commissioner went into length in interpreting different clauses 
in international conventions that Estonia had committed itself to. Thus, the HCNM stressed that, according 
to the Convention of the Rights of the Child, children could not be made beneficiaries of the rights of their 
parents. Therefore, even if Estonia would consider former citizens of the USSR to hold the right to apply 
for Russian citizenship, thus not being fully viewed as subject to statelessness, the same consideration 
could not be applied to their children. Van der Stoel thus recommended introducing the ius soli principle 
to Estonian citizenship policy in this particular case, as was done in Finland. He rushed to add that this did 
not necessarily mean that Estonia would be obliged to grant citizenship to all children born in Estonia, but 
only to those who would otherwise become stateless. Consequently, the HCNM referred to two further 
limitations on the issue of stateless children that were accepted in the Convention, and which were also 
                                                 
515  Cf. ibid. 
516  Cf. HCNM Letters to Velliste, 6 April 1993 and to Meri, 1 July 1993.  
517  The amendment to the Law on Citizenship was adopted in the Parliament on 23 March 1993, but the change came to force 
only on 26 April 1993, after High Commissioner’s letter; see Kodakondsuse seaduse muutmise seadus [Law amending the 
Law on Citizenship], 23 March 1993.  
518  Cf. HCNM Letter to Ilves, 21 May 1997. 
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 recently supported by a consensus opinion in the Council of Europe. First, parents were still required to 
submit a formal application on behalf of their child. Thus granting citizenship on the basis of ius soli 
principle was not necessarily automatic. Second, proof of previous residence could also be required. 
According to the Convention on Nationality, up to five years could be set as a requirement.  
 
Further discussions on the same issue revolved around the constitution exam and language tests that were 
included in the Estonian Citizenship Law. From the High Commissioner’s letter one can assume that that 
one reason why the Estonian government declined to grant citizenship to stateless children related to the 
questionability of their loyalty to the Estonian state, as they were brought up by parents who do not have 
Estonian citizenship. Much more certainty could be obtained about their attitudes if children were 
naturalized together with their parents, who would thereby illustrate their commitment to the state they 
were living in (and proving it by knowledge of Estonian laws and language through the tests). 
Alternatively, the children themselves could be required to pass the tests. Only in response to this line of 
argument can one understand the High Commissioner’s concern that keeping the obligation of citizenship 
tests robbed the Convention of the Rights of the Child its meaning. In this way, the child’s right to 
nationality would be made dependent on the tests, as well as on the prerequisite timeframe of more than 
five years. Tests would be passed only when 'approaching adulthood'. The official response of the 
Estonian government was that granting citizenship to stateless children would rob Estonian citizenship 
legislation of its meaning with regard to the constitution and language tests.519 This argument was 
expressed even though the High Commissioner had just previously stressed that according to the Estonian 
Constitution (para. 123), international law prevails over domestic law if a conflict exists between the two.  
 
The High Commissioner referred to further integration-related arguments in support of his 
recommendation. He reminded that the Estonian Foreign Minister had stated that it is foremost the 
younger generation of non-Estonians who are eager and more likely to integrate into Estonian society. 
Surveys indeed illustrate that parents prefer their children to have Estonian citizenship, and attach great 
importance to their children’s knowledge of Estonian language.520 Consequently, it is unlikely that the 
recommended amendment in the Citizenship Law, concerning stateless children, would create a great 
number of ill-integrated citizens in Estonia. Moreover, as parents would have to submit the application, 
they would through this process express their willingness to integrate their children into Estonian society. 
Estonian authorities used the same argument of integration to reason the opposite. If families who were 
stateless were willing to integrate, by learning the Estonian language among others, they would not face 
any difficulties in passing the naturalization tests themselves.  
 
In turn, the Estonian government went into lengthy reasoning as to why granting citizenship to non-
citizens' children born in the country was neither a universal nor an OSCE obligation which Estonia was 
subject to comply with. While the HCNM stated that European states mostly complied with the European 
Convention on Nationality, the Estonian government pointed out that many did not. Among this latter 
group Austria, Norway, Germany, Malta, the Netherlands and Switzerland were mentioned. Moreover, 
particularly in respect to citizens of former USSR, many European Union countries held the position that 
these people were not stateless, as they could be registered as citizens of the Russian Federation.521  
 
While in 1997 Estonian politicians showed extreme reluctance in granting citizenship to stateless children 
born in Estonia, only a year later, in December 1998, the law was finally amended to allow for a limited 
application of the ius soli principle. In the Law on Citizenship, points 4 to 6 were added to paragraph 13. 
These points state that children born after February 1992 to stateless parents have the right to citizenship, 
on the condition that the child is under the age of 15 and that the parents, who are required to reside in 
Estonia on a legal basis for five years, file an application on behalf of their child.522 Former nationals of 
                                                 
519  Cf. Ilves Letter to HCNM, 4 June 1997. 
520  Cf. IOM 1997, p. 23. 
521  Cf. Ilves Letter to HCNM, 4 June 1997. 
522  Poleshchuk 2001b, p. 64. 
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 the Soviet Union are included in this category, but only in this particular context. The amendments were 
supposed to affect an estimated 6,500 Russian-speaking children.523 However, as a matter of fact, only 
1419 children had acquired citizenship on the basis of this condition since the amendment had come into 
force on 12 July 1999.524  
 
In a press release on the subject, the High Commissioner welcomed the adoption of the law on children of 
stateless parents, which he viewed to be more or less in conformity with his recommendations. The 
HCNM expressed his appreciation for the Estonian government, thanking it for coming to the 
understanding that a mere opportunity to apply for another citizenship did not make a person a citizen of 
that country, as Foreign Minister Mälk had also declared during parliamentary debates. In addition, the 
High Commissioner claimed he was confident that the new law would help to reduce statelessness in 
Estonia, and would also stimulate integration.525 
 
Thus by December 1998, the Estonian government had followed up also the last recommendation that had 
been made by the HCNM since 1993. At this point, one has to recall the reluctance in 1997 to implement 
this recommendation, expressed, inter alia, in Foreign Minister Ilves' letter to the HCNM dated 4 June 
1997. Whereas the Council of Europe did not played an active part in this issue after the monitoring 
procedure for Estonia had been closed in January 1997, both the EU and the OSCE had supported easing 
the country’s naturalization requirement for children. Granting citizenship to stateless children was among 
the short-term priorities of Estonia’s preparation for EU accession, listed in the Agenda 2000, which was 
published on 15 July 1997. Therein it was stated that the "Estonian authorities should consider means to 
enable stateless children born in Estonia to be naturalized more easily, particularly with a view to the 
impending entry into effect of the European Convention on nationality agreed within the Council of 
Europe."526 Moreover, the Commission stated in its conclusions the need to "accelerate naturalisation of 
Russian-speaking non-citizens and to enable them to become better integrated into Estonian society."527 
Thus, there are good reasons to assume that the involvement of the European Union in this issue, and in 
particular the backing that the EU gave to the recommendations of the High Commissioner, was a crucial 
factor for the success of the HCNM's involvement. 
 
 
5.3 Language Questions Back on the Agenda 
 
Once the amendment on stateless children to the Citizenship Law had become inevitable, politicians 
attempted a tit-for-tat game by striving towards tightening the language requirements. Estonian-language 
requirements for candidates were included in the amended Law on Local Elections in February 1998. A 
similar attempt was made in May 1998 concerning the draft law on Parliamentary Elections, which would 
have required fluency of Estonian from parliamentary candidates. The law was, however, not passed. 
Moreover, in February and July 1999, the language requirements for the private and public sector were 
tightened. Thus, the language question was back on the agenda. This provoked new comments by Van der 
Stoel at a time when Estonians thought that they had fulfilled all recommendations made by the HCNM.528 
 
In late 1998, the HCNM criticized the laws that set language requirements for parliamentary and local 
government candidates. According to his statements, the requirements unreasonably limited the equality 
of citizens. Although the law on language requirements had already been adopted by the parliament, the 
                                                 
523  Freedom House country report: Estonia 1999. 
524  Information provided by the Estonian Citizenship and Migration Board on 24 May 2002. 
525  Cf. HCNM Press Release on Estonia, 9 December 1998.  
526  EU Agenda 2000, 15 July 1997, p. 19. 
527  Ibid., p. 116. 
528  Cf. Ilves Letter to the HCNM, 4 June 1997. Therein Ilves states that 28 out of 30 recommendations had already been 
fulfilled. The remaining two, concerning the simplification of the constitution test and the issue of citizenship for stateless 
children, had been resolved by December 1998. 
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 HCNM had hoped that he could make a difference. He wrote to the Estonian President,529 and made his 
views clear also in the Estonian press. The High Commissioner again assured that he fully supported the 
position of Estonian as an official language, and that Russian-speakers would have to learn the Estonian 
language. He also stated that the Estonian parliament could establish Estonian as the working language by 
law. However, requiring a certain knowledge of Estonian from parliamentary and local government 
candidates would deprive citizens of their free choice to elect their representatives. In his letter to the 
President, the HCNM also referred to the UN Convention on Human and Political Rights (para. 25), which 
prohibits restrictions of citizens' rights on the basis of language. 
 
Estonians felt that they had been cheated. In their understanding, the HCNM had promised not to make 
any more recommendations after the Law on Citizenship was liberalized. To this the HCNM replied that 
he found all the existing laws to be by large in accordance with international standards and his own 
recommendations, and that he would not make any more suggestions on the Citizenship Law. However, 
he assured that he would still interfere in accordance with his mandate if Estonia adopted new laws 
concerning minorities that ran opposite to liberal principles.  
 
The HCNM also objected to Estonian allegations that the statements on behalf of the Russian Federation 
had induced his latest criticism.530 While the HCNM had made his confidential address to the Estonian 
President on 19 December 1998, the press representative of the Russian Foreign Ministry made a 
statement only on 22 December.531  
 
In fact, language requirements for candidates had been introduced already in spring 1996. The Law on 
Parliamentary Elections of 1994 stated in section 26 that candidates running for a parliamentary seat had 
to affirm by their signature that they know enough Estonian to participate in the work of the Riigikogu.532 
The Law on Local Elections of 1996 also declared, in section 3, paragraph 3, that a candidate had to know 
the Estonian language as set in the Language Law.533 The changes, introduced in the Law on Languages in 
1996, stipulate that candidates must have written and oral skills of Estonian, and that the standards of 
written language requirements will be set by a government regulation.534 In the draft, the requirements had 
even been spelled out in more detail, and were backed up by a control mechanism that would act to check 
the candidate's language skills. Exams would also be carried out if this were deemed necessary, a matter 
which provoked strong negative reactions from the representatives of Russian-speakers. These even 
threatened to hold parallel elections in Narva. On this background, the OSCE Mission to Estonia as well 
as several embassies undertook a considerable amount of lobbying in order to soften the language 
requirements.535 The HCNM on his part pointed out in a still unpublished letter to President Meri, that the 
language requirements ran contrary to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. 
Consequently, he asked the President not to promulgate the law.536 Indeed, President Meri refused to 
promulgate the law, claiming that it was unconstitutional. In his explanation, he claimed that the language 
requirements set preconditions to the candidates.537 The President referred also to the UN Covenant on 
Civil and Political Rights, section 25, which declares that every citizen should have a right to elect and to 
be elected without discrimination or unfounded limitations.  
 
                                                 
529  HCNM Letter to Meri, 19 December 1998. 
530  Cf. Baltic News Service 30 December 1998, Estonia's Ex-Foreign -Minister Sees Russia's Hand Behind OSCE 
Commissioner's Recommendation. 
531  Cf. Postimees, 12 January 1999, Van der Stoel arvustab jätkuvalt Eesti seadusi [Van der Stoel is continuously criticising 
Estonian laws]. 
532  Cf. Riigikogu valimise seadus [Law on Parliamentary Elections], 7 June 1994, art. 26, para. 12, point 1, as of 11 July 1994.  
533  Cf. Kohaliku omavalitsuse volikogu valimise seadus [Law on Local Elections], 16 May 1996, art. 3, para. 3 and art. 26, 
para. 7, point 1, as of 8 June 1996. 
534  Cf. Kohaliku omavalitsuse volikogu valimise seadus [Law on Local Elections], art. 48: Keeleseaduse muutmine 
[Amendment to the Law on Language], 16 May 1996.  
535  Cf. OSCE Mission to Estonia, Spot Report on Local Elections Law, 19 April 1996. 
536  Cf. Kemp 2001, p. 147. 
537  The parliament replied that the age limit, residence requirement and lack of criminal record were similar preconditions.  
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 The parliament was of the opinion that the President’s refusal to promulgate the law was due to political 
rather than juridical reasons. However, as the local elections were approaching and the previous election 
law was deemed unsatisfactory, the parliament agreed to change the controversial sections in the law on 
pragmatic grounds. However, the parliamentarians did not agree that they had been in conflict with the 
Constitution or international law.538 Thus, the language requirements remained in the law, but the control 
mechanism to check a candidate's language knowledge was omitted.539 After this mechanism had been 
taken out of the law, the President promulgated it as a political compromise and the law came into force 
on 8 June 1996. As the control mechanism was neither introduced in the law nor in the government decree 
regulating language capabilities, the changes were of no practical relevance for the 1996 Local Elections. 
Parliamentary elections were not scheduled before 1999. However, one should note that in November 
1997, the mandate of a Sillamäe city councilor was annulled due to her lack of Estonian language 
knowledge. Another councilor from Maardu was allowed to continue his legislative work only because he 
could prove in court that he spoke at least some Estonian. The HCNM did not comment on these cases, 
but the OSCE Mission was actively involved and reported on both of them.540 Thus, one could assume that 
the HCNM was informed about the implementation of the language requirements, but that he did not deem 
it necessary to complement the activities already undertaken by the OSCE Mission at that stage. 
 
However, the situation took a different turn when the Riigikogu passed new amendments to the Law on 
Languages on 19 November 1997, enabling the government to check the language abilities of 
candidates.541 After the Estonian Supreme Court had ruled this unconstitutional on the grounds that this 
stipulation was only introduced in the Law on Languages but not in the Laws on Local and Parliamentary 
Elections, the Riigikogu followed suit and changed the Laws on Local and Parliamentary Elections. 
According to the new amendment, candidates standing for election to parliament or a local council were 
required:  
 
a) to understand the content of legislative orders and other texts; 
b) to present reports on agenda, and to express their opinion in speeches and interventions; 
c) to put questions and make proposals (for a deputy in Parliament: to be able to make inquiries); and 
d) to communicate with electors, to reply to complaints and requests, to answer inquiries.542 
 
As in 1996, the HCNM urged President Meri in a confidential letter not to promulgate the changes to the 
law.543 Again, the HCNM claimed that the new rules ran counter to international law, notably the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.544 This claim was also supported by international 
scholars and by the OSCE/ODIHR Election Observation Mission, which monitored the 1999 
parliamentary elections in Estonia.545 However, this time the Estonian President did not follow the 
recommendations made by the HCNM, and promulgated the law on 31 December 1998. The changes 
came into force only on 1 May 1999 and, thus, did not apply to the parliamentary elections of 7 March 
1999.546 The law did, however, apply to the 17 October 1999 local elections. The new Estonian 
                                                 
538  Cf. Stenogrammid [Parliamentary debate], 14 May 1996. The amended law was passed by 70 votes in favor and 7 
abstentions on 16 May 1996. Latvia had established similar language requirements, and as a matter of fact, no-one had 
accused them at that time to be in contradiction with the UN Covenant. However, in April 2002, the European Court of 
Human Rights (ECHR) ruled that Latvia violated the European Convention on Human Rights by preventing the candidate 
Ingrida Podkolzina from participating in parliamentary elections in 1998 because of her alleged inadequate knowledge of the 
Latvian language. Cf. RFE/RL Baltic States Report, 17 April 2002, Latvia Loses European Human Rights Court Case, Right 
to Set Language Laws Affirmed. 
539  The only way to question an elected person’s language knowledge was by taking the issue to court. This policy is very 
reasonable, considering that otherwise officials of the state’s Language Department could have decided who could and who 
could not stand in elections. 
540  Cf. OSCE Mission to Estonia, Activity Report No. 108. 
541  Cf. East European Constitutional Review, Constitution Watch Estonia, Winter 1998; Poleshchuk 2001b, p. 72. 
542  Poleshchuk 2001b, p. 67. 
543  Cf. HCNM Letter to Meri, 19 December 1998. 
544  Cf. ibid. 
545  Cf. Thiele 1999a, p. 177, 1999b; OSCE/ODIHR, 31 March 1999. 
546  Cf. Riigikogu valimise seaduse, kohaliku omavalitsuse volikogu valimise seaduse ja keeleseaduse muutmise ja täiendamise 
seadus [Law amending the Law on Parliamentary Elections, the Law on Local Elections and the Law on Language], 15 
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 government under Prime Minister Mart Laar was quite reluctant at the beginning to revoke the new 
stipulations. In a letter dated 26 April 1999, Foreign Minister Ilves replied to Van der Stoel that, according 
to a ruling of the Estonian State Court, the requirements of certain knowledge of Estonian for candidates 
running for parliament or local councils were constitutionally justified.547 He even openly questioned the 
authority of the HCNM on this issue, declaring that: 
 
in light of the legal complexity of the issue, the best opinion would undoubtedly be to let the European Court 
of Human Rights rule on this issue should any further case arise regarding the conformity of the recent 
amendments to the Estonian election law with international standards.548 
 
Moreover, Prime Minister Laar declared that the recommendations of the High Commissioner were not 
obligatory for Estonia.549 In a letter sent by several Estonian MPs to the CiO on 28 January 1999, the 
efforts of HCNM were criticized "as being 'unconsidered, political in effect' and no longer serving to 
defuse situations involving minority issues."550 Things were also taken to the personal level: The idea 
forwarded by the Netherlands to nominate Van der Stoel for the Nobel prize were openly objected to by 
15 Estonian MPs.551 
 
Thus, 1999 was clearly a period of crises for the OSCE in Estonia. Alongside the HCNM, also the OSCE 
Mission was under strong attack from the Estonian government. The Estonian Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
demanded the Mission to be closed down, and even President Meri, who was considered to be a moderate, 
suggested that the Mission should be reorganized into a "center for educating youth in the art and science 
of conflict prevention."552 On this background, the Austrian Chairmanship of the OSCE for the year 2000 
developed a set of guidelines for the OSCE Mission. The Mission was requested to focus its attention on 
bringing the Law on Parliamentary Elections and the Law on Local Elections into conformity with 
international standards, by removing language requirements for candidates who ran for a political office. 
Moreover, the Mission was to address the amendments to the Language Law in the private sector and the 
implementation thereof (see below), as well as the support and the establishment of a regional office of the 
Estonian Legal Ombudsman in North-east Estonia (see chapter 5.4). Also, the further implementation of 
the State Integration Programme was to be monitored and supported. Finally, obstacles to naturalization, 
family reunification and residence permits were to be identified and removed.553 
 
These guidelines had been drawn up on the basis of input from the OSCE Mission to Estonia and the 
Office of the High Commissioner. Moreover, broad consultations among OSCE participating States had 
taken place, and especially the European Union had demonstrated that it wished these issues to be 
resolved. Already in its 1999 Progress Report, the European Commission had referred to the HCNM's 
view that the "the current text [of the law on languages] contradicts a number of international standards as 
regards freedom of expression, in particular those introduced by the European Convention on Human 
Rights, of which (sic) Estonia is a contracting party."554 As the language requirements for candidates had 
not been removed by early November 2001, the European Commission stated in its 2001 Progress Report 
on Estonia that, "although enforcement of these provisions is weak in practice, these restrictions affect the 
                                                                                                                                                              
December 1998, RFE/RL Newsline 30 December 1998, OSCE Criticizes Language Requirements for Estonian Deputies; 
RFE/RL Newsline 11 January 1999, Van der Stoel Again Criticizes Estonian Language Requirements for Deputies; see also 
Bollow 2000, p.172. 
547  Cf. Poleshchuk 2001b, p. 68. 
548  Citation from Ilves Letter to the HCNM, 26 April 1999, by Poleshchuk 2001b, p. 73. 
549  Deutsche Welle Monitor Osteuropa, 28 April 1999, Estlands Premier betrachtet UN[sic]-Empfehlungen als "nicht 
obligatorisch" [Estonian Prime Minister views UN[sic] recommendations as "non-obligatory"], Moskow, 27 April 1999 
(INTERFAX, russ., from Tallinn). 
550  Kemp 2001, p. 150. 
551  Cf. Päevaleht, 2 February 1999, Eesti ei tahtnud Stoelile Nobeli preemiat [Estonia not in Favour of Granting Nobel Prize to 
Van der Stoel].  
552  Cf. OSCE Mission to Estonia, official translation of Postimees, 7 May 1999, Possibilities for New Co-operation. What if we 
reorganise the work of the OSCE Mission. 
553  Cf. OSCE Annual Report 2001, p. 32f. 
554  EU 1999, Progress Report, p. 15. 
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 right of non-Estonian speakers to choose their candidates, in particular at local level."555 Consequently, the 
Commission concluded that "Estonia should ensure that the implementation of language legislation 
respects the principles of justified public interest and proportionality, Estonia's international obligations 
and the Europe agreement."556  
 
A week after this report had been published, the parliament finally passed the necessary changes to the 
Laws on Parliamentary and Local Elections on 21 November 2001.557 The abolishment of the language 
requirement also opened the way for the envisaged closure of the OSCE Mission to Estonia by the end of 
the year. The new High Commissioner, Rolf Ekéus, who took office on 1 July 2001, welcomed the 
abolition of the language requirement for individuals running for local or national office. This was what 
the office of the HCNM had long been promoting. In the statement made on 22 November 2001 he 
explained: 
 
The amendment to the Elections Laws brings Estonian legislation into conformity with Estonia’s international 
observations. More generally, Estonian law now ensures the basic democratic principle that, through their 
freely chosen representatives, the will of the people shall be the basis of the authority of government.558 
 
Thus, also this recommendation of the HCNM was finally implemented. This recommendation had never, 
as a matter of fact, been published as an "official" recommendation. The HCNM had played an important 
role in the combined international efforts to convince the Estonian government and parliament of the 
necessity to take these restrictions out of the respective laws.559 This was especially the case since the 
High Commissioner, alongside the OSCE Mission, had taken this issue up at an early point, bringing it to 
the attention of other relevant international actors, primarily the European Union. The effectiveness of the 
sticks-and-carrots game played by the OSCE alone, as well as together with the EU, should not, however, 
be overlooked. The guidelines formally presented to the OSCE Mission were, first of all, a list of actions 
that the OSCE expected the Estonian government to undertake before the OSCE Mission would be closed. 
At the same time, the European Union had bound itself openly to these guidelines, and backed this 
strategy up, inter alia, through its Progress Reports on Estonia. As will be laid out below, these EU-
backed guidelines and the EU's pressure in general were also crucial in defusing another crisis connected 
with the language legislation. This crisis arose also in 1999. 
 
On 9 February 1999, the Riigikogu passed an amendment on the Law on Languages, according to which 
an obligatory level of knowledge of Estonian language was established not only for government officials 
and municipal employees, but also for the employees of commercial and non-profit organisations and 
institutions, as well as for private businessmen. The rationale behind these amendments was to protect the 
rights of the consumers, as well as to ensure public order, health and national security.560 The most 
controversial provision of the amendments to the law was that entrepreneurs, employees of business 
associations, NGOs and foundations had to use Estonian at their workplace for the purpose of offering 
goods and services.561 
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 In two unpublished letters to Foreign Minister Ilves, dated 26 March 1999 and 12 July 1999, the HCNM 
criticized the law. He claimed that it allowed intrusion into the private sphere which went beyond what 
international standards allowed for.562 He also "raised severe reservations about the implementation decree 
concerning the private sector which he felt was overly intrusive."563 The European Commission not only 
supported the position of the HCNM as far as the question of minority rights were concerned, but was also 
concerned that the intrusion of the language issue into the private sector could have wider implications:  
 
The concerns raised by the adoption of this law go beyond the non-compliance by Estonia of the political 
criteria for membership on minorities issues and could conflict between the law and the obligations of Estonia 
under the Europe Agreement, in particular in the fields of free movement of persons, right of establishment, 
supply of services, capital movements and award of public contracts (Title IV and V of the EA).564 
 
Also the Head of the OSCE Mission to Estonia criticized the new regulations in an extraordinary open and 
harsh manner.565  
 
As the impact of the law depended on how it is implemented, the focuses of the HCNM, the OSCE 
Mission and the EU shifted to the government decrees for implementing the law. The HCNM urged the 
Estonian government to ensure that these decrees would be in compliance with international standards. In 
this regard, he also made a clear reference to the European Union, noting that it would be regrettable if 
this issue would become an obstacle in the negotiations between Estonia and the European Commission.566 
 
In his above-mentioned letter to Van der Stoel, dated 26 April 1999, Foreign Minister Ilves also referred 
also to the Estonian State Court. He assured the HCNM that the "government's Regulation on the 
implementation of the amendments will not be in contradictions with the relevant international 
standards."567 As a matter of fact, however, the implementation decree that was issued by the Estonian 
government on 27 July 1999568 was not what the OSCE and the EU had expected: 
 
An examination of the draft decree by the Commission indicates that the draft texts envisaged so far, suffer 
from a lack of precision in the definition of proffessions (sic) and that the language requirements are 
unjustified in relation to the stated objectives, thus constituting a possible restriction in the application of the 
Europe Agreement. The application of the law in the public sector could have considerable impact in some 
groups of public workers such as prison officials, of which around 40% are non-Estonian citizens and have a 
relatively low command of the Estonian language.569 
 
Finally on 14 June, the Estonian parliament relaxed the conditions governing the use of Estonian as the 
official language in the private sector.570 Article 21 of the Law on Languages now called for the 
justification of requirements concerning proficiency in and use of Estonian in proportion to the objective 
that was being sought, and stipulated that these requirements might not distort the nature of the rights 
which are restricted. Nevertheless, some questions regarding the implementation of the revised Language 
Law and the subsequent regulations571 remained.572 The OSCE Mission to Estonia therefore organized a 
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 seminar on "Incorporating International Standards in Enforcing Estonian Language Law" on 8 and 9 
November 2001. The seminar, which was also attended by a member of the HCNM's office, aimed at 
assisting the Estonian State Language Inspector in his staff training, as well as to enhance the 
understanding of the HCNM's recommendations concerning the implementation of the Language Law.573 
 
Thus, one can conclude that the involvement of the OSCE and the EU in the language issues that 
resurfaced were successful. As a matter of fact, the situation in 2002 is even more favorable than at the 
time before these issues returned onto the agenda. This effectiveness was mainly due to the combination 
of incentives that the international community had to its disposal in 2000 and 2001. What was foremost 
striking was the changed role of the European Union. Whereas the EU hardly played a role during the 
discussions in 1996, it was heavily involved after 1999. Moreover, the OSCE itself had "produced" a new 
incentive in 2000 by "sacrificing" its Mission to Estonia in exchange for concrete steps on the behalf of 
the Estonian government. As a result, the HCNM could operate effectively in 2000 and 2001, although he 
had come under heavy fire in 1999, and even though he had not made public his recommendations on 
these issues in 1999 and 2000 and, thus, had basically changed to an even quieter diplomacy than before. 
 
 
5.4 Creation of the Ombudsman Office 
 
Over the years, the High Commissioner encouraged the creation of independent institutions that would 
deal with minority questions in Estonia. Notably in his first letter from April 1993, he recommended to the 
Estonian government to establish the office of a "National Commissioner on Ethnic and Language 
Questions."574 He foresaw that the tasks and profile of such a commissioner would be to: 
 
take up any relevant complaint which he/she considers to require further attention with any government 
agency. He/she would also have to actively find out about uncertainties and dissatisfaction involving 
minorities, act speedily in order to help clarify gray areas in legislation and practice, answer to questions 
within a specified period of time (e.g.) two months and finally act as a go-between to the Government and the 
minorities in Estonia. He/she should focus his/her activities primarily on the Northeastern region of Estonia, 
specifically including his/her activities the Estonian minority there.575 
 
As a matter of fact, the Estonian government had already in its first composition included a Minister 
responsible for Inter-Ethnic Affairs. This position indicated that Estonia took minority questions seriously, 
and would deal with them on the highest political level. At the same time, the government's position was 
strongly tied to the official views of the state, which could be in clear opposition to the minority 
standpoints. Moreover, in summer 1993, the Presidential Roundtable for Minorities was established in 
order to enhance the dialogue between minority representatives and government officials. Despite having 
been a valuable forum for discussion and a meeting point, the Roundtable had little real effect or output on 
the minority politics in Estonia. The Roundtable made comments and amendment proposals on minority-
related legislation and policies, but its standpoints were not considered as particularly accountable. As a 
matter of fact, in February 1999, after the aforementioned amendments to the Electoral Law and the 
Language Law were introduced without prior consultation with the roundtable, and as they were actually 
in obvious contradiction with the recommendations the roundtable has issued on its own initiative, four 
prominent Russian-speaking members of the roundtable declared they would resign from this 
institution.576 Although this crisis was overcome in the following months, and although the Roundtable 
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 was re-organized in late 2001 under the newly elected President Arnold Rüütel, it has to be stated that this 
body was, in any case, a body for enhancing dialogue, but not an institution that could follow up on 
complaints. Thus, the Roundtable, like the Minister for Inter-Ethnic Affairs, could hardly act as go-
between to the government and the minorities in Estonia: Neither could be considered as an alternative for 
the institution that the HCNM had in mind. 
 
Therefore, the HCNM continuously proposed to establish the "National Commissioner on Ethnic and 
Language Questions" as an independent body. This would serve neither the government’s nor minorities’ 
interests, but see into the improvement of inter-ethnic affairs and the respect of human and minority rights. 
The Estonian government’s response was that the Estonian Constitution foresees the post of an 
ombudsman, but promised also to consider the High Commissioner’s proposal of a National 
Commissioner on Ethnic and Language Questions. It is true that the Estonian Constitution has a separate 
chapter on a Legal Chancellor. However, this chapter establishes only the function of a constitutional 
reviewer: 
 
The Legal Chancellor shall be, in conducting his or her work, an independent official supervising the 
accordance with the Constitution and legislation of the legal acts issued by the state legislature and executive, 
as well as by local government bodies […] 
 
The Legal Chancellor shall analyse the proposals made to him or her for amending legislation and adopting 
new laws, as well as for the work of government institutions, and, if necessary, shall present a report to the 
Riigikogu.577 
 
The Legal Chancellor’s office was instated in May 1993, after the Law on Legal Chancellor was adopted. 
According to that law, anyone could make statements to the Legal Chancellor and inquire after the 
constitutionality of varying laws and other legislative acts. Since then, many people have turned to the 
Legal Chancellor for help.578 As the law gives everyone the right to appeal to the Legal Chancellor’s 
office, non-citizens of Estonia also had the right to do so.579 However, a complaint could only be filed if a 
person considered that their rights had been violated on the basis of particular laws or acts which were not 
in conformity with the Constitution and international treaties ratified by Estonia. According to the law, the 
Legal Chancellor could not deal with cases that concerned the maltreatment of citizens by public offices. 
He did not, therefore, have the powers of an ombudsman.  
 
It soon became clear that the legal powers vested to the Legal Chancellor were insufficient for him to 
fulfill the responsibilities of an ombudsman. The Legal Chancellor could only solve cases where the laws 
were not in accordance with the Constitution, not if the public institutions had failed to implement the 
laws properly. This problem had been on the agenda in Estonia for years. The Foreign Ministry was 
pushing for the establishment of an ombudsman’s office as a result of international pressure on Estonia to 
initiate such an institution. As until then, Estonia would be under stricter scrutiny of the international 
organizations in terms of general respect for human rights. The Foreign Ministry, in fact, had proposed to 
the Ministry of Justice to draft a relevant law already in 1995. However, the latter did not come up with 
such a law before 1998. Varying interpretations of the Estonian Constitution caused this delay. Even 
though there was a general agreement about the necessity of an ombudsman’s office, there were varying 
opinions on whether the ombudsman’s office should be independent, or whether its powers should be 
vested in the already existing post of Legal Chancellor. One of the problems connecting the posts of Legal 
Chancellor and ombudsman lay in the fact that the former is a government official, whereas the latter is 
                                                 
577  Estonian Constitution, art 139.1. 
578  In the first year, in 1993, 264 inquiries were made. In the following year, this figure lay at 786, and by 1998 the number of 
appeals had risen to 1033. Cf. http://www.oiguskantsler.ee/stat/1993kuni_.htm (24 April 2002). 
579  For example in years 1993-1998 there were 35 complaints made concerning residence permits. The share of non-citizens 
among other issues raised cannot be determined as there is no differentiation made according to citizenship in the statistics. 
Cf. http://www.oiguskantsler.ee/stat/1993kuni_.htm (24 April 2002). 
 97
 supposed to be independent from the government.580 On the other hand, the Estonian Constitution does not 
foresee the post of an ombudsman. Therefore, some analysts considered that the establishment of an 
ombudsman's office would require amendments to the Constitution itself. At the same time, the paragraph 
on the Legal Chancellor states that he or she also has the responsibility to analyse proposals made to him 
or her with regard to the work of state institutions. Thus, linking the ombudsman’s responsibilities to the 
Legal Chancellor was in the end seen as constitutionally viable.581 Moreover, the Legal Chancellor already 
indirectly dealt with these issues, as people’s complaints to him often concerned the violations of their 
rights. The institution of an ombudsman was therefore to be attached to the existing position of the Legal 
Chancellor, creating a unique solution in international practice.  
 
Some Estonian politicians pointed that out of all HCNM recommendations, the office of an ombudsman 
remained one of the very few issues still to be implemented. In the overarching analysis of the Foreign 
Ministry, which was compiled for presentation at the OSCE Permanent Council in April 1997, the 
government explained that preparations for the institution of an ombudsman, who would deal with all 
human rights-related pleas, were in process.582 During parliamentary debates, the drafters of the law 
claimed that in the process of drafting the new law on the ombudsman's office, the OSCE Mission, the 
HCNM and the ODIHR were not consulted. However, apparently this was not the case. The CBSS 
Commissioner on Democratic Institutions and Human Rights, Ole Espersen, was also intensively involved 
as an expert. Experts of UNDP and the European Union were also informed or invited to participate in the 
preparations of the draft. Therefore, stating that the draft went through international expertise would go 
too far, but international participation was widespread.583 The HCNM replied to the plan to establish an 
ombudsman’s office supportively, but nonetheless with suspicion:  
 
I am of course aware that an Ombudsman can, in principle, perform many of the tasks which I hoped a 
National Commissioner on Ethnic and Language Questions might be able to undertake. This would be the 
case, however, if the Ombudsman would be allowed to extend his activities to all residents of Estonia, and not 
only to the citizens of Estonia. I hope that such a formula is being envisaged.584 
 
The HCNM was therefore mainly worried that the large non-citizen population of Estonia would not 
benefit from the ombudsman’s office. However, such worries were unfounded. Already under the existing 
functions, anyone could turn to the Legal Chancellor with a plea, irrespective of their citizenship. The Law 
on Legal Chancellor of 1993 did not limit who could appeal to the Legal Chancellor on the basis of 
citizenship. Many non-citizens had already addressed the Legal Chancellor, and issues included such that 
related to residence permits and aliens' passports. Thus, it was unforeseen that the new regulation would 
establish any limitations. This is also what the Estonian government communicated to the HCNM: 
 
The draft law on Ombudsman, currently under preparation in the Ministry of Justice, does not foresee any 
discriminatory provisions. All residents of Estonia will have a right to lodge a complaint, which [is] the only 
rightful way of doing it.585 
 
The HCNM was unsure whether the ombudsman’s office could fulfill all the functions a commissioner on 
national or language questions was to carry out as the HCNM pictured it. Russian deputies expressed 
similar concerns when the draft law was debated in parliament. Namely, the draft foresaw that some of the 
Legal Chancellor’s councilors would be employed regionally, so that all complainants would not have to 
travel to the capital Tallinn to file their statements. The Russian deputies proposed that the functions of the 
ombudsman could be divided on an issue-basis instead: minority rights, children’s rights, etc. The 
                                                 
580  Cf. Poleshchuk 2001b, p. 30. 
581  Cf. Stenogrammid [Parliamentary debate], 25 November 1998. 
582  Cf. Ilves Letter to HCNM, 4 June 1997. 
583  Cf. Stenogrammid [Parliamentary debate], 25 November 1998. 
584  HCNM Letter to Ilves, 21 May 1997. 
585  Ilves Letter to the HCNM, 4 June 1997. 
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 Minister of Justice replied that in practice, different councilors would most probably concentrate on 
different issues. However, establishing certain divisions by law would be too arbitrary.  
 
The law was finally adopted in February 1999, and came to force in June 1999. The previous Legal 
Chancellor’s term of office was, however, coming to the end, and the new ombudsman could take up his 
work only in February 2001. However, the fact that the appointment of a new person started also a new 
era of the Legal Chancellor, with his newly vested responsibilities as an ombudsman, should be seen as 
positive. Most importantly, paragraphs 19 and 20 in the law state the ombudsman’s powers and who can 
file complaints with the Legal Chancellor: 
 
§ 19. Right of recourse to Legal Chancellor to supervise guarantee of constitutional rights and freedoms of 
persons 
Everyone has the right of recourse to the Legal Chancellor to supervise the activities of state agencies, 
including the guarantee of the constitutional rights and freedoms of persons. 
§ 20. Exercise of supervision 
(1) The Legal Chancellor shall exercise supervision pursuant to law over the activities of state agencies, 
including the guarantee of constitutional rights and freedoms.586 
 
In the beginning, there was some concern within the OSCE and the EU whether the inhabitants of 
Northeastern Estonia would have equal access to the ombudsman's office. As a matter of fact, unlike an 
earlier draft, which envisaged complaints to be filed only in Estonian, the new law foresaw also the 
possibility to address the ombudsman in Russian.587 And although the response would generally be in 
Estonian, a real language problem did not exist. However, in the beginning, no offices were opened in the 
Ida-Viru County of Estonia, where the Russian-speaking population is concentrated. Only after the 
Chairman-in-Office included this question in the above-mentioned letter, and only after the European 
Union supported this demand,588 were the envisaged offices in the Northeast opened, namely in Narva, 
Jõhvi and Rakvere.589 Whether or not the Estonian government would have opened these offices anyway 
is, of course, hard to determine. In any case, it was not the HCNM, but the CiO, who interfered directly in 
this matter. However, the guidelines were developed by the CiO with the support of the Mission and the 
HCNM's office, and one could consequently assume that the HCNM had been involved to a certain extent. 
As a matter of fact, since the enacting of the Legal Chancellor’s ombudsman responsibilities, the number 
of applications to its office rose by fifty per cent.590 Also, many of the petitioners came from minority 
communities in Estonia. For example, in 2000 28 petitions made to the Legal Chancellor on the questions 
of citizenship and migration.591 The inhabitants of the Ida-Viru County make on average ten addresses to 
the Legal Chancellor every month.592  
 
As far as the Legal Chancellor is concerned, one should highlight that this institution enjoys wide public 
respect as a neutral and impartial figure, and that his statements are taken into account. He has also taken a 
stand on several important issues that concern the Russian-speakers in Estonia. Thus, the creation of the 
ombudsman's office should be judged as a step forward. It at least created a situation in which calls for a 
commissioner on ethnic and language questions would not be renewed, as had been the case in 1993. 
 
 
                                                 
586  Õiguskantsleri seadus [Law on Legal Chancellor], 25 February 1999. 
587  Cf. Law on Legal Chancellor (draft) 1998 and Õiguskantsleri seadus [Law on Legal Chancellor], 25 February 1999. 
588  Cf. Poleshchuk 2001a, p. 6; OSCE Mission to Estonia, Activity Report No. 128 and No. 141. 
589  Ibid., http://www.oiguskantsler.ee/avaldus/avaldus.htm#saavadesitada (24 April 2002). 
590  Under the earlier provisions of the law, in 1998 the number of petitions was 1033. In 1999, when the ombudsman’s position 
was activated, the number of petitions rose to 1530. In the year 2000, this figure reached 1595. Cf. Homepage of the Legal 
Chancellor of Estonia, at: http://www.oiguskantsler.ee/stat/ 1993kuni_.htm (24 April 2002). 
591  Cf. ibid., http://www.oiguskantsler.ee/lahendatud/lahendatud.htm#Kodakondsusküsimused (24 April 2002). 
592  Cf. ibid., http://www.oiguskantsler.ee/stat/statistika.htm#oigusharude (24 April 2002). The petitions can only be analysed on 
the basis of their topic and region. The entry of ethnicity is a private matter and is not accounted for in the statistics. It is 
probable that more applications are made by Russian-speakers, for example by those living in and around Tallinn, which 
concern more topics than citizenship and residence permits.  
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 5.5 Summary 
 
Summing up the High Commissioner's work in Estonia between 1997 and 2001, one can state that at the 
end of 2001, all recommendations of the HCNM to Estonia had been implemented by the Estonian 
government. Accordingly, the new High Commissioner, Rolf Ekéus, on 26 March 2002 told Siim Kallas, 
who had become Prime Minister on 22 January 2002,593 that in his view, no major problems exist in 
Estonia, and that he would focus his efforts in the country on supporting social integration.594 The progress 
already made in the integration policy after 1997, the establishment of an ombudsman's office in 1999 and 
the easing of the naturalization procedure for stateless children in December 1998 meant that the last 
recommendations drawn up by the HCNM in its first letter to the Estonian Foreign Minister as early as 
1993 had finally been implemented. The changes introduced in the legislation regarding elections and the 
use of languages meant that also the later recommendations of the HCNM had been followed up. Thus, in 
terms of effectiveness, this period had been quite successful. However, one also has to point out that the 
HCNM had been "saved" by the European Union during this period. After the Riigikogu had eased the 
naturalization process for stateless children, as required by the HCNM, a quite obvious reluctance among 
Estonian policymakers to accept any more recommendations by the High Commissioner emerged. The 
"assault" staged on the HCNM and the OSCE Mission in early 1999 by leading Estonian politicians 
effectively limited the OSCE's room for maneuver in Estonia. Given that Estonia had implemented all 
recommendations published by the HCNM between 1993 and 1998, and also given that Estonia had 
started an active policy towards integrating the non-Estonians into society, the acceptance of further 
OSCE scrutiny, whether conducted by the Mission or by the HCNM, was at an all-time low. Moreover, a 
secession of Narva or violent conflicts between Estonians and Russian-speakers in Narva or Tallinn 
seemed as unlikely as did Russian aggression towards Estonia. To be sure, Russian rhetoric against 
Estonia was still strong, but Russia by no means represented an immediate threat. Thus, unlike 1993, 
when Russian troops were still stationed in Estonia and when Estonia was also in urgent need for help in 
defending itself against Russian allegations that human rights were being violated in Estonia, there was 
not much incentive for Estonia to accept continued interference by the High Commissioner. Furthermore, 
Estonia was still bound by the OSCE principles and by the fact that it had subscribed to the HCNM's 
mandate as well as to that of the OSCE Mission to Estonia. However, this no longer appeared to be 
sufficient. In this situation, the fact that the EU effectively used the High Commissioner's 
recommendations as benchmarks for assessing whether or not the situation of the Russian-speaking 
population in Estonia was in accordance with EU accession criteria595 was crucial for the effectiveness of 
the High Commissioner. 
                                                 
593  Cf. RFE/RL Baltic States Report, 4 February 2002, Kallas Approved as New Prime Minister. 
594  Cf. RFE/RL Newsline, 29 March 2002, OSCE High Commissioner Sees No Problems in Estonia. 
595  Cf. Johansen 1999, p. 78; EU Agenda 2000, 15 July 1997, p. 12. 
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 Chapter 6. Conclusion: The Effectiveness of the High Commissioner's Involvement 
in Estonia and Its Conditions 
 
The High Commissioner’s work in Estonia has often been criticized for its inconsistency, which 
consequentially undermined the government’s co-operativeness and compliance with him and his 
recommendations. In the Estonian perception, it seemed that that no matter how much the Estonian 
authorities amended minority-related legislation in accordance with the High Commissioner’s 
notifications, the latter always came forward with new recommendations, which were often regarded as 
being increasingly demanding.596 This strategy created confusion with regard to the uniformity of 
international standards, and frustrated the authorities, who felt that they were never able to satisfy the 
demands of the OSCE and the High Commissioner.  
 
Indeed, since the beginning of the HCNM’s involvement, his focus on central issues that concerned him 
shifted on several occasions. However, these alterations seem to have been a response to the order of 
preparation and ratification of minority-related legislation, as well as to broader changes that took place in 
society. The issues of citizenship and naturalization were central until the Law on Aliens came into 
discussion. This, on the other hand, lost some of its importance in relation to some other legislative acts 
that came into being later, such as the Law on Language or the election laws. In addition to the HCNM’s 
responsiveness to the legal and social developments in Estonia, in his recommendations one can also 
notice a clear ranking of issues, based upon what was of concern and importance for Van der Stoel. Thus, 
on the controversy over the HCNM’s consistency in his recommendations, we can conclude that the shifts 
in his concern over various issues has been justified, as they correspond to shifts in Estonian legislation 
and society, as well as to the High Commissioner’s issue-ranking according to importance. 
 
Indeed, one can deem a tentative ranking of the issues which the High Commissioner intervened in. The 
most substantial issues in the HCNM’s recommendations concerned by far the questions of naturalization 
and the aliens’ legislation. With regard to the Language Law, the High Commissioner was less consistent 
in his attention and position, which affected the overall substantiality of his involvement in Estonia. 
Finally, the creation of the Presidential Roundtable for minorities and the ombudsman's office illustrate 
the HCNM’s influence on more instrumental issues. 
 
Whereas the HCNM was not active in the process of drafting the Law on Aliens in spring 1993, the OSCE 
Mission to Estonia was. The HCNM reacted with urgency once Estonian President Lennart Meri refused 
to promulgate the law in June 1993. The High Commissioner's recommendations were linked to conflict 
mediation attempts, as the Russian-speaking population had become highly agitated over the 
consequences of the planned Law on Aliens. The HCNM's recommendations bore fruits and were taken 
into account of in the amended version of the law. Many ambiguities concerning the refusal of residence 
permits were removed, and unemployment benefits and maintenance by other family members were 
accepted as sources of legal income. His recommendation to make the aliens' passport a widely-used 
document both for domestic and travel purposes was not at first considered by Estonian legislators. 
However, as the HCNM continued his endorsements, the aliens' passports were in 1996 indeed made the 
main identification document for most of the 300,000 stateless persons in Estonia. On several occasions, 
the High Commissioner turned his attention to the application deadlines (for residence permits and aliens' 
passports), and to the imminent need to postpone these. However, in this aspect the Estonian government 
itself realized the practical difficulties in the process of application and distribution of the documents, and 
planned postponements independent from the HCNM. The last major breakthrough was made in 1997, 
when the parliament decided to start issuing permanent residence permits to non-citizens several years 
earlier than had originally been planned for. 
 
                                                 
596  Kristina Mauer, Programme Coordinator of UNDP, in an interview conducted by the author on 2 September 1999. 
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 The changes proposed by the HCNM were seldom welcomed by Estonian politicians, especially among 
the opposition, no matter who happened to be in it at the time. It was almost a ‘must’ for each consequent 
opposition in the parliament to criticize the doings of the government in the field of aliens’ legislation. 
However, whenever the previously critical opposition forces got into government themselves, they did not 
rush to tighten the regulations, but actually took their own steps towards liberalization. This was true not 
only in the case of the aliens' legislation, but also concerning most other changes that were undertaken. 
This can be illustrated most powerfully with the example of the Pro Patria Party. While in opposition in 
the years 1995-1999, the party's members constantly and resoundingly voiced their views against the 
liberalization of the aliens' legislation. For example, when it was decided to change temporary residence 
permits to permanent ones earlier than planned, the party declared the step to run against Estonia's 
national interests. However, once in government after the 1999 parliamentary elections, the Pro Patria 
Party in turn had to convince the new opposition about the necessity of liberalizing the citizenship 
legislation, and had to prove that these changes were not contrary to national interests.  
 
Two factors explain such varying attitudes between the government and the opposition forces. The 
opposition focused more on the domestic audience. As the majority of Estonians was in general against 
making any concessions towards the Russian-speakers, the opposition always played the intolerance-card 
in order to strengthen its support amongst its constituencies. This strategy of ethnic outbidding was 
especially successful during the early 1990s, when the Russian-speaking electorate was still negligibly 
small.597 However, once the opposition parties came into power, they realized the importance of 
international pressure and the inter-relatedness of Estonian domestic success, for example in the economic 
sphere, and Estonia’s international reputation, among other with regard to the question of minorities. As 
the ruling elites realized at the same time that the international spectrum had more or less accepted 
Estonia’s ius sanguinis basis of citizenry and the consequent restrictive citizenship policies, they were 
more ready to accept amendments in the sphere of aliens' legislation. These were more practical in nature 
and their implementation was in general more acceptable to the Estonian electorate than changes in the 
citizenship policies.  
 
Both the initial adoption of the Law on Aliens as well as the later amendments, for example with respect 
to the use of aliens' passports, were also under attentive scrutiny of other international actors, most 
importantly the Council of Europe and the OSCE. These institutions co-ordinated their approach to this 
question informally in summer 1993.598 The CoE was thoroughly consulted after the President’s refusal to 
promulgate the law, in order to determine the law’s compatibility with international standards. 
Additionally, the CoE helped in printing the large number of aliens' passports once they came into 
common use. However, the role of the HCNM can be considered more important in the question of aliens' 
legislation, first because of his very swift and appropriate interference in the midst of the crisis of summer 
1993, and second because of his continued insistence on the issue over the years. 
 
In short, the HCNM made a right decision to move his imminent attention from citizenship policies to 
aliens' legislation already in the early phase of his involvement in Estonia. The most burning issue of 
diminishing the share of stateless persons in Estonia had always been on the table. However, as the 
naturalization process appeared to develop with its own speed, the issue of aliens' legislation was put 
forward by the High Commissioner. The latter issue had a more immediate effect on most Russian-
speakers in Estonia, and could thus have led to (as happened in 1993) heightened ethnic tensions in the 
country. Guaranteeing the large portion of Estonia’s population without Estonian citizenship the right to 
reside in Estonia, including the right to travel freely to and from Estonia, had to be solved before 
everything else. At present, one could conclude that questions relating to the aliens have been resolved: 
Most non-citizens of Estonia possess permanent residence permits, which save them from procedural 
hassles. Also, most stateless persons hold aliens' passports, which allow them to travel.  
                                                 
597  Cf. Metcalf 1996, pp. 224-230. 
598 Cf. Kemp 2001, p. 144. 
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 Thus, naturalization was of secondary importance, as it was clear that the process would take significantly 
longer. As soon as the general idea of Estonian citizenship politics was left to develop at its own speed 
and there was no more insistence on unconditional naturalization, the HCNM started to operate within the 
established framework, initiating less substantial changes within the existing citizenship context. The 
HCNM accepted by and large the residence and language requirements as necessary prerequisites of 
granting citizenship to Russian-speakers in Estonia. However, he made numerous recommendations on 
how to soften these same requirements, as well as on how to simplify citizenship acquisition for certain 
groups, such as the elderly, disabled persons and children. He had considerable success in doing so. The 
elderly and disabled people were partially exempted from the language test quite soon after the HCNM’s 
indication. However, as he had asked for a complete and not only partial exemption, he initially continued 
his recommendations on this matter. However, the issue was no longer discussed in public after 1997, and 
its seems that the HCNM tacitly accepted that further liberalization would not be forthcoming in this area. 
Thus, it is worth noting that on 14 June 2000 further liberalization indeed took place, as the parliament 
decided to exempt disabled people from both naturalization exams on the basis of a medical certificate.599 
As for elderly persons, it seemed that the HCNM, as well as the Estonian government and the Russian-
speakers, had come to the conclusion that the focus of the naturalization process should be on the younger 
generations, and that people who were born prior to 1930 and who had not been naturalized until now 
were unlikely to consider this step anyway.  
  
As far as the level of difficulty of the language test is concerned, the HCNM provoked Estonian criticism 
by recommending a lower required word amount in one of his later letters than in his first one on this 
issue. The Estonian Foreign Ministry was quick to point this out, and informed the HCNM that the 
government had already significantly, though step-by-step, lowered the level of Estonian required in order 
to acquire citizenship. In this process, the Council of Europe was again actively involved. It was called in 
for its expertise, according to which the level of language knowledge was lowered, and based upon which 
a concrete list of words suitable for that level was established. However, as the language requirement was 
set to the lowest level, the language test was in 1995 coupled to a test on the Estonian Constitution. The 
HCNM failed to address this issue in the phase when the law was being drafted, and his consequent 
attempts to bring about the simplification of the constitutional exam were minimal. His general comments 
on the difficulty of the test went to deaf ears, as the government kept insisting that the citizenship 
applicants’ best interests had been taken into account. Moreover, the Estonian Foreign Ministry declared 
that if the HCNM was compelled to criticize the test, he should be more concrete and point out which 
questions he considered problematic. This is exactly what the HCNM did. He mentioned three questions, 
which he considered unfairly complicated, and these same questions were indeed rapidly removed from 
the test by the Estonian government. Although the HCNM was thus in a formal way effective with his 
recommendation, one has to note that this step did not improve the overall content of the exam, and that 
the government started reflecting upon the general restructuring and reformulation of the exam only five 
years later. Thus, in substance, the effectiveness of the HCNM was relatively low in this particular 
question. The technical character of many of the HCNM’s recommendations had in fact both its positive 
and negative sides. On the one hand, the concrete form of these proposals made it easier for the Estonian 
government to implement the recommendations, and one could even argue that this example demonstrates 
that the HCNM’s recommendations were more effective if they concerned concrete solutions and 
proposals. On the other hand, the motivation behind the implementation remained for the most part 
arbitrary or superficial, and did not change the general policies. Moreover, some of the concrete 
recommendations of the HCNM were perceived by the Estonian side as inconsistent and even seen as 
raising the pole of expectations. Consequently, the HCNM’s general credibility was undermined. This 
trend was, for example, apparent concerning the above-mentioned Estonian language knowledge required 
for acquiring Estonian citizenship. In addition, the HCNM’s interpretations of Estonian legislative acts 
seemed to the Estonians in several questions overly suspicious. One example in this regard concerns the 
High Commissioner's fear that people could be denied citizenship because they failed the language test. 
                                                 
599  Cf. Poleshchuk 2001b, p. 59. 
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 As applications for naturalization would not be accepted at all unless the language test was passed and as 
the language test could be repeated several times, these fears were, as a matter of fact, groundless. 
 
The most extensively and enduringly pursued recommendation of the HCNM was related to the question 
of naturalization: Granting citizenship to stateless children born in Estonia since the declaration of 
independence. The issue was first mentioned by Van der Stoel in 1993, but was resolved only in 1998, 
after heavy legal discussions took place between the HCNM and the Estonian Foreign Ministry. This issue 
most illustratively raised the question of the HCNM’s timing, and whether he should have paid more 
attention to the level of preparedness of society to bring about changes. Many researchers have established 
a connection between the decision to liberalize stateless children’s opportunities to acquire citizenship and 
the tightening of the language law that followed. The sociological studies on the period indicate that 
Estonian society was getting ready to accept the idea of granting citizenship to stateless children, and that 
the Estonian government itself was planning to propose the amendment to the law. However, after the 
HCNM had extensively insisted on the issue, and the change was more or less forced upon Estonia with 
the help of the European Union, it brought with it a general rejection of the amendment, of the HCNM’s 
interference and, most dramatically, a drawback in people’s attitudes towards the liberalization of minority 
politics. According to the government, only months later the amendment concerning stateless children 
could have been made as an internalized and a widely accepted social decision, but the HCNM’s haste had 
undermined this.600 It has therefore been speculated that as the decision on stateless children was 
informally rejected, the legislators initiated another change, this time making the language law stricter. 
However, the question of societal readiness can be easily turned around. Had the HCNM waited for 
societal support in every issue he raised, he would not have gotten very far, as the attitudes of Estonians 
towards minority politics were usually stricter than what the political elites were willing to undertake. By 
issuing his recommendations and by mastering international support for them among the participating 
States of the OSCE, Van der Stoel not only put pressure on the Estonian government, but also 
strengthened the position of moderate forces among the Estonians by giving them a point of reference. At 
the same time, he was able to place the blame on somebody for unpopular legislative changes. Thus, the 
HCNM certainly needed internal coalitions of moderate and compromise-seeking forces for the 
implementation of his recommendations. However, instead of waiting tacitly until they appeared, the 
HCNM accelerated the process of societal readiness through his continuous involvement in Estonia. 
 
The regulations concerning the minimum language requirement for candidates running for local or 
national elections has been the only issue in Estonian minority politics in which, after initial abiding to the 
HCNM’s recommendations, this decision was later overturned. Namely in 1996, the parliament was 
planning to include language requirements and their control mechanisms in the Law on Local Elections. 
However, after the President refused to promulgate the law and the HCNM had voiced his critical opinion, 
the control of language knowledge of election candidates was left out from the law. However, attempts to 
include language skill control mechanisms in the laws on elections continued, and in late 1998 were 
successful. The HCNM reacted shortly after the alterations were made. However, he did not succeed in 
abolishing the language requirements for the 1999 local elections. As has been laid out in chapter 5.3, it 
was only due to the continuos pressure of the EU, as well as the incentive signaled by leading delegations 
in the OSCE Permanent Council not to prolong the mandate601 of the OSCE Mission to Estonia if the 
language requirements were abolished, that this "confidential" recommendation602 was implemented. The 
fear that Russian might be used alongside, or even push aside, Estonian in the Rigiikogu or the local 
councils remained eminent. The language requirement was therefore a core issue for the Estonians. 
Accordingly, the abolishment of the language requirement was counterbalanced by a decision to make 
                                                 
600  Interview with Katrin Saks, Minister responsible for Inter-Ethnic Affairs, autumn 2001. 
601 See for example the statement of Swedish Foreign Minister Anna Lindh on behalf of the EU presidency at the Permanent 
Council on 27 June 2001 (PC.DEL/475/01). 
602  This recommendation had surfaced publicly only indirectly, and was never officially published by the HCNM. As a matter 
of fact, the respective letter to President Meri has until today not been placed on the official HCNM website. 
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 Estonian the official language for local councils.603 As exceptions to this rule, however, the government 
could grant local councils the right to use another language to conduct business, if this language was 
spoken by the majority of the permanent residents in the locality.604 Thus, this decision was mainly a re-
affirmation of the legislation already in force. A similar development could be observed in Latvia in the 
following year. The language requirements for candidates in the Latvian legislation605 even survived the 
closure of the OSCE Mission to Latvia,606 and it took a decision of the European Court for Human Rights 
and renewed pressure of Western states, now brought forward in the context of NATO enlargement, to 
ensure a respective change of legislation also in Latvia.607 
 
The above analysis indicates that the HCNM was basically a firefighter who intervened when something 
had gone wrong or was about to. He was more involved in short-term conflict prevention, aiming at more 
immediate steps to correct laws or policies that negatively affected minorities. The most serious ‘fire’ was 
about to flame when the Law on Aliens was in the process of being adopted and promulgated. The 
President had done his bit to prevent an escalation of tensions by refusing to promulgate the law. 
Nevertheless, an outsider was required to mediate between the agitated Russian-speakers, who were about 
to become ‘aliens’, and the Estonian government, who was not about to let autonomy referenda to take 
place in the overwhelmingly Russian-speaking areas of the Northeast Estonia. The HCNM, having been in 
office for only half a year, was still considered an objective and neutral figure by both parties, and was 
called to ease the situation. Though still a novice in his new position, the HCNM reacted quickly and 
adequately to the crisis that was about to erupt in Estonia, and managed to commit both sides to mutual 
respect backed up by public statements. This time, the mutual distrust had been contained, but there the 
HCNM still faced a lot of work. 
 
Despite the HCNM’s concentration on offering concrete short-term solutions, he also attempted to bring 
about a long-term improvement in inter-ethnic relations as well as in the general trend of liberalization of 
minority-related laws and policies. Especially in the early phase of the HCNM’s involvement in Estonia, 
he stressed the importance of inter-ethnic dialogue and the creation of bodies through which dialogue and 
co-operation could be institutionalized. Despite his efforts, his effectiveness in this area was, however, 
limited to operational effectiveness. Indeed, a Presidential Roundtable for minorities was created during 
the height of the crisis in 1993, as recommended by the High Commissioner and the OSCE Mission, but 
the body was buffered up by representation of small minority groups in Estonia. Consequently, the 
Roundtable failed to fulfill the HCNM’s vision of an institution in which primarily the Russian-speaking 
minority could meet face-to-face with government representatives. Also the establishment of the 
ombudsman’s office was not exactly what the HCNM had hoped for when he recommended to install a 
Commissioner on National and Language Questions. Moreover, the ombudsman’s office was founded 
long after the HCNM had insisted on such an institution. The ministerial post responsible for inter-ethnic 
affairs had become a more important figure in each new government - a development which the High 
Commissioner welcomed, but did not really manage to influence. Also the Integration Programme was 
initiated by the Estonian authorities independently of the HCNM, although one has to concede that the 
OSCE as such was involved in the process leading to this programme through the OSCE Mission to 
Estonia. Primarily, however, the Integration Programme was not set up in order to please the OSCE but to 
promote the country’s accession to the European Union.  
 
                                                 
603  Cf. RFE/RL Newsline, 5 December 2001, Estonian Made Official Language of Local Councils.  
604  Cf. ibid. 
605  Cf. Dorodnova 2002. 
606  In this context, it is worth mentioning that the reactions of the OSCE delegation of the Russian Federation to the informal 
closure of the OSCE Missions to Estonia and Latvia, although negative in both cases, had been much stronger in the case of 
Latvia than in the case of Estonia, see OSCE PC.Jour/373 and OSCE PC.Jour/374. 
607  Cf. RFE/RL Newsline, 10 April 2002, European Human Rights Court Rules Against Latvia and The Jamestown Foundation 
Monitor, 13 May 2002, Latvia eliminates language qualifications for candidates in all elections. For continued Russian 
criticism towards the Latvian language legislation see, inter alia, PC.DEL/338/02. 
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 As laid out in chapter 5, the influence of the European Union on Estonian politics after 1997 was crucial 
for the continued work of the HCNM. At first, when Russian troops were still stationed in Estonia and the 
OSCE was playing an important role in getting them out, the Estonian government responded to the 
HCNM’s recommendations more enthusiastically. Also inter-ethnic relations were still less settled in 
result of the early steps taken with the citizenship and aliens' legislation. The HCNM served well as a 
mediator in these cases. However, once the Russian troops were removed and ethnic tensions de-escalated, 
Estonia became less willing to implement recommendations from the outside on how to manage its 
minority politics. The extent of co-operation between the HCNM and the Estonian authorities was also 
affected by the nature of the coalition government that was in power from 1992 to 1994. The leading 
party, Pro Patria, had been elected on the nationalist card, promising to make a clean slate in the state and 
start anew. This meant brushing away all remnants of the old order, among them the favourable conditions 
of Soviet settlers in Estonia.  
 
The consecutive governments, which were in power during the next composition of the parliament, were 
more pragmatic in their nature and thus complied more willingly with the HCNM’s recommendations. 
Especially when the Center Party was included in the government in 1995, several important changes in 
the minority-related legislation were initiated. However, also the latter governments from 1996 to 1998, 
which included parties that were positioned more to the right on the party continuum, such as the 
Coalition Party and the Reform Party, took the HCNM’s advice into consideration. Thus, the ministerial 
post in charge of inter-ethnic affairs became more active and capable after 1997, and brought about 
relevant steps in minority politics. These reached their peak with the national Integration Programme. For 
one, the attitudes of Estonian politicians were already being influenced by Estonia’s application for 
European Union membership. The European Commission valued the positions of the HCNM on the 
minority politics questions of the accession countries. Thus, the Estonian authorities conformed to the 
HCNM's suggestions in order to give a better impression to the European Union. Secondly, in 1997-1998 
Estonia was ruled by a minority government, which often depended in its decisions also on the votes of 
the Russian deputies in the parliament.  
 
The most recent period discussed in this study was characterized by a complicated combination of 
conditions based upon which the HCNM had to act. Once Estonia was invited to the accession talks with 
the European Union, the new coalition government of Pro Patria, the Reform Party and the Moderates was 
basically unreceptive to any other advice given than that of the European Union. Also the domestic 
pressure for the OSCE Mission to leave Estonia was on the rise, and it inevitably affected also the 
attitudes towards the HCNM, who was another representative of the OSCE. The fact that the letters 
between the HCNM and the Estonian Foreign Ministry or the Estonian President were no longer published 
officially by the HCNM after 1997 is striking in this regard. There was obviously a need to conduct a 
more 'quiet' form of diplomacy, as there was now less readiness to accept public criticism by OSCE 
institutions in public. The OSCE Mission to Estonia witnessed a similar experience. The Mission's over 
100-page-strong report on the aspects of the integration process in Estonia, which had been drafted in 
August 1998, was not cleared for distribution by the OSCE Secretariat until April 1999.608 
 
The interplay and mutual influence of the OSCE Mission to Estonia and the HCNM are aspects which 
cannot be overlooked. The two institutions are more than often mixed up not only in the minds of normal 
citizens, but also by the representatives of the political elite in Estonia. In several interviews conducted in 
relation to the current study, when asked about the work of the HCNM, interviewees would often actually 
start talking of the actions of the Mission. While the HCNM conducted his visits and consequent 
recommendations in Estonia rather quietly and according to the principle of ‘quiet diplomacy’, the OSCE 
Mission to Estonia was more vocal. The Mission was in constant contact with different state institutions. It 
also appeared regularly in the media and denoted any slightest issue of relevance in the context of 
                                                 
608  Cf. OSCE Mission to Estonia, Report on Aspects of Integration Processes in Estonia, August 1998, distributed 8 April 1999 
as SEC.FR/306/99. 
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 minority politics, to the extent as how many songs in Russian the song festival should include. Also, the 
constantly changing staff of the Mission made co-operation with Estonian officials more chaotic and fluid. 
Thus, if people were fed up with the OSCE, it was because of the Mission rather than the HCNM.  
 
However, there were also occasions when Estonian officials looked more favourably at the Mission than 
at the HCNM. This holds true for example in relation to the draft Law on Local Elections and the plan to 
include in it a mechanism to control a candidate's language knowledge. While the HCNM criticized the 
plan as discriminatory, the Head of the Mission did not find anything wrong with the draft. Such a 
difference in opinion between two different sub-institutions within the same organization did not have a 
positive effect on either one's public appearance. For the work of the HCNM as such, however, the 
Mission was of a great value. The Mission not only prepared the visits for the HCNM, but was also 
responsible for follow-ups. Thus, issues raised by the High Commissioner during his visits to Estonia 
were addressed again by the Head of Mission or regular Mission Members in their meetings with Estonian 
officials or representatives of the Russian-speakers. Moreover, the Mission reported to the HCNM on new 
developments in Estonia, and also briefed him on discussions in the Estonian press on the HCNM's 
activities. Former Secretary General of the OSCE, Wilhelm Höynck, even characterized the interplay of 
the HCNM and the Mission as the key factor for successful OSCE conflict prevention in Estonia in 
1993.609 Thus, although the OSCE Mission and the HCNM were not always consistent in their 
recommendations, nor united in their views on particular issues or tactics, the overall co-operation 
between the Mission and the HCNM was a clear asset for OSCE conflict prevention in Estonia. 
 
To be sure, not only in the cases when the Mission and the HCNM were of different opinion did the 
effectiveness of the HCNM suffer. Similar occasions occurred also with other international organizations, 
most notably with the CBSS Commissioner. On most occasions, however, the recommendations of the 
HCNM benefited from other organizations that held similar positions. This was for example the case with 
the Law on Aliens, regarding which both the HCNM and the Council of Europe were actively involved. 
Later on, the HCNM’s recommendations carried more weight if they were backed by the European Union. 
This apparently happened with the granting of citizenship to stateless children. Also, when Estonia 
amended the Language Law due to pressure from the European Union, and abolished the language 
requirements for private company managers, the HCNM welcomed the decision and gave a final 
evaluation that the law was now in accordance with international standards. After 1997, when Estonia had 
become less receptive to the recommendations of the HCNM, it was in fact the European Union, which 
through the adoption of the High Commissioner's recommendations, made sure that the HCNM kept his 
room for manœvre and ultimately also his influence in Estonia. 
 
There are several issues in this study, which might have deserved attention, but were not discussed 
because the HCNM did not address them. The HCNM only once touched upon the Russian-language 
education in Estonia, and then only to welcome the changes the President had initiated. Nor was the 
HCNM concerned with the issue of family reunification, which many other international observers and 
most importantly the OSCE Mission to Estonia had laboured over. Another unsolved problem that the 
HCNM could have addressed within his mandate was the schism of the Orthodox Church in Estonia, 
concerning the difficulties with recognition and conflicts over property. However, explanations can be 
found for each of the above-mentioned examples on why the HCNM did not interfere. These were not 
issues of high alert and the HCNM, as a firefighter, chose to concentrate on other riskier issues. For 
example, the plan to lessen Russian-language education was received with dissatisfaction among the 
Russian speakers, but did not raise tensions in a way that the aliens' legislation did. It was also not going 
to have an immediate effect on the Russian-speakers' lives. Moreover, the HCNM has in general been 
supportive of Estonia’s language policies, and acquisition of Estonian as the common language for all 
persons in the state would, in his opinion, promote inter-ethnic integration in Estonia. Also the question of 
the orthodox churches in Estonia affects far fewer Russian-speakers than some other, more general 
                                                 
609  Cf. Höynck 1994, p. 66 
 107
 policies. Finally, the avoidance of the family-reunification issue by the HCNM, though this is a very 
humanitarian concern, is most illustrative of the position of the HCNM. His main concern in Estonia was 
the large number of stateless people and the increasing number of people applying for Russian citizenship. 
The insistence on family reunification would have, however, run opposite to these views. Instead, it would 
have meant more stateless persons or Russian citizens moving to Estonia who would make the situation 
less settling.  
 
This brings us to the main conclusion on the HCNM’s involvement in Estonia: The HCNM has been more 
interested in advancing security in Europe than in promoting respect for minority rights. He concerned 
himself foremost and almost exclusively with the issues which had large-scale effects on the Russian-
speaking community in Estonia. Some other concerns, such as the above-mentioned family-reunification 
or minority-language-education issues, perhaps affected minority rights more than the issues that the 
HCNM dealt with. However, whereas the former issues could have caused extensive tensions and conflict 
escalation, which could have led to a situation in which Russia would have found itself compelled to 
interfere, did the latter not have the explosive output of ethnic unrest, which could have resulted in 
interference by the ‘kin-state’, at least not in the Estonian context. Thus, the HCNM was - especially 
during his early involvement - not so much concerned with the situation of the Russian-speaking minority 
in Estonia, but rather with possible reactions of Russia. He therefore also traveled to Moscow in 1993 and 
kept in contact with then Foreign Minister Andrei Kozyrev. The Estonian authorities failed, however, to 
realize this simple truth. Whenever they saw a connection between the HCNM’s recommendations and 
prior complaints on behalf of the Russian Federation, they suspected that the High Commissioner must 
have been representing the interests of Russia. More likely was that the HCNM was attempting to avoid 
Russia’s influence on Estonia, most importantly on its Russian-speaking minority. 
 
In conclusion, one could state that Estonian authorities implemented most of the recommendations made 
by the HCNM, at least partially, though this was always done with a great deal of grumbling and for the 
wrong reasons. Changes were made in order to improve Estonia’s international reputation, to increase 
Estonia's chances of EU accession or to get the OSCE finally off Estonia's back. However, changes were 
rarely made because of the acknowledgement that the changes would be for the good of the state and 
society, for the advancement of inter-ethnic relations in Estonia or as an integral part of security concerns 
in Europe. Nevertheless, they have been accepted and have been internalized to the extent that they are no 
longer questioned. Given the increasing integration of Russian-speakers into Estonian society and into 
Estonian politics, and given that discrimination on the bases of language or ethnicity could be quite 
successfully challenged at the European Court of Human Rights in Strasbourg as well as, in a few years 
time, at the European Court in Luxembourg, major setbacks in the future are rather unlikely. A low profile 
engagement of the HCNM and ODIHR, as well as a continued close scrutiny by the Russian Federation, 
will, in any case, ensure that remaining and re-emerging problems in the relations between Estonians and 
Russian-speakers in Estonia will be included on the international agenda also in the future.  
 
The question evolving from this kind of conclusion is, however, less directed to the future prospects of the 
relations between Estonians and Russian-speakers in Estonia, and more to whether we could label the 
HCNM's involvement in Estonia effective with regard to the definition presented in the introductory 
chapter. The conclusion that most recommendations have been accepted is only part of the answer in this 
regard. The notion that they have been accepted mainly due to the direct and indirect pressure caused by 
other international actors, namely the EU, provokes the question whether the High Commissioner's 
recommendations caused the established changes in the Estonian legislation. Moreover, one should 
wonder whether these recommendations and their implementation have contributed to the dispersion of 
the conflict constellation and to a sustainable reduction of the level of conflict.  
 
As far as the question is concerned whether the High Commissioner's recommendations caused the 
established changes in the Estonian legislation, the main factors enabling these changes next to the 
HCNM's influence have already been identified in the discussion above: (1) the growing influence of the 
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 European Union, (2) Russian pressure and (3) the readiness of moderate Estonian forces to change the 
legislation. As matter of fact, all these factors are intertwined, as is the influence of the HCNM and other 
OSCE actors, namely the OSCE Mission and the Chairman-in-Office. To start with the European Union, 
one has to state clearly that the EU was not active during the crisis in 1993. As an actor, the EU has been 
engaged in Estonia only since 1997. Thus, as far as the implementation of recommendations before 1997 
is concerned, the EU did not play an active role. After 1997 it was indeed the European Union, which 
caused, through its Progress Reports and its continued lobbying, the implementation of the HCNM's 
recommendations. However, without the HCNM's involvement and the continued reporting of the HCNM 
and the OSCE Mission, the European Union would not have had the detailed information and concrete 
recommendations at hand. Moreover, also the EU relied on the willingness of the Estonian political elite 
to integrate into the European Union and to accept the changes in the aliens' and citizenship legislation 
forwarded by the EU. Although the Estonian public was less enthusiastic about Estonia's accession to the 
EU, within the political elite of the country the integration into EU and NATO was largely undisputed. 
This was especially true for the right-wing parties that had come to power in 1992 through a strategy of 
ethnic outbidding. In the context of an integrationist policy, ethnic outbidding reached its limits already in 
1992. Even before the negotiations on EU accession began, the general attitude prevailed that concerns 
forwarded from the West should be considered seriously. Moreover, accession to the Council of Europe, 
which was regarded as first step of the longer way of integration into Western structures, was dependent 
on changes in the drafted aliens' legislation. Thus, the Estonian government was receptive to Western 
advice and pressure already in 1993. This readiness to accept outside interference in its internal problems 
was reinforced by Russian pressure at that time. Newly independent Estonia felt threatened by Russia's 
aggressive rhetoric, and most of all by the Russian troops stationed until August 1994 on Estonian 
territory. Although Russia very often provoked strong negative reactions in Estonia, and though its 
rhetoric and its reluctance to withdraw its troops might have been counter-productive to a certain extent, 
one has to see also that this pressure pushed the Estonian government towards accepting international 
monitors such as the HCNM and the OSCE Mission. Moreover, it was mainly due to the perceived wider 
security implications that the Western states and the OSCE got involved in the first place with such a high 
profile.610 Thus, although Russian pressure by no means caused the changes in the Estonian citizenship 
and aliens' legislation, it helped to pave the way for an active engagement of the HCNM in 1992 and 
1993. After the perception to be threatened by Russia had considerably decreased in Estonia, it was the 
European Union which helped to keep the HCNM in Estonia. In fact, the strategy of ethnic outbidding had 
been replaced to a certain extent by an "integration" outbidding among the Estonian right-wing parties in 
the mid-1990s. By pursuing the way of EU accession, the right-wing parties effectively limited their 
ability to conduct a radical policy towards the Russian-speakers. Attempts to follow a strategy of ethnic 
outbidding had to been reversed after the EU had backed the recommendations of the HCNM. The only 
political forces more critical towards EU accession, such as the Center Party, were at the same time also 
ready to back the interests of the Russian-speakers. Thus, a situation had been created in the second half of 
the 1990s when a radical policy towards the Russian-speaking population could only be conducted to the 
extent that it would not be questioned by the EU. As the EU took the recommendations and observations 
of the HCNM into account while drafting its own policy towards Estonia, the HCNM retained its 
influence on the Estonian aliens' and citizenship policy. The HCNM could, however, not have changed the 
Estonian legislation by himself. Thus, he needed the co-operation of those Estonian forces who were ready 
to block radical draft laws or to vote for liberalizing changes in parliament. As mentioned above, these 
were those Estonian parties who were ready to compromise in the citizenship and aliens' legislation in 
order to go ahead with the integration process with the EU. However, these were also parties and figures 
who had been more moderate than the radical forces from the beginning onwards, and who supported also 
the underlying ideas behind the proposed changes. For them, the HCNM was, on the one hand, a point of 
reference, meaning that they could demonstrate that their proposals had international backing. Secondly, 
however, they could blame the HCNM for imposing these changes on Estonia, as the majority of the 
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 electorate was against these changes. The decisions of President Meri not to promulgate the draft Law on 
Aliens in 1993 and other legislative acts in the following years might be recalled as example in this regard. 
Thus, the HCNM in fact limited the effectiveness of the strategy of ethnic outbidding.  
 
To conclude, one can state that the HCNM was not strictly causing the changes in the aliens' and 
citizenship legislation, but that he was a central figure in the configuration of national and international 
actors, which made these changes happen. The HCNM was certainly the driving factor in the 
naturalization and integration process in the last decade. The implementation of his recommendations 
would have hardly been possible without the support of the moderate forces in Estonia, the European 
Union, the OSCE Mission to Estonia and the OSCE Chairman-in-Office, just to name the main supporting 
actors. However, without the High Commissioner's involvement, these actors would have been left 
without their main point of reference. Thus, one could say that the HCNM caused these changes in a wider 
sense, meaning that the probability that they would have been forthcoming in the last decade would have 
been considerably lower, if the HCNM had not been engaged in Estonia. 
 
With regard to the question whether the HCNM's recommendations and their implementation have 
contributed to the dispersion of the conflict constellation and to a sustainable reduction in the level of 
conflict, we should recall that the conflict constellation had already been relatively dispersed in 1992. In 
the course of 1992, however, the Estonian radicals pursued successfully a policy of ethnic outbidding, 
resulting in the new citizenship and aliens' legislation that was discussed in chapter 3. As a result, the 
conflict constellation in Estonia became more ethnified in 1992-93. Thus, in summer 1993 Estonia 
experienced an escalated and ethnified conflict constellation. With regard to his involvement in the 1993 
summer crisis, operational effectiveness can certainly subscribed to the HCNM. His recommendation to 
establish a Roundtable was followed up in a critical situation. This helped to open new lines of 
communication between Estonians and Russian-speakers. Moreover, the intensive shuttle-diplomacy of 
the HCNM, which resulted in a face-saving compromise for all sides, and which was backed up by the 
confidence-building public statement of 12 July 1993, was an example of effective crisis management. 
Other examples of successful crisis management, although on a lower level of escalation, were connected 
to the process of application for temporary residence permits and to the introduction of language 
requirements for candidates running for local councils in 1996. In the first case, the HCNM, supported by 
the OSCE Mission, convinced representatives of the Russian-speakers in Narva that their plans to boycott 
the registration of aliens in a campaign of civil disobedience might provoke deportations, thus escalating 
the situation611 more than they intended. In the second case, the HCNM contributed, through talks as well 
as through his recommendations, that threats to hold parallel elections in Narva were not implemented.612 
Finally, the HCNM's intervention in 1999, when the language issue came back on the agenda, helped to 
prevent a process, which might have resulted in regressive developments after a more dispersed conflict 
constellation had already been reached. As the language requirements would have affected in particular 
Russian-speaking citizens, a more ethnified conflict constellation could have resulted from these 
amendments. Thus, it is fair to conclude that the operational effectiveness of the HCNM unquestionable.  
 
The second type of effectiveness that was introduced in the introductory chapter is normative 
effectiveness, which means that international norms and standards are introduced, and actors are socialized 
with these. As a matter of fact, by pursuing his approach to foster the naturalization and integration of the 
Russian-speaking population in Estonia, the High Commissioner referred from the outset to international 
norms and standards. In his first letter to the Estonian government, the HCNM expressed his opinion that a 
policy, which tries to assure a privileged position for the Estonian population would "scarcely be 
compatible with the spirit, if not the letter, of various international obligations, Estonia has accepted."613 
To soften his criticism and to underscore his argument, the HCNM went on to appeal to the national 
interest of Estonia, as such a policy, in the High Commissioner's view, would "involve a considerable risk 
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 of increasing tensions with the non-Estonian population which, in turn lead to a destabilization of the 
country as a whole."614 Consequently, the HCNM recommended to Estonia a policy of "integration of the 
non-Estonian population by a deliberate policy of facilitating the chances of acquiring Estonian citizenship 
for those who express such a wish, and of assuring them full equality with Estonian citizens."615 If we 
consider that the recommendations concerning the aliens' legislation were basically born from the 
understanding that progress in the question of naturalization was not imminent, practically all 
recommendations the HCNM made in the first as well as in his following letters derived from this core 
recommendation. This holds true also for the above-mentioned technical recommendations.  
 
As far as possible, the High Commissioner continued to back his recommendations with international 
norms and standards, and he referred also to Estonian legislation when he had the feeling that new legal 
acts or the implementation practice did not take these laws into sufficient consideration. As a matter of 
fact, the normative approach was compatible with both the Estonian approach and the one of the Russian-
speakers and their kin state. As mentioned in chapter 3, the Estonians primarily justified their policy 
towards the Russian-speaking settler community with a legal argument, more precisely with the notion of 
legal continuity. To be sure, the main foundations of this policy were of historical and psychological 
nature. As the case of Lithuania demonstrates, a different citizenship policy would have been possible 
without placing the idea of legal continuity under question. Nevertheless, one has to note that Estonians 
themselves introduced a legal argumentation into the discourse, and did not take recourse only to the 
historical misdeeds of the Soviet "occupiers". The Russian-speakers in Estonia, as well as the Russian 
government in their support, were quick to point to international norms and standards when defending 
their point of view. Thus, in the Estonian case it would not be fair to say that the HCNM introduced 
international norms and standards as terms of reference. They have been part of the discourse from the 
outset. However, their interpretation differed widely between the different actors. In fact, the Estonian side 
as well as Russia and the Russian-speakers in Estonia used legal norms more or less as instruments for 
defending their own position. A particularly good example is the argument brought forward by then 
Foreign Minister of Estonia Juri Luik to defend the reluctance to issue aliens' passports on a larger scale: 
"the number of persons who are deemed to be stateless [should] not be artificially increased",616 an 
argumentation which pointed at least indirectly to the UN Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness. 
This initial reluctance notwithstanding, Estonia started issuing aliens' passports to non-citizens in 1996 
and, by and by, all recommendations of the HCNM, which were sufficiently backed up by international 
norms or were complementary to state practice, were finally implemented. Two aspects next to the 
continuos influence of the HCNM and his reference to international norms and standards greatly 
contributed to this growing acceptance of international norms as basis for viable conflict transformation: 
(1) the fact that according to the Estonian Constitution, international law precedes over Estonian law and 
(2) Estonia's wish to integrate into West European structures, namely the EU. Thus, also in this respect, 
not all credit can be given to the HCNM alone. However, it can not be overseen that the HCNM 
continuously pushed the Estonian government in this direction. As far as the Russian-speakers in Estonia 
were concerned, at least their moderate wing also accepted international norms as a framework for co-
operative solutions after 1993. The "Legal Information Centre for Human Rights" (LICHR), which was 
founded in 1994 and which is basically a watch-dog for the rights of Russian-speakers in Estonia, might 
be characterized as the institutionalized proof in this regard.617 A good example for the general acceptance 
of international norms by the Estonians as well as by the Russian-speakers in Estonia is also the lawsuit 
filed against the Citizenship and Migration Board by the LICHR, with regard to the application of the 
immigration quota.618 In this case, the Estonian State Court satisfied the case of the Russian-speaking 
plaintiff with reference to the European Convention on Human Rights. Thus, one could conclude that the 
HCNM, operating in a conducive environment in this regard, was normatively effective, as he helped to 
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 introduce international norms and standards as frames for reference, and helped to socialize primary actors 
with these norms. 
 
This, however, leads us to the core question. Was the HCNM able to transform his operational and 
normative effectiveness into substantial effectiveness? In other words, did he succeed in a sustainable 
dispersion of closed fronts and in lowering the level of escalation? In fact, one has to conclude that the 
recommendations of the HCNM contributed largely to the dispersion of the conflict constellation in 
Estonia. To be sure, as the High Commissioner had accepted the core elements of the citizenship and 
aliens' legislation, his recommendations were not aimed at dispersing the conflict constellation in the short 
run. His long-term-oriented approach to promote the naturalization of those Russian-speakers who would 
be willing to integrate, however, helped to disperse the conflict constellation over the years. As more 
Russian-speakers became Estonian citizens, the old cleavage between moderate and radical Russian-
speakers emerged again, resulting in a differentiation of the group of Russian-speakers as an actor. 
Naturalization and integration are also a prerequisite for the de-ethnification of the political system, as 
only the emergence of a larger, ideologically-dispersed, Russian-speaking electorate paves the way for a 
ideologically-based, cross-ethnic coalitions. This is exactly what happened in the last years in Estonia. As 
the number of naturalized Russian-speakers had slowly risen over the years, also the size of the Russian-
speaking electorate grew.619 Today some 15 to 18 per cent of the electorate for the parliamentary 
elections620 and even thirty per cent for local elections, where also the non-citizens are entitled to vote, 
might be Russian-speakers. Accordingly, not only the Russian dominated parties and the Center Party, but 
also the Reform party, successfully campaigned for the votes of Russian-speakers in the 1999 
parliamentary elections.621 In November 2001, Russian-dominated parties even backed the Pro Patria-led 
(!) Tallinn city government in a vote of no-confidence.622 Finally, during the 2001 presidential election, 
which was determined by a special electoral college, it seems that the votes of Russian-speaking delegates 
from local councils were crucial for the victory of Arnold Rüütel over Toomas Savi from the Reform 
Party. Thus, in situations where just a few votes are needed to break a tie – which happens quite often in 
the fragmented political system of Estonia – the votes of Russian-speakers are important. This increases 
the bargaining power of the Russian-speakers and their representatives. As the Russian-speakers are a 
differentiated group and as they have a variety of interests, which are not based exclusively on their 
nationality,623 they are ready to back Estonian parties and candidates. Already back in 1995, one of the 
leaders of the block of Russian parties who competed in the 1995 parliamentary elections together, Victor 
Andreev, argued that his block "did not seek to promote and protect a distinctive cultural identity; rather it 
conjoined sectional parties working to articulate the broad spectrum of Russian interests."624 In fact, the 
political party cohesion of Russian-speakers has been already low on the level of local elections in 1993625 
- at a time when the society of Estonia was strongly polarized along ethnic lines.626 Thus, it seems that 
over the years a readiness always existed on the part of the Russian-speaking electorate to vote for non-
Russian parties, as long as they satisfy their broader interests. The importance of these non-nationality-
related interests rises as the rights of Russian-speakers are secured and the process of integration 
continues. The diminishing role of ethnic affiliations in the Estonian party system finally became evident 
in March 2002: The Center Party signed a co-operation agreement with the predominantly Russian-
speaking United People's Party, while the Reform Party and the likewise moderate Russian Baltic Party in 
Estonia merged.627 Given that the Center Party and the Reform Party formed a minority government in late 
2001, the moderate Russian-speaking forces are now, for the first time officially, although only indirectly, 
part of a government coalition. For the upcoming 2002 local elections, however, a pre-election alliance of 
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 Russian parties has been formed, indicating that the process of de-ethnification of party politics will be a 
rocky one.628 
 
By helping to reframe the Estonian citizenship and aliens' legislation, the High Commissioner paved the 
way for the integration of the Russian-speaking population. This process, however, has just started and 
needs to be continued in the upcoming years. Currently, the naturalization process is still slow. As a 
matter of fact, the number of newly naturalized citizens has come down from 9,986 in 1998 to 3,090 in 
2001.629 Given that around 180,000 Russian speakers without any citizenship reside today in Estonia, the 
naturalization process would take two generations, if continued at this speed. As children of stateless 
persons will receive Estonian citizenship through a simplified procedure, and as the final exams in 
Estonian at schools and high schools were equated since 2000 with the naturalization test,630 also children 
of Russian citizens residing in Estonia might find it easier to apply for Estonian citizenship than their 
parents. Moreover, the old generation of non-integrable persons will pass away over the years and, thus, it 
is quite probable that the percentage of stateless persons and foreigners will decrease much faster over the 
next ten to twenty years than the current naturalization rate indicates. The integration of the younger 
generation of Russian-speakers and the increase of the Russian-speaking electorate over the next ten years 
opens the way to a further dispersion of the conflict constellation and finally to a transformation of the 
conflict itself.  
 
As Estonians still see such a development critically, setbacks are, however, still possible. The attempt to 
raise language requirements in the economic and political field in 1999 was such a setback, which 
threatened to re-increase the ethnification of the conflict constellation. Moreover, as Järve631 argues, the 
Estonian Constitution defines Estonia practically as an ethnic democracy, in which it is the duty of all 
citizens (regardless of their ethnicity) to preserve the Estonians as an ethnic group. This dilemma, 
comprised of an increased number of naturalizations of non-Estonians in the future and a continued 
reluctance on the side of the Estonians to grant these non-Estonians a greater influence in the formation of 
Estonian politics, might, however, very well be resolved in the long run through the assimilation of the 
younger generations of non-Estonians. As a matter of fact, Laitin presumes that the younger generations of 
Russian-speakers might choose to assimilate at least linguistically, as they anticipate economic benefits 
for themselves and their children.632 Such an outcome might lead indeed to a sustainable transformation of 
the current conflict. However, this is a long-term prospect and in the short- and middle-term, setbacks and 
processes of intensified re-ethnification can not be ruled out. Preventing such setbacks in the upcoming 
years will therefore be a continuous task for preventive actors in Estonia. 
                                                 
628  Notably the Russian Baltic Party in Estonia is not part of this alliance, see RFE/RL Newsline, 27 March 2002, Four Russian 
Parties in Estonia Conclude Agreements for Elections. 
629  Cf. http://www.mig.ee/eng/press/stat_otused.html (30 May 2002) 
630  Cf. Poleshchuk 2001a, p. 16. 
631  Cf. Järve 2000, p.7. 
632  Cf. ibid., p. 11f. and Laitin 1998. 
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